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NOTICE: This volume contains a representative selection of material previously disseminated in softcopy format.

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Albania: ATA Reports DIA Director's Visit to Tirana

AU2806100096 Tirana ATA in English 1152 GMT 27 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tirana, June 27 (ATA)—The director of the Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) Patrick Hughes paid an official visit to Albania in the context of cooperation between the Albanian and U.S. Governments.

The visit aims at promoting the cooperation between the armies of the two countries.

He held separate meetings with Defence Minister Safet Zhulali and head of the National Information Service Bashkim Gazidede.

Albania: Meksi Speaks to Greek Leaders at Papandreou Funeral

AU2806101396 Tirana ATA in English 1139 GMT 27 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tirana, June 26 (ATA)—Albanian prime Minister Aleksander Meksi attended the funeral of Andreas Papandreou a well-known personality of the Greek policy, chairman of PASOK, former Greek Prime Minister, statesman and a world wide respected figure. Meksi on behalf of the Albanian Government expressed his grief and condolences to the late's family members and to the high officials of the Greek Government and state.

Making use of his presence there, Meksi met and talked with President of Cyprus Kliridhis, Dutch prime minister, Bulgarian Prime Minister Videnov, Macedonian deputy prime minister, German Foreign Minister Kinkel, Greek Foreign Minister Pangalos, Belgian defence minister, Croatian Foreign Minister Granic, Romanian education minister and others.

Meksi also had a special meeting with Greek Prime Minister Konstandinos Simitis, to whom after expressing the condolences of Albanian president and government, once more, expressed Albania's readiness and will to enlarge the bilateral cooperation in all fields especially in business, road building in the context of cross-border and interegional program, in the field of energy, transport, customs and others. Simitis voiced the Greek Government commitment to raise to a new level the relations with Albania in the benefit and development of both countries. He stressed the importance and seriousness the Greek Government will pay in the future to the stabilisation of Albanians who work and live in Greece.

"For the Greek Government the status of Albanians in Greece is important and a priority which will be resolved in the near future," Simitis said. They talked on the necessity for closer cooperation in the region in order to offer Balkan peace and prosperity. Meksi invited his counterpart for a visit to Albania.

In the meeting with Greek Foreign Minister Pangalos, the latter greeted Meksi for the victory of elections. Pangalos once more voiced the possibilities of further development of bilateral cooperation.

German Foreign Minister Kinkel after greeting Meksi on the victory of elections voiced the German support for a deepening of reforms and improvement of economic welfare and democracy in Albania.

The Dutch premier greeted the democratic developments in Albania and its economic increase. He said his country is ready to help Albania in its relations with European Union and according of funds for Albania. In the context of its leading the rotating presidency during the second semester of the year they will support Albania's association into the EU.

Meksi also talked to the Cyprus president about the possible concrete cooperation in tourism, seasonal working for Albanians in Cyprus and increase of contacts between both Chambers of Commerce. He asked a new impetus for the business relations between both countries and increase of the Cyprus investments for Albania.

Albania: Press Welcomes Resolution on Elections

AU2806111096

[FBIS Report] The Albanian newspapers of all political allegiances on 27 June welcome the resolution of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe on the Albanian elections, passed in Strasbourg on 26 June. The papers also carry interviews and statements containing overwhelmingly positive comments by leaders of the political parties.

Rezear Xhaxhiu, the Strasbourg correspondent of the independent GAZETA SHQIPTARE, writes in a 900-word report on page three entitled "Change the Laws and Think About Elections," "Parliament should start work and improve the legal framework, and the parties should later sit down and think about new elections. This was the final result of the three days devoted to Albania at the Council of Europe. The resolution approved yesterday evening included only one alteration to the draft approved one day before. It recognizes the assembly that resulted from the 26 May elections and calls for the establishment of a roundtable, although prescribing no time scale, which will assemble the Albanian parties in order to discuss new elections after the introduction of legal amendments according to the recommendations of the OSCE and the Council of Europe. For its future relations with Albania, the Council of Europe has proposed representatives to be sent to the local elections; help for the Army, the police, and the judiciary; and the repeal of the Antigenocide Law. The stand by the Council of Europe has been welcomed by the government and the opposition alike. For Shehu, it has legitimized the newly elected parliament, and for the opposition it leaves the road open for new elections."

The progovernment ALBANIA carries on page three a 300-word editorial with the headline "Dokle Votes for a Return to Parliament—The Unanimously Approved Resolution Recognizes Parliament's Legitimacy and Calls for the Opposition To Return to Parliamentary Life." The editorial states: "Socialist Party Deputy Chairman Namik Dokle, member of Albania's permanent delegation of the Council of Europe, yesterday voted alongside the other deputies of the Assembly of the Council of Europe in favor of the resolution on the elections in Albania, which recognizes the legitimacy of the parliament emerging from the 26 May elections and calls on the left-wing opposition to return to parliament to continue political dialogue there. The resolution puts an end to the hopes of the left for a repeat of the elections and gives elbowroom for the political action of democratic forces to decommunistify [dekomunistifikimi] Albanian society. It appears that yesterday's vote by the Socialist deputy chairman is the start of a movement within the Socialist Party [PS] to block Chairman Nano's efforts for a purge at the congress. The adoption of the European stand by a deputy chairman of this party who has been an outstanding supporter of its conservative wing means that the Socialists' despair and pessimism extends far beyond questions of the party's survival. It appears that Dokle discovered at Strasbourg that the Socialists' only hope of survival lies in adapting to European attitudes. After this public step, it remains for Dokle to return to Tirana and to seriously discuss with his colleagues the question of participation in the new parliament, not only because this might once again make him a member of the parliamentary delegation in Strasbourg, but because after September, when Nano will send his doom-laden message from prison, Dokle and his comrades will be among the most unfortunate of Albania's unemployed, without even years of military service behind them to provide them with an honorable discharge. It is said that Dokle's decision yesterday was also silently approved by deputy Chairman Pellumbi, who is in Strasbourg as a party representative, and that the other two PS deputy chairmen in Tirana are also in agreement. The 'anti-Nano' and 'anti-Center Pole' aspects of this decision seem to be its most surprising ingredients."

The Center Pole's POLI I QENDRES carries on page three a 900-word editorial entitled "New Dialogue, New Elections" The editorial states, "Yesterday in the Assembly of the Council of Europe was the day when Europe put on trial the electoral farce of 26 May and the obstinacy of the Democratic Party [PD] and President Berisha. The deputies present in the hall almost without exception denounced the electoral fraud of 26 May in Albania and the force used in the polling stations and against the leaders of the opposition two days later. New phrases such as 'the Albanian precedent' and 'the Albanian case' appeared in the vocabulary of the Council of Europe deputies, becoming synonyms for the serious distortion of democracy in Albania." The editorial continues, "As usual, Pjeter Arbnori yesterday used the rostrum of the Council of Europe to attack the Albanian opposition, as if it had been the opposition that had sent armed men to every polling station and not his own party. It seems that Arbnori exaggerated to such an extent that he obliged Lord Finsberg to interject, 'I would prefer not to hear Mr. Arbnori's attacks on the opposition here in front of the assembly.' Many deputies who took the floor said that a gulf has now opened between Albania an the Council of Europe. The deputies of the new democracies of the former communist countries seemed to be most vociferous, not doubt looking at the Albanian cancer with great anxiety." The editorial concludes, "In the end, a resolution about the elections in Albania was approved, asking for a compromise solution among the Albanian political parties and calling for all the country's legislation to be brought up to European standards as a prelude to new and early elections. This is the basic message of the Council of Europe resolution, a message welcomed by the opposition forces. The PD bosses, aware of the extent of their vote-rigging, were prepared for a harsher attitude. They are naively boasting as if the Council of Europe had hung a medal on their chest for the great deception of 26 May. Like a drowning man clutching at a straw, they are clinging a phrase in the resolution that gives the green light to the new parliament of the police. However, they forget that this is only a compromise solution to pave the way to legislative changes that will make it possible for the repeat elections to be based on the standards of the Council of Europe. The game has only begun."

The Socialist Party's ZERI I POPULLIT carries on page three a 700-word commentary by Alfred Dalipi entitled "Resolution on Albanian Elections Approved — European Trial for Berisha's Rule" which states, "After yesterday's trial at which Tritan Shehu, Ali Spahia, and Pjeter Arbnori stood on trial in front of 120 deputies of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, any formula for overcoming the crisis found by the PD alone would constitute a further abuse and would create a new precedent. The parliamentarians who discussed the Albanian case yesterday called the political 'trick' played by the PD on the Albanians at the polls a serious burden that weighed upon them themselves too, for having placed their confidence in the PD. All speakers openly expressed their fear of the danger that the parliament announced by President Berisha's decree might pose as being a legislature composed of only one party. No member of the opposition will be present in the Assembly of the Council of Europe either." The editorial concludes. "With the response issued yesterday and the condemnation of the Albanian authorities by both the left and the right, the support of the PD from the 'big shots' has also come to an end. Berisha's sole chance of political survival lies in giving the green light of approval to the resolution of the European Parliament passed one week ago, the resolution of the Council of Europe passed yesterday, and the declarations of the U.S. State Department. The decisions embodied in the resolution of the Council of Europe, so important for the continuity of democratic processes and so far not accepted by the officials of Tirana, could burden Albania with the guilt of disobeying international institutions."

The Republican Party's REPUBLIKA carries on page one a 500-word commentary by "A.D." under the headline, "Europe Says It Again: 'Sit Down at a Table!'" The commentary concludes, "Although not put in so many words, the Council of Europe's resolution is a 'tweak on the ear' for the government and the ruling party, which must draw back from authoritarianism and control their tendencies to monopolize everything positive and to pour scorn on their political partners. Europe is also against the idea of 'street politics' that the left-wing opposition has advocated in the belief that it will achieve its aims through rallies and mass protests.. Authoritarianism on one hand and what is called 'street politics' on the other both undermine the kind of compromise on which Europe and the United States insisted immediately after the events associated with the 26 May elections. There can be no hope of success in finding a compromise without surrendering the maximal demands that emerged as a result of the 'strong line.' The resolution of the Council of Europe must make the PD give up its eulogies and vacuous propaganda about 'stupendous successes.' It must force it to admit the defects that exist in the legal framework surrounding the elections and to sit down at a table with others in order to make the necessary corrections, which will fortunately be inspected by Europe. The same also holds true for the Socialists and their partners in the boycott, who carry no less responsibility for the precipitation of the situation on 26 May."

Bulgaria: Greek Ambassador Summoned About Pomak Campaign

AU2806130596 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 26 Jun 96 p 1

[Article by Tanya Koleva: "Bulgarian Socialist Party Awaits an Official View From Athens Concerning the 'Pomak Nation'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] On 25 June, Foreign Minister Georgi Pirinski received on his own initiative Greek Ambassador Sidhelis in connection with reports that official personages in our neighbor's country have made statements in support of the thesis of the so-called Pomak nation and Pomak community. In response to Pirinski's request for explanations concerning the Greek Government's official position on the issue, Ambassador Sidhelis said that Greece "has not and does not support" theses and claims of this kind.

We are waiting for an official view from the Greek authorities regarding the campaign to promote a "Pomak nation," Georgi Purvanov told journalists yesterday. The BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party] deputy chairman was adamant that the party, as always, will oppose both the attempts to Turkicize the Pomaks in Bulgaria and the present campaign on the part of Greece to distort the self-awareness of this section of the population so as to promote some kind of "Pomak ethnic community."

Nevertheless, we should also see the errors in our own house, Purvanov added. In his opinion, Bulgarian policy toward this section of the population has been inconsistent and flawed by costly mistakes.

Bulgaria: Tirana Ambassador Said Threatening To Kill Staff

AU2706132896 Sofia KONTINENT in Bulgarian 25 Jun 96 pp 1, 7

[Unattributed report: "Our Ambassador in Tirana Threatens Six People With Death"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Our ambassador in Tirana is to be interrogated in connection with murder threats, slander, and financial abuses.

Bulgarian Foreign Ministry Spokesman Pantaley Karasimeonov announced that a team from the Foreign Ministry, counterintelligence, and the Presidency are leaving for Albania to investigate allegations made against Ambassador Stefan Naumov.

It has reportedly been confirmed that Bulgarian and local "strong-arm men" have been following our embassy diplomats in cars. Naumov himself reportedly travels with two bodyguards.

The investigation has been mounted following a letter of complaint from the technical personnel of our diplomatic mission. The letter alleges that the ambassador and his wife threatened the six members of staff with death at a reception to mark the victory of Sali Berisha's party in the parliamentary elections. The threat was transmitted to some Albanians at the reception as a kind of "insurance."

The Bulgarians' bones were to be strewn in the mountains and none of them would cross the border of Mother Albania alive, the ambassador's wife said in an English translation of the threat.

We fear for the lives of our families, the letter of complaint states. The letter was sent 10 days ago to the president, National Assembly chairman, the prime minister, and the foreign minister. It further accuses Ambassador Naumov of spreading insults, slanders, and intrigues among the embassy staff. Naumov is said to have accused his colleagues of writing denunciations against him "as the only representative of democracy." The letter alleges that the ambassador told high Albanian civil servants that only unprofessional people were working in the embassy.

Spokesman Karasimeonov said that the Foreign Ministry had tried to contact Ambassador Naumov, but was unable to locate him. "If the facts against the ambassador are confirmed, we will also inform the prosecution service," Karasimeonov added.

The Foreign Ministry has asked President Zhelev to sign a decree recalling Naumov. The cabinet reportedly decided on this several months ago. Ambassador Naumov has been in Tirana for over six years, and his term of duty expired long ago.

Bulgaria: Ambassador to Tirana Rejects Complaints

AU2706140096 Sofia KONTINENT in Bulgarian 25 Jun 96 p 7

[Interview with Bulgarian Ambassador to Albania Stefan Naumov by Plamen Kulinski; place and date not given: "They Will Eliminate Me"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Kulinski] Mr. Naumov, what is your comment on the complaints lodged against you and your family?

[Naumov] I am surprised by these letters, and I want to state immediately that they do not correspond to the truth.

I have never threatened anyone, although I have grounds for seeking revenge, for example against the driver who, in November 1994, almost beat up my wife and myself and against whom a case has been brought for premeditated murder. On the eve of the elections in Albania, a group was sent on a mission to eliminate me physically should the Socialists win....

[Kulinski] What is the reason for all this?

[Naumov] The purpose of the entire campaign is clear: It is to put psychological pressure on me and my family to force me to give up my post, because the president has issued no decree to relieve me. This is the logic behind all the reports against me in the Bulgarian media.

[Kulinski] You campaigned for Berisha in the elections....

[Naumov] That is utter nonsense. I am a professional diplomat and have worked in the Foreign Ministry since 1970. Can you really imagine that I could act in such a naive manner?

[Kulinski] Are you aware that a special commission will investigate the complaints against you?

[Naumov] I even asked for a commission to be sent myself, to establish that the allegations in the reports against me have nothing in common with the truth. People came from Sofia unofficially, made inquiries, but nothing happened....

I repeat, they want to discredit me, finish me off by psychological pressure, and make me surrender and give up my post. However, I have no grounds to be troubled or to give in to the pressure.

[Kulinski] Is the rumor true that you will not return to Bulgaria when your tour of duty expires or if you are recalled?

[Naumov] These are again complete inventions, but I cannot say anything until my tour of duty expires. Look, I have no guarantees that everything will be all right if I return to Bulgaria.

Bulgaria: Media Highlight Infighting in BSP

AU2706160596

[FBIS Report] Recent changes in Prime Minister Zhan Videnov's cabinet and in the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) Executive Bureau follow several weeks of heavy criticism of Videnov and his policies in the media. Much of this criticism has come from within the ranks of the BSP itself, but press commentators and the opposition have also called on Videnov to address Bulgaria's serious economic problems and make changes in his government.

On 29 May, Stefan Prodev, chief editor of the BSP's official newspaper DUMA, pointed out that "the Socialists...are again facing hostile glances and insults in the streets" and declared that "it is high time for the BSP and the government to wake up and overcome the impotence that has engulfed them." Prodev was very clear as to what was required: "A new social policy must be proposed, new political faces, new governmental solutions, and above all—a new awareness of the social commitment."

According to the 28 May issue of DEMOKRATSIYA, the daily of the opposition Union of Democratic Forces (SDS), members of the BSP parliamentary faction demanded the removal of Deputy Prime Minister Rumen Gechev, Industry Minister Kliment Vuchev, and Culture Minister Georgi Kostov. The independent Sofia daily TRUD even suggested on 30 May, that Andrey Lukanov, one of Videnov's main opponents in the BSP, was planning Videnov's ouster with the United States, alleging that "Lukanov and U.S. Envoy Schifter agreed that the cabinet should be replaced shortly before or after receiving the IMF loan." DUMA also kept up the pressure and continued to demand "ministerial resignations" (30 May). Also on 30 May, KONTINENT claimed that Videnov continued to resist and "refuses to accept any resignations." The next day, however, Bulgarian national radio reported that cabinet changes were "possible" at the upcoming 8 June BSP plenum. On 1 June, the press agency BTA reported that Krasimir Premyanov, leader of the BSP parliamentary faction, confirmed that the plenum would indeed discuss changes not only in the cabinet but also in the BSP Executive Bureau, and that he "will support the changes."

On 3 June, DUMA reported that "Videnov agreed to propose changes in the cabinet" at the 8 June plenum. KONTINENT, however, suggested earlier, on 1 June, that the BSP leadership actually "obliged" Videnov to effect the changes in the cabinet. DEMOKRATSIYA even expected "a coup against Videnov" at the upcoming plenum (4 June), while STANDART NEWS anticipated "sweeping changes." (4 June). KONTINENT, moreover, claimed that Videnov's own political fate was on the line and that party sources were predicting his political fall in July (4 June).

The personnel changes began even before the plenum, with the reported resignation of Videnov's economic adviser Professor Ivan Angelov on 7 June (TRUD 7 June). The 9 June plenum, in which the BSP's coalition partners—the Aleksandur Stamboliyski Agrarian Party and the Ecoglasnost Political Club—also took part, was reportedly a stormy meeting, at which "contradictory opinions" were expressed, according to a Sofia Radio report on 9 June. Videnov was forced to withdraw his proposal to appoint Kiril Zhelev, chairman of the National Assembly Budget Commission, as minister of agriculture. According to BTA of 10 June the new minister of agriculture was Krustyu Trendafilov, the regional governor of Montana. Ivan Mazarov became minister of culture, and Lyubomir Dachev—minister of industry. Deputy Prime Minister Gechev kept his post, while the Committee on Power Supply became a ministry under Rumen Ovcharov (BTA 10 June).

Even though Videnov's cabinet survived the no-confidence motion in parliament (BTA 13 June), members of the BSP leadership continued to criticize Videnov's performance and personality in interviews with the media. Aleksandur Marinov, former chief of the BSP Sofia organization, claimed that the "prime minister is not a sacred cow," and that "his responsibilities cannot be evaded" (STANDART NEWS 8 June). Both Marinov and Andrey Lukanov opposed the cabinet changes as "inadequate," and voted against them in parliament, according to a Sofia Radio report on 10 June.

Nikola Koychev, the newly elected chief of the BSP Sofia organization, suggested that the BSP and the cabinet differed on economic issues. (TRUD 6 June). BSP Deputy Chairman Georgi Purvanov, in interviews in STANDART NEWS alluded to Videnov's "mysterious shortcomings," (12 June) and said that "there are many doubts in the party" and "some organizations are even discontented," (13 June). Simultaneously, reports in the newspapers revealed that Videnov was "attacked" by former party leaders Aleksandur Lilov and Andrey Lukanov at the 9 June plenum (KONTINENT 10 June), and that Videnov was forced "for the first time to acknowledge weaknesses committed by the Council of Ministers and the Democratic Left parliamentary faction" (DUMA 10 June). On 11 June, KONTINENT went as far as to suggest that the Videnov cabinet and BSP policy were "dead." Finally, Aleksandur Tomov, an ex-Socialist and leader of the Civic Alliance for the Republic, stressed that "Zhan Videnov is the main obstacle to the unification of the Bulgarian left" (TRUD 13 June).

In this atmosphere, Videnov responded by thoroughly reshuffling the BSP's "Politburo"—the Executive Bureau. After a debate that lasted more than 10 hours, described by KONTINENT of 17 June as a "scandal," the plenum approved Foreign Minister Georgi Pirinski as the BSP candidate in the presidential elections. Following his selection, Pirinski did not appear at all placated, charging that there "had not been a full-fledged dialogue" between him and the party and that his nomination was "belated."

In the changes made by Videnov in the Executive Bureau, the four BSP deputy chairmen—Doncho Konakchiev, Georgi Purvanov, Yanaki Stoilov, and Krasimir Premyanov—kept their seats, as did another critic, Nikolay Kamov, who was proposed from the floor and became a member of the Executive Bureau although he had not been proposed by Videnov himself. The new Executive Bureau contains other powerful party members, such as Interior Minister Nikolay Dobrev (who also heads the BSP's Organizational Department); NOVO VREME Editor Iskra Baeva; Filip Bokov, soon to become BSP spokesman; and Nikola Koychev, head of the BSP Sofia organization (Sofia Radio 17 June).

The changes in the cabinet and the BSP Executive Bureau have been widely criticized by BSP members. Anton Grigorov, an outgoing member of the Executive Bureau, described the behavior of certain party leaders during the 16 June plenum as "political prostitution," pointing out that some of Videnov's deputies "are demanding his head" with a view to taking the leadership themselves (TRUD 18 June). He predicted that Videnov "will pay a heavy price" for the compromises he was forced to make in the membership of the cabinet and the Executive Bureau and lamented the fact that Videnov was not given any "party support."

In analyzing the BSP plenum, STANDART NEWS of 19 June stressed that both Videnov and Pirinski "received something"—Videnov preserved his posts as party and cabinet leader, while Pirinski became "one of the most important figures in the party," in addition to the enhanced popularity he is expected to obtain during the presidential campaign. Nevertheless, the newspaper forecasted only a brief reprieve in the infighting within the BSP. It anticipated "a new jump in the dollar rate and hyperinflation" in the autumn to prompt a new crisis and a new round of the struggle from which Pirinski could emerge victorious, not in a "palace coup" but in a "simple change of leadership."

Czech Republic: Comment on U.S. NATO Enlargement Statements

AU2806104196 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 27 Jun 96 p 12

[Commentary by Michal Mocek: "NATO Enlargement Is Taking Shape"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The U.S. statesmen in the two main political parties who are grappling with the political Semtex called "NATO enlargement" have finally reached at least a basic consensus. In contrast to the demand from the Republicans that NATO be enlarged speedily by three Central European states in 1998, Clinton's defense secretary, William Perry, has come up with the proposal to admit four countries from this region by 1999.

It is true that the Republican candidate Dole and Defense Secretary Perry spoke at a time when the U.S. presidential campaign had begun to gather speed. It is also a fact that Perry made a clear statement only after Dole had accused his boss, Clinton, of adopting the stances of Russia. However, the fact that both of them said essentially the same thing is important. No matter who wins, it will be possible to remind him of these statements. With Clinton or with Dole, the endeavor to enlarge the alliance should continue. And the U.S. stance in this matter is crucial.

So, Central European politicians should mark the year 1999 in their political calendars, and not only because the defense secretary—that is, a politician who knows the practical obstacles to enlargement—spoke about it. To wit, an interesting no to the "rapid enlargement" statements has come from the other side of the Atlantic. The political leader of NATO, Javier Solana, has rejected explicitly the statements by Robert Dole. He has not said anything at all, however, about the pronouncement from William Perry.

Meanwhile, the shift in U.S. policy will please Warsaw, Prague, Budapest, and Ljubljana. Apart from adjustments to their defense policy, this should spur Czech politicians into new thinking about their policy toward Slovakia. They have to decide now whether to begin to at least strive, for instance, in cooperation with our other neighbors, for the additional inclusion of Bratislava in the first wave of the alliance's enlargement. Otherwise, they have to prepare for the borders of the unstable East running along the ridges of the Beskydy and Carpathian Mountains.

Czech Republic: Survey on Concern About Russian Threat

AU2706115496 Prague RESPEKT in Czech 24-30 Jun 96 No 26, p 10

[Unattributed report: "How Afraid of Russia We Are?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The uncertain and, in many respects, unfavorable development of the political situation in Russia is evincing itself in anxiety felt by the Czech public about the East. More than half of the Czech Republic's citizens (58 percent) think that "Russia may present a threat to our Republic in the future." Left-wing oriented citizens and supporters of the opposition parties, especially the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia [KSCM], are less concerned. For example, 67 percent of Civic Democratic Party [ODS] supporters see Russia as a threat, while only 32 percent of KSCM supporters feel this way. This suggests that certain stereotypes still persist in the perception of Russia: Russia is no longer "the vanguard for all progressive mankind"; despite this, left-wing oriented people view it more favorably, while right-wing oriented people think the opposite.

It is also apparent from the results of a survey conducted by the Center for Empirical Research that the individual age, education, and social categories differ only imperceptibly in their assessment of the possible threat from Russia. We do not often encounter such homogeneity of views in sociological surveys, especially in political matters. This usually means that the subject of the survey is one that is more on the fringe of public opinion interest and that the public's views stem from very general notions about it. Apparently, this is also the case with Russia.

The concern about the possible threat from Russia is not projected particularly strongly into the views on joining NATO. Forty-five percent of our citizens are in favor of joining NATO, and 53 percent are against (2 percent do not know). Of those who are concerned about the possible threat from Russia, 53 percent are in favor of joining NATO, 46 percent are against, and 1 percent do not know. These figures also suggest that the anxiety about the threat from Russia is more undetermined.

May Russia Present a Threat to Our Republic in the Future?

	ODS	ODA	KDU-CSL	SPR-RSC	CSSD	KSCM
	Percent					
	67	62	60	56	55	31
Rather yes	42	37	46	31	37	21
Definitely yes	25	25	14	25	18	10

NOTE: ODA = Civic Democratic Alliance; KDU-CSL = Christian Democratic Union-Czechoslovak People's Party; SPR-RSC = Association for the Republic-Republican Party of Czechoslovakia; CSSD = Czech Social Democratic Party

Czech Republic: 'Bitter' Exchanges in Coalition Talks Described

AU2706155796 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 27 Jun 96 p 2

[Article by "(jik, ina)": "Turbulent Passions Almost Thwarted the Agreement on the New Government"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prague—The finale to the three-week-long coalition talks, in which all of the disputes seemed to have been resolved definitively, but, even so, signs of a coalition crisis were surfacing, altered completely the hitherto polite conduct of the most senior politicians. The past 24 hours have been accompanied by unheard of bitter mutual attacks by the Civic Democratic Party [ODS] and Civic Democratic Alliance [ODA] chairmen, manifestations of hysteria, and offended sulking.

It all started early on Tuesday [25 June] evening after Alliance leader Jan Kalvoda proposed a level of jurisdiction for the minister without portfolio that was absolutely unacceptable to Vaclav Klaus. "The prime minister fled from the coalition table as if someone was shooting at him. He had previously endured a meeting of the ODS Deputies' Club, which did not approve much of the coalition negotiators—and, thus, of Klaus himself—for having made concessions in many issues. He was all nervous and his hands were shaking," said one of the representatives of the coalition troika.

Half an hour later, at a meeting of the coalition chairmen and President Vaclav Havel, Klaus even stated that the negotiations had collapsed. "The president listened to us all and then said: Vaclav, as I hear it, you have disagreed only on a couple of petty issues. Therefore, the president then declared publicly that the coalition talks were continuing and going well," claims a participant in the meeting at the Castle.

Klaus, Lux, and Kalvoda then agreed that they would meet the next morning and continue the coalition talks, but the leader of the strongest party telephoned his partners during the night and canceled the meeting. "He then waited all morning for Kalvoda to call him. He himself would quite certainly not have done this," declared one of Klaus's colleagues.

Eventually, after lunching with Lux, Kalvoda picked up the black government telephone, concluded the negotiations on the meeting, and went to see the prime minister at the government office. Following the talks, in which they managed to ward off a coalition crisis, Kalvoda, despite this, did not refrain from aiming some criticism at Klaus when he declared: "It is not good to send further conditions for negotiations via the media." Kalvoda was reacting to Klaus's morning statement that he was now waiting for an accommodating step from ODA.

Czech Republic: Lesak Joins Dienstbier as Joint SD-LSNS Head

AU2806083896 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 26 Jun 96 p 2

[Article by "(bar)": "The SD-LSNS Still Has Two Joint Chairmen"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prague—The Free Democrats-Liberal National Social Party [SD-LSNS] is headed by joint chairmen even after Vavrinec Bodenlos's resignation on Saturday [22 June]. Jiri Dienstbier is one of them, while SD-LSNS First Deputy Chairman Josef Lesak has, in accordance with the party's articles, assumed the authority of Bodenlos.

"There will be two chairmen until the party's congress, which will, apparently, be held in November," said Lesak yesterday. He added that he does not intend to stand for the post of deputy chairman at the congress.

Dienstbier said that he will weigh up his continuation in his function against there being competent people to fill the important party post. However, most of the Central Council members have expressed confidence in Dienstbier. "I view this as a mandate for preparing the congress," said Dienstbier.

Slovakia: Meciar on Possible NATO Exclusion

AU2806125296 Bratislava SME in Slovak 28 Jun 96 p 1

[Interview with Slovak Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar by Juraj Hrabko; place and date not given: "This State Is in Parliament a Matter of Teamwork"]

[FBIS Translated Text] After his return from Strasbourg [on 26 June], Vladimir Meciar acknowledged that, abroad, one frequently speaks about only three candidates for NATO integration.

[Hrabko] Not so long ago, there was talk about four countries, including Slovakia. Do you not consider this fact to be a signal that something has really gone wrong in the Slovak Republic?

[Meciar] The questions regarding admission to NATO are still open and the discussion continues. There is no doubt that the speed at which the decision is being prepared is accelerating. The decision will be made by the end of this year and probably implemented in the first half of next year. But, as of today, no one has been excluded from integration. The process of assessment is now under way, in which the conduct of political entities and the expression of the intention are being assessed as well. If we are going to present ourselves as a country that is full of instability and of unclear and unsolved domestic political problems, in that case everyone will tell us: Wait. This is not just my business. It is the business of the government, the opposition, and the president. The state as a whole is being assessed according to how they behave. It all now depends on how intensively we utilize the remaining time to convince our partners that we are an orderly and democratic country. If we cannot convince them, we should not be surprised at the consequences. But this is everyone's business. Responsibility does not rest only with a person or with the government.

[Hrabko] But is it not the government that carries the greatest responsibility, as the administrator of public affairs and executor of state power?

[Meciar] No. The government is responsible to the same extent as all the others. Responsibility for the state is at issue and we cannot think that only the government is responsible for the state. This state is the businees of all the citizens, while in parliament it is the matter of teamwork of all political entities. And the evaluation and conduct abroad affects Slovakia, so, if those who have been going abroad to wail came into the government today, they would be carrying with them the traces of their wailing. They, too, bear responsibility. Even the president, who calls into question the democratic system of this state, is responsible, as head of state, for what is happening in this state. In other words, the question of degree of responsibility is open to discussion, but it is a shared responsibility.

Slovakia: Poll Shows Meciar Dismissal in Case of Referendum

AU2806103096 Bratislava SME in Slovak 19 Jun 96 p 1

[Report by "ax": "According to Poll, Referendum Would Decide on Vladimir Meciar's Dismissal but Not on Michal Kovac's"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—The possibility of dismissing Vladimir Meciar from the post of prime minister has greater support among citizens than the possibility of dismissing Michal Kovac from the post of president. This transpires from the results of a poll conducted from 27 May to 3 June 1996 by Slovak Radio's Methodological Research Department (MVK). The poll involved a representative sample of 1,220 citizens. In the event of a referendum, 34.2 percent would support Vladimir Meciar's dismissal, 33.9 percent would be opposed, 21.1 percent would not participate, and 10.7 percent are undecided. This means that the referendum would be successful as more than 50 percent of voters would participate in it and more than 50 percent among them would reply "yes." On the other hand, a possible referendum on Michal Kovac's dismissal would be unsuccessful, according to the poll. The president's dismissal would be supported in a referendum by 31.6 percent, rejected by 37 percent, 21.6 percent would not participate, and 9.9 percent are undecided. The inclusion of the above questions in the MVK poll was commissioned by entrepreneur Robert Krajnak, who some time ago initiated a petition for calling a referendum on Vladimir Meciar's dismissal. The poll revealed that support for Michal Kovac's dismissal declines and support for Vladimir Meciar's dismissal grows with the respondents' growing education. Michal Kovac's opponents (that is, those supporting his dismissal) outnumber his supporters (those opposing his dismissal) only in central Slovakia. In all other regions, the ratio is reversed. As for Vladimir Meciar, his opponents prevail significantly in Bratislava and western Slovakia and, by a very narrow margin, also in eastern Slovakia. Meciar's supporters are dominant in central Slovakia. Supporters of Vladimir Meciar and opponents of Michal Kovac are preponderant among voters of government coalition parties. Among opposition voters, supporters of Michal Kovac (with the exception of Social Democratic Party of Slovakia voters) and opponents of Vladimir Meciar are prevalent.

Slovakia: Meciar Claims Kovac Knew About Son's Kidnapping

AU2706151196 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 27 Jun 96 pp 1, 6

[Article by Blazej Panik: "Vladimir Meciar Confirmed Interest in NATO Membership"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Strasbourg—The Slovak Republic is interested in becoming a full-fledged member of NATO and welcomes developments aimed at objectifying the criteria for admission into the EU, Slovak Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar declared in Strasbourg, the seat of the Council of Europe, yesterday. [passage omitted]

Replying to the question of one Hungarian deputy [of the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly] regarding the Slovak language law, which supposedly authorizes language inspectors to levy a fine when, during a wedding ceremony, the groom or the bride say the word "yes" in a language other than Slovak, Vladimir Meciar literally said: "A Council of Europe deputy requires respect. Therefore, those who gave you this information should not be making fun of you because it is not true. Everyone who so wishes can say *igen* [Hungarian word for 'yes'] if he wants to."

As far as the Penal Code amendment, better known as the law on the protection of the Republic, is concerned, Vladimir Meciar expects its passage after the conclusion of expert appraisals "sometime in the fall."

Regarding the mass media councils, the prime minister said that the government was never interested in monopolizing them, but "at the time when (these) councils were installed in parliament, no opposition deputies were there."

As for the present situation within the government coalition, Vladimir Meciar said that both the Slovak National Party and the Association of Workers of Slovakia "told me the day before yesterday that they want to return to the coalition. They regret the step they took," the prime minister declared.

In conjunction with last year's kidnapping of the president's son, Vladimir Meciar said that "there are more intelligence games than the search for truth" in this matter. What was highly surprising was his assertion that the president supposedly admitted that he knew that such an operation was being prepared. According to Vladimir Meciar, Michal Kovac supposedly spoke along those lines on the night that he learned about the kidnapping.

Slovakia: Meciar: No ZRS, SNS Conditions To Stay in Coalition

AU2706153896 Bratislava SME in Slovak 27 Jun 96 p 2

[Article by "bog, jo": "According to Vladimir Meciar, SNS and ZRS Are Interested in Continuing in Coalition Without Conditions"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—"The talks being held by the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] with political parties will end by the end of this week with specifically adopted conclusions. I suppose that the results of these talks will make themselves felt already at the Monday [1 July] deliberations in the National Council of the Slovak Republic," Slovak Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar announced yesterday after his return from a meeting of the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly in Strasbourg. "I can confirm that the chairmen of the Slovak National Party [SNS] and Association of Workers of Slovakia [ZRS] came to see me and notified me of their interest in continuing in the coalition without any conditions whatsoever," the prime minister declared. According to Meciar, it is necessary to stabilize the situation in Slovakia also because "important foreign policy decisions must be made." He added that the Party of the Democratic Left [SDL] is ready to support a HZDS minority government until the 1998 elections, but is not ready to enter into the coalition. "This development is determined by processes within both the Common Choice and the SDL. We did not reject the SDL in 1993, 1994, or 1996. I made them the offer of an honest and open coalition, but the offer was not accepted," he said.

Slovakia: HZDS, SNS Agree 'To Let Bygones Be Bygones'

AU2706151496 Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA in Slovak 27 Jun 96 p 6

[TASR report: "Normalization of Relations Between Coalition and Opposition"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—"We are glad that the contents of the talks between the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] and the Slovak National Party [SNS] were also reflected in the vote on the adjournment of the 16th National Council of the Slovak Republic [NRSR] meeting," a source close to the SNS leadership told TASR yesterday. Tuesday's meeting at the Slovak Government Office, which was initiated by Marian Andel, NRSR deputy chairman and SNS honorary chairman, was attended by HZDS Chairman Vladimir Meciar and, on behalf of the SNS, by Chairman Jan Slota and another honorary party chairman, Jozef Prokes. According to available information, the talks were held in a good atmosphere and the coalition partners agreed on further cooperation. Controversial statements made by the leaders of the two political entities about one another were not assessed at the meeting. The partners agreed to "let bygones be bygones and move on." The two sides described as a "contribution" in the present situation the talks being held between coalition and opposition parties and the fact that these talks are conducted in a fair spirit and without unnecessary squabbles. This normalization of relations between the coalition and the opposition should also make itself felt in the work of the legislature. According to information obtained by TASR, the "blunting of edges" in relations between the SNS and the HZDS will also have an impact on the work of parliament. The above meeting between the highest HZDS and SNS representatives should not be the last one this week.

Slovakia: Slovak, Czech Political Attitudes Compared

96CH0125B Prague TYDEN in Czech 27 May 96 p 25

[Commentary by Martin Butora, chairman of the Slovak PEN [International Association of Poets, Playwrights, Editors, Essayists, and Novelists] Club Center: "A Preelection Glass of Champagne"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Sometimes life plays around with symbols. For the beginning of the Czech preelection campaign, such a symbol was ice hockey. The manner in which both top politicians, Vaclav Klaus and Vladimir Meciar, who made the most express contribution following the last Czechoslovak elections to see to it that any subsequent elections might take place in two independent nations, took a hold on this symbol says something not only with regard to their relationship with sports.

The prime minister of the Slovak Government stepped onto the ice in great style. He received Slovakia's hockey players and their sponsors even before departing for Vienna. The prime minister of the Czech Government did not push himself into the foreground on the first day, but he was to be seen at the moment there was something to show: geysers of champagne, the red banner proclaiming "World Champion Czech Republic," enthusiasm and emotion during the playing of the national anthem. A less-informed foreigner might think that he was looking at the trainer of the world championship team.

However, the road toward the hockey title also reflects the successful path that Czech society has negotiated over the past election season. Behind this success stand three key factors that stand out in comparison with Slovakia on an absolute as well as relative plane. They are the more favorable starting conditions, the gradually prevailing criterion of output, and a little luck.

The more favorable starting conditions need to be understood primarily as the relatively successful modernization, complete with all its original characteristics, as designated by sociologists: finalized urbanization, the advanced secularization of society, and the rationalization of everyday life. They also include the experiences connected with modern industrial development prior to the advent of communism, a solidly developed market economy, which, at that time, was developing under conditions of a decently functioning democracy. In contrast to Slovakia, a country with delayed and incomplete modernization, the Czech lands were dealing more with an interrupted modernization. The second factor—output capability—the willingness to be guided by principles of qualification, the readiness to accept income and property differences, was carried into Czech life by the dynamically developing middle class. The fact that this trend had the fundamental support of the current Czech Government coalition cannot be disregarded. Third, there is that little bit of luck, which is manifested, for example, by the fact that much like the Czechs had TGM [Thomas G. Masaryk] during the birth of the first republic, Vaclav Havel played one of the key roles in renewing freedom in the 1980's and, thank goodness, still plays such a role today.

In addition to these three factors, there is one more key moment. For working purposes, it would be possible to call it the organizational culture, the capability to master and direct, with clarity, major economic and political entities and, if necessary, create new institutions and see to it that they function solidly. This organizational element was possessed by the Austrians within the framework of the monarchy. As far back as the first republic, the Czechs profited most from it, and now, in their own albeit somewhat diminished state, they are developing it further. However, they are doing so in a situation that conceals certain pitfalls: As a consequence of the past half century, the Czechs, Moravians, and Silesians are now creating their state on their own—virtually without minorities. They have thus far not learned how to deal with one of these minorities—the Gypsies.

TGM said about our former joint homeland that it will take 50 years for it to become a decent and stabilized democracy. How many years will a country that recalls the Masaryk legacy require today to do so? And how is this to be achieved under conditions of difficult competition without extremes of egotism so that the Czech success might not become a failure for others, but, on the contrary, might turn into a traction machine for those who are not yet achieving the equivalent of the Czech successes?

Slovakia: Ministry To Order Removal of Hungarian Monuments

LD2706204696 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1800 GMT 27 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The Slovak Environment Ministry is to order the removal of the 1,100th anniversary monuments erected in towns inhabited by Hungarians. [Memorials erected by ethnic Hungarians of Slovakia to mark 1,100th anniversary of Hungarian conquest]

According to the ministry, these are public monuments, the erection of which require the appropriate permit; however, these permits were not obtained.

A comprehensive campaign was launched three weeks ago in Slovakia against the erection of various monuments commemorating the Hungarian conquest.

Slovakia: Government Discusses Survey on Ethnic Relations

AU2806090296 Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA in Slovak 20 Jun 96 p 5

[Unattributed report in the "From the Government Session" rubric: "Only One-Quarter of Slovak Hungarians Consider Language Law Necessary"]

[FBIS Translated Text] At its meeting on Tuesday [18 June] the government took note of a report on a public opinion survey entitled "Population of Ethnically Mixed Areas of Southern Slovakia on Some Questions of Coexistence Between Slovaks and Hungarians in this Environment." The survey was conducted by the Institute for Public Opinion Research of the Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic. From the survey it follows that Slovaks evaluate the observance of ethnic rights embedded in the Constitution of the Slovak Republic in a highly positive way, while among citizens of Hungarian nationality dissatisfaction prevails with the observance of the right to participate in the solution of matters affecting ethnic minorities. An overwhelming majority of Slovaks are convinced that the law on the state language of the Slovak Republic is necessary for all citizens, while only less than one-quarter of respondents among citizens of Hungarian nationality share this view. A high percentage of respondents of both nationalities consider the Slovak-Hungarian basic treaty important for good mutual relations.

B-H: Prime Minister Views Roles of Kasagic, Karadzic

AU2706182296 Belgrade DUGA in Serbo-Croatian 21 Jun 96 pp 8-11

[Interview with Serb Republic Prime Minister Gojko Klickovic by Vanja Bulic; place and date not given: "Do Not Force the Serbs To Be Stubborn"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Gojko Klickovic is the prime minister of the Serb Republic. He is 41 years old, married, and has two childen. He was born in Krupa, the town to which Branko Copic [Bosnian writer and poet] dedicated one of his finest poems. A little girl recently wrote a poem in which, among other things, she says: "Branko was give back his Hasane [not further specified], but I will never get back my Sarajevo." Gojko Klickovic has a lot to say about the Sarajevo that will never again be returned to an 11-year-old girl.

He completed his high school in Krupa and later got a degree in Sociology from the School of Political Science in Sarajevo. He earned a batchelor of arts degree from the School of Law and Economy in Osijek and the department in Belgrade. He became prime minister after a boisterous meeting in the night between 18 and 19 May. In this war, he was the commander of a brigade and was the first to state publicly that the Serbs should evacuate Sarajevo.

[Bulic] What is the story behind the dismissal of Rajko Kasagic?

[Klickovic] There is no mystery there. Everything is completely clean. In the implementation of the Dayton agreement, the platform of the political action of the Serb Republic has been clearly determined. This was determined by the Main Committee of the party [Serb Democratic Party—SDS]. The assembly and the government were assigned to carry that policy through. But there was a divergence, or more precisely, there were individual activities in the government that were contrary to the agreed policy. I think that one the causes was the pressure by the international representatives assigned to implement the Dayton agreement. It so happened that Kasagic signed certain arrangements that not even the top state officials had known about and which the government had not discussed nor made any decisions on.

[Bulic] What kinds of arrangements are you referring to?

[Klickovic] For instance, the arrangement regarding the repair of the Cajnice water supply system that was supposed to provide water for Gorazde. In return, we did not get water for Vojkovice, for Kljuc, for anywhere. It was simply an impermissible relenting to pressures that allowed the Muslim-Croat federation to use our economic resources without any requests for something similar to be provided for the Serb side. And all those things that they wanted, they really did not even need, for their goal was to create unified systems in order to integrate Bosnia, in other words, to retain its status. Or better said, they were fulfilling the task set by Alija Izetbegovic; that is, by those who had promised him such a Bosnia.

[Bulic] I can conclude that you resented Kasagic talking about a possible common life between the Serbs, Muslims, and Croats on the territory of the former Bosnia.

[Klickovic] To tell the truth, it disturbed me, and it disturbed the top state officials. First of all, we agreed to conduct a unified policy of the Serb people in the Serb Republic. We also agreed that we were not interested in the Herzeg-Bosnian and Muslim parts of the Federation. If that was our agreed policy, then all the things Kasagic talked about were contrary to our policy. We were interested in clearly defining the internal ethnic area in which we will build our Serb state. Even then, I let it be known, I mean after the signing of the Dayton agreement, that the key to creating a Serb state on the other side of the Drina River was the complete separation of the Serbs in Sarajevo. Literally, it means the evacuation of the Serbs from Sarajevo. In addition, I emphasized that the next condition would be the victory of the SDS in the upcoming elections.

The Referendum Has Shown What the Serbs Want

[Bulic] You openly supported the mass departure of Serbs from Sarajevo?

[Klickovic] Yes, because I have a good knowledge of the situation in Sarajevo. I know that, in their 36 offensives, the Muslims suffered their worst defeats there, defeats they will never get over. I know that, in Ilijas alone, 1800 Serb defenders lost their lives. I know that there were no conditions here for a life together, not even for life close to each other. There were so many victims on both sides that it would be impossible for the wounds to heal so quickly and for both nations to transcend what they had done to each other.

That is the basic reason behind my demand to divide that area once and for all into Serb and Muslim parts of Sarajevo.

[Bulic] In other words, not only a territorial division, but a total division of the people.

[Klickovic] The people, all material factors, all resources. It is clear that, in the 46 percent that we got, as in the basic principle of all divisions, there is no Serb

Sarajevo. As soon as I found out about this, everything was clear to me. The referendum had shown that the Serbs wanted to separate and leave Sarajevo. That was clear to every politician, except Kasagic. Do you recall how, on returning from Rome, he said that the Serbs from Sarajevo had gained much, how they would finally get their autonomy, their language, their education, etc. After that statement, I told the press that, in Serb Sarajevo, which after the Dayton agreement would be a part of the Muslim-Croat federation, not even a Serb grave would remain. This has proved to be true.

[Bulic] Did you wage any propaganda campaign toward that goal?

[Klickovic] We did not wish to conduct any propaganda, and we exerted no coercion on Serb Sarajevo. The reason was simple: The wisdom of these people was far above that of the Serb Republic officials. The people were more aware of both the historical moment and the burden that awaited them.

[Bulic] The people were more aware than who?

[Klickovic] Than the leaders of the Serb Republic.

[Bulic] Was what you told the press, as you have described, not propaganda?

[Klickovic] No, it was not, because I said that in a very close circle. It was necessary to conduct certain preparations, to evacuate Serb Sarajevo. At the referendum, it was stated openly that the Serbs in Serb Sarajevo wanted their autonomy and a connection with the Serb Republic and that, if they did not get that, they would leave. That was very clear to everyone, and it was only necessary to read what had been said. The Westerners read that properly, and they knew that if they did not fulfill these Serb demands, Serb Sarajevo would be abandoned. Unfortunately, we were hping indecisively that, under the pressure of conscience, we would finally hear the voice of Western democracy, the democracy of the new world order, if I may say. A little delay brought us into a very delicate situation. When we saw that the green berets were entering Vogosca, Rajlovac, Ilijas, Stari Grad, Grbavica, Ilidza, and Trnovo, it was clear that we would get nothing from the West. It was also clear that we had gotten ourselves entangled in a very complicated situation in which we needed to act swiftly to evacuate the Serb population. The government formed a task force to take care of the refugees from Sarajevo. I led the task force, although, at the time of the evacuation, I was in the Krajina, in Banja Luka, where I was taking care of things in my ministerial jurisdiction. I received an urgent call for me to go at once to Sarajevo. The representatives of the Sarajevo municipalities expressed their readiness to work only with me. When the task force began working on 18 February, it began to snow and did not stop until 19 March. The situation was such that, in some areas, we had to use tow trucks and tanks to pull vehicles full of the personal belongings of people leaving Serb Sarajevo. The entire Serb people wanted to get out. The most difficult situation was in Vogosce. We had three days to move everyone all of Vogosce, because the federal police were ready to take over on Friday morning, and our evacuation began on Tuesday. We managed to evacuate the people and their belongings. Still, around 480 Serbs had remained in Vogosce to await the federal police.

[Bulic] They did not want to leave?

[Klickovic] No, the fact is, we were not able to get them out, and the weather conditions were so bad that they were not able to go on foot toward the main roads. We simply did not manage to provide transportation for all the people and their belongings.

Evacuation as Precondition for Normal Life

[Bulic] Did you issue orders for the people to burn their belongings that remained?

[Klickovic] People simple felt they should do so, and they did not want to leave behind what they had acquired over the years.

[Bulic] The Serbs who stayed behind were portrayed as being people who did not wish to leave.

[Klickovic] The untruth of that was demonstrated soon enough, because we continued the evacuation under the new conditions. We primarily endeavored to evacuate out as much as we could, including technical goods, furniture, and personal belongings, so that these people could continue their normal lives in another environment as soon as possible. They knew where they were going—into destroyed areas, into areas that had not been prepared and adapted to accept them immediately and offer them a normal life. If they had gone without their things, they would have headed straight for catastrophe. That is why we evacuated them with as many of their things we could get out: doors and windows, cupboards, elecrical appliances, personal items, etc.

[Bulic] This is the first time that a top official of the Serb Republic has spoken so openly about the evacuation of Serbs from Sarajevo.

[Klickovic] This is the real truth. We were not able to reject the will of the Serbs. There were pressures to try to use political means to make the Serbs stay in Sarajevo, but, after the first Muslim-Croat police forces entered the city, it was very clear what would be in store for the Serbs who remained.

[Bulic] I recently read that Kasagic and Bildt were very close, and that they even talked about women as two men with reputations.

[Klickovic] I do not know how intimate they were, but I do know that when we first met after I had been elected prime minister, Bildt asked me whether I would accept everything that Kasagic had signed. I told him that everything that Kasagic had signed that was in keeping with the state's top officials and bodies had to be implemented. And that meant that I would not heed anything that Kasagic had signed on his own behalf, even if that resulted in misunderstandings or even delays in implementing the Dayton agreement.

[Bulic] Then whose man was Kasagic, if he came and went so easily, too easily?

[Klickovic] Kasagic is one the leading figures in the SDS, which is something that no one can deny. He is a man who did much and gave much for the Serb cause. However, the fact is that, in his craving for power, in attempting to score some political points for the upcoming elections, he made the wrong moves. He simply went ahead too fast in implementing the Dayton agreement. At my first session as prime minister, I said that I would do for the Dayton agreement only as much as the Muslims and Croats did. He simply grabbed everything that the Dayton agreement offered, without any caution, and waited for the other side to accept the same condition, because the Dayton agreement presumes reciprocity.

[Bulic] Some political analysts feel that the reason Kasagicwas dropped was that he was getting too close to the socialists.

[Klickovic] I do not think that was the reason. Personally, I am convinced that Kasagic was never close to the socialists. Perhaps he has become that now, since his dismissal, because the leader of the socialists is now Radic, whom the people of that area trust much more. He is a very serious man, both of whose sons spent the war in the trenches. Although he is relatively old, he also fought in the war. He was mayor of Banja Luka, a distinguished businessman, and formerly the executive secretary of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Before, anyone with any kind of political wisdom never entered into any arrangements with the socialists. Now, with the coming of Radic, many things are changing.

[Bulic] How do you evaluate Kasagic as a person, because they are trying to attribute all kind of things to him.

[Klickovic] He is a stubborn man, but very honest and proper. He did not abuse his authority. He simply took a wrong political stand in terms of implementing the Dayton agreement.

There Was Crime—Where Are the Criminals?

[Bulic] Some analysts claim that he was brushed aside because, among other things, he announced a showdown against economic and other kinds of crime in the Serb Republic.

[Klickovic] There is economic crime, and it was resented throughout the entire war. We know who did that and how they did it.

[Bulic] When you say that—you are obliged to take certain measures.

[Klickovic] Of course.

[Bulic] The top state officials were also involved.

[Klickovic] I know that too.

[Bulic] Even one of your predecessors.

[Klickovic] And I also know that. Branko Ostojic, deputy prime minister, was directly involved in criminal business activities during the war, first through his company "Nord hemija," and later in the purchase of fuel for the Serb Republic. He caused great harm.

[Bulic] What does that mean in terms of money?

[Klickovic] If it is reevaluated, we are talking about 12 million German marks [DM]. That is a lot of money, and he is only one man.

[Bulic] Are there any other such cases?

[Klickovic] The rest are not so large-scale. We could even saythey were cases of people not being careful enough in their dealings, and most of it has been compensated for. More specifically, I am referring to oil arrangements, when several truckloads were confiscated. There were also cases in which oil from the reserves in Serbia was to come to our territory, but was sold while still in Serbia. We are doing something about crime, but it is not enough to tell people that the criminals have been indicted. I know exactly what people are saying when they have been left without anything and their deputy prime minister runs off with DM12 million. Our obligation is to bring all these criminals to justice. Ostojic has managed to escape from our police authorities. He has no one to pay compensation, and no real estate for us to confiscate. The most important thing is for our authorities to track him down so that we can repay the money he took away.

[Bulic] It is no secret—Ostojic is in Moscow. What about the house that he started to build near the Red Star soccer stadium in Belgrade? There were rumors that this was supposed to have been Karadzic's Belgrade residence.

[Klickovic] Those who are closer to that area will probably confiscate that property, because they are entitled to do so. There are many rumors regarding President Karadzic. But I know where he lives.

[Bulic] He used to live in the Intercontinental Hotel.

[Klickovic] Ostojic's task as deputy prime minister was to take care of Karadzic's hotel arrangements when he needed to conduct affairs in Belgrade.

[Bulic] Was that his duty as deputy prime minister or as an affluent man who bought his status in that way?

[Klickovic] You must not forget that there was a war going on. I assure you that all those people who were in Belgrade conducting affairs for the Serb Republic stayed there and made more use of all the available possibilities than President Karadzic himself.

[Bulic] There have been rumors that Ostojic used to cover Karadzic's gambling debts.

[Klickovic] Karadzic never gambled. He likes to write. I haveknown Karadzic since 1984, and the first I heard of these allegations was when I read about them in the press. And there is nothing I want to say about the media war. What I do know about Karadzic is that he likes to write, that he is persuasive when it comes to things in which he believes, and that he likes to give more democracy than is necessary.

[Bulic] On the subject of democracy, let me remind you of an opinion according to which democratic changes in the Serb Republic will only occur if the elections are not democratic; that is, if Karadzic is not elected.

[Klickovic] We tend to have an erroneous conception of democracy. Very often, even anarchy is proclaimed as democracy. Everyone talks about rights, but no one thinks about obligations. That is why everybody is always calculating something. That will happen if Karadzic runs in the elections, and what if he does not? What kind of democracy would we have in one case, and what kind would we have in the other? And so on. We have our program. The author of that program and of the concept of our party is Dr. Radovan Karadzic.

The People Will Decide About Karadzic

[Bulic] Will Karadzic run in the elections?

[Klickovic] That is something that the people will decide, and ourassumption is that 99 percent of the people will vote. And they will vote because they will have to. As far as President Karadzic is concerned, we had a hard time convincing him in 1992 when we finally had to separate. That is how it was in a unified Bosnia, as well as now.

[Bulic] Is that not actually the creation of a peronality cult?

[Klickovic] He only endeavored to groom a number of people so that they would be able to work as he does, so that he could continue to do his scientific research work in the area of neuropsychiatry, and, of course, to continue writing poetry. He has embarked on many things. Believe me that all those around him had more affinity toward all those functions than he himself did.

[Bulic] On the other hand, according to the Dayton agreement, sanctions will be imposed if Karadzic runs in the elections. Has the time come for yet another Serb sacrifice?

[Klickovic] We on this side of the Drina River will not sacrifice Karadzic!

[Bulic] I did not mean to literally sacrifice Karadzic by handing him over to the Hague War Criminals Tribunal. I was referring to a political sacrifice.

[Klickovic] In a certain way, we have politically already sacrificed him, because we accepted that he will withdraw. In fact, President Karadzic is now more involved with organizing the state from within, primarily the economy. That is why he does not appear in public much. That is, in itself, already a sacrifice that he, himself, has accepted.

[Bulic] Beside a neuropsychiatrist, do you not have any other experts that could work on organizing your economy?

[Klickovic] Karadzic has a wide circle of friends in the United States, Greece, and Australia. He brings those people over here. In other words, he uses his connections, and then our specialists talk with these people and work together with them in implementing the agreed tasks. He never goes into details. We tell him there is a problem, and he finds someone who can help. At present, several big deals are underway. We are trying to attract Western capital. When Western capital comes, there will be less chance of war breaking out, because everyone will preserve their investments. This is very simple logic. The international community knows about all the people who are investing here. But we have also continued our prewar cooperation. In Modrica, "Castrol" is permanently present, and they want to sign a contract such as we had before the war. "Delta bank" is also coming here, and many distinguished German politicians have shares in that bank. A Japanese company wants to build a gas pipeline here on the basis of concessions. The project has been finalized. Lamberto Dini, the chairman of the European Union, asked me directly what I, as the new prime minister, was planning to do about Karadzic and Mladic and whether Karadzic will run in the elections. I replied that only the people could make that decision, and, as far as Mladic is concerned, that he is a soldier and that the army was responsible for him.

[Bulic] Is not the supreme commander responsible, in other words the president of the Serb Republic?

[Klickovic] If the supreme commander makes decisions about the army, he will not run in the elections, because we agreed that the army must be depoliticized.

[Bulic] When the supreme commander, Karadzic, wanted to remove Mladic, we must admit that the general remained thanks to the support of Serbia.

[Klickovic] He remained thanks to a group of officers that is nolonger here! As soon as there was danger of a paratroop assault on the main headquarters, they went across the Drina River. But General Mladic has remained. You could say that those who were in his way have gone. A few days ago, I spoke with Mladic, who is an honest man and a good Serb. He is in a painful situation, pressed from all sides, and unsure how he would organize the army in completely different conditions. He knows that the economic situation is bad. He has grasped the situation and is no longer so impetuous. Perhaps this is because he does not have any advisors. There are no more unreasonable demands, because it is clear what kind of economic situation we are in. But it is also clear that if the Muslims arm themselves, then we will have to do the same. They have allies in the West. We have still not managed to find any.

[Bulic] Are not Serbia and Yugoslavia your allies?

[Klickovic] We asked for concrete guarantees, but we did not get them.

[Bulic] What guarantees do you give to the citizens of Sarajevo whom you encounter throughout the Serb Republic?

People Who Have Not Lost a Battle Have Lost Their City

[Klickovic] I run into them all the time, scattered in all partsof the Serb Republic. People who never lost a battle in the War, have lost their city. I can tell you that, provided there are no sanctions against the Serb Republic, you will be able to count the people who will still be in collective camps when winter comes on the fingers of one hand.

[Bulic] What does that mean?

[Klickovic] It means that we will settle all border areas around Brcko, because, according to the Dayton agreement, that area is part of our territory. I told the gentlemen from various international organizations that Brcko will never be subject to dispute. We are even prepared to discontinue the further implementation of the Dayton agreement if Brcko should become subject to dispute, which would be impossible anyway because it could not be a border dispute. We will not allow Brcko to become a free zone where Western brokers will wheel and deal for their personal gain.

[Bulic] And if, in spite of everything, Brcko does become subject to dispute?

[Klickovic] No matter what the implications are, we can no longer bow our bends. You know, we have given in to a lot of things in order to calm the situation in the Balkans. To give Brcko away would mean to split the Serb Republic into two parts and then suffer the same fate as the Serbs from the Krajina. We would not be able to give in even if it meant the beginning of new conflicts.

[Bulic] Are you aware of what you are saying?

[Klickovic] I certainly am.

[Bulic] I know it is not easy to measure every word, particularly in a situation in which many people have been left homeless and without their families. But some new heroes have emerged from the war who should now go back to their former jobs. Are they requesting special privileges?

[Klickovic] There are many people who feel that four years of wearing auniform gives them the right to choose any function they want. But merits can be paid in other ways, and I am certain that political and economic jobs and positions will not be given away to those who had fought well in the war. This would mean halting the positive trends that are present, in spite of all our problems. The state is a only regaining the people's trust. Earlier, when we had to pay the people who were fighting on the front lines, we offered them bonds. Only two brigades rejected bonds. We recently bought bonds to a total value of DM14.5 million. We decided to buy the remaining bonds and other papers of value that are held by individuals and companies. This is how to rebuild the confidence in the state, which means it is not necessary to go after various privileges, because the state will deal fairly with everyone. To be quite frank, many people who fought in the war think that it is payoff time now. At the same time, 280,000 people took part in the war. Can you imagine soldiers becoming bureaucrats and living off the state, not from their own work, but only on the basis of their war records?

[Bulic] What about the war invalids?

[Klickovic] We have made a relatively good legal framework for taking care of this problem, and we have managed to provide certain funding. Now, for the first time, we are able to pay people, with only a one-month delay, what they are entitled to according to the law. We have also managed to provide aid to the families of those who were killed in the war. We have 40,000 welfare beneficiaries. If you add to that a further 175,000 retired persons, you will realize how much money the state has to allocate for these categories of citizens. The economy is reawakening, and people are gradually starting to return to their former jobs. Although they work for only two or three hours, it is still good. They are regaining their self-confidence and their faith in the state. They are thinking about other things.

Serbs From the Left Side Understand the Serbs From the Right Side

[Bulic] What about trust in Serbia and Yugoslavia?

[Klickovic] Relations are changing. President Milosevic has done a lot to bring about those changes, particularly in economic trends and the behavior of the border officials. We look to him for support, regardless of ideological differences and occasional misunderstandings. Milosevic is the key figure in all of this. We know he is pressured by the international community, which is trying to extort things from him. Ordinary people cannot interpret every message in the proper way. These are such times. That is why we are prepared to swallow a lot of pride, because we know the conditions in which President Milosevic is working. We have a lot of understanding for the moves that Serbia and Yugoslavia are making.

[Bulic] How has the removal of Mr. Avramovic [former governor of the Yugoslav National Bank] affected monetary processes in the Serb Republic?

[Klickovic] We have a limited amount of money, and there are no changes in that respect. But we do regret such an expert having to go, because he could have contributed so much more. We do not know the background to the entire affair, nor do we wish to interfere. The party [Socialist Party of Serbia—SPS] is in power there. Let the people pass judgement.

[Bulic] I have to ask you about the selection of the capital ofthe Serb Republic.

[Klickovic] If it were my choice, I would say Belgrade. At present, the best facilities are in Banja Luka. I am a frontier man [krajisnik] myself, and I know that, in time, Banja Luka will be the capital. However, it would be politically illogical for us to now move all our institutions from Pale to Banja Luka. That would create a gap for the Muslims to use to reach the Drina River.

[Bulic] Would sanctions be applied to the Muslims for doing something like that?

[Klickovic] No, because the yardstick is different, and it will be so for a long time.

[Bulic] Some people think the capital is not moving to Banja Luka because Karadzic is not safe there.

[Klickovic] Those are insinuations. We do not know from whom President Karadzic should hide. Everyone is called on to do something, but they forget that anyone making such an attempt also has to find a way to leave this area. And how someone could do that, I do not know. The question is whether that would be the start of a new war in the Balkans. And the most important question is whether it is good to invoke stubbornness in the Serbs. We know well that the international community is doing just that and is forcing the Serbs into obduracy. After Christopher's statement, in other words, after the presentation of the U.S. view that the issue of Karadzic is not a crucial one for the elections, many hotheaded people will calm down. Everything will go as it should when the international tribunals indict Izetbegovic, Ganic, Tudjman's clientele, and many others.

[Bulic] So does that mean that there were no war criminals among the Serbs?

[Klickovic] Of course it does not mean that. But we were defending ourselves all the time.

B-H: Karadzic Says Candidacy Depends on 'Guarantees'

LD2706181096 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1732 GMT 27 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 27 Jun (SRNA)—Radovan Karadzic, president of the Serb Republic, said today that the decision on whether he will run as a candidate in the elections will be reached by a committee of the Serb Democratic Party [SDS] which will be elected at the party's electoral assembly tomorrow.

Opening a session of the SDS main committee in Pale today, President Karadzic stressed that he is ready to step down if the international community gives the guarantees which are of vital importance for the survival and prosperity of the Serb Republic, and warned that failing this he will put his candidacy forward.

Karadzic welcomed the OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe] decision for the elections to be held on 14 September, in line with the Dayton agreement, but warned about some indications that they might be undemocratic and not free.

According to Karadzic, this refers especially to the ban on individuals' candidacies, as well as to the confusion about who will vote where, which makes it possible—he stressed—to manipulate the elections and prejudice their outcome.

President Karadzic also pointed to the international community's unequal treatment of the Serb Republic and the Muslim-Croat federation in the process of implementing the Dayton agreement. He said he expects this practice, as well as various types of blackmail and pressure, to stop.

The international community must decide whether these elections will be free and democratic, Karadzic said. He demanded reliable guarantees and understanding for the Serb Republic.

According to the Serb Republic president, the SDS is the most responsible political force which has led the Serb people through unprecedented vicissitudes over the past six years, and which has achieved in that period something no one has achieved before in this region—a state.

Commenting on the threat to impose sanctions on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Karadzic said that this is yet another reason why the Serb Republic "is hurrying to elections," but warned that regardless of the pressures from the mother country the Serb Republic will not accept the unacceptable and what is not in line with its constitution.

B-H: 'Definite Decision' on Karadzic Candidacy Expected

LD2806102096 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1004 GMT 28 Jun 96

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Pale, June 28 (TANJUG)—Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic has expressed readiness not to run at the upcoming elections if he is given guarantees by the international community of vital importance for the survival and prosperity of Republika Srpska.

Speaking at a session of the main board of the Serbian Democratic Party in Pale late Thursday, Karadzic said he would run for president if these conditions were not met.

Karadzic said, however, that the definite decision on his nomination would be made by the main board at the election assembly on Friday.

Karadzic welcomed the decision of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) that the elections in Bosnia be held on Sept. 14, in agreement with the Dayton accords, but pointed out certain elements which indicate that they might not be democratic or free.

Speaking about the sanctions with which the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was being threatened, Karadzic said this was yet another reason why Republika Srpska would like elections to be held as soon as possible, but warned that Republika Srpska "will not accept the unacceptable and that which is not in agreement with its constitution."

Within the intense preparations for the elections, lots were drawn to establish the timetable for the presentation of parties on Srpska Radio and Television in a public television broadcast late Thursday.

Parties will start presenting their programs on July 9 and broadcasts will be given alternately from studios in Banja Luka, the biggest city in the republic, and from its administrative center of Pale near Sarajevo.

Srpska Radio and Television, and the GLAS SRPSKI daily will follow principles established on the basis of the R.S. law on elections and regulations set by the interim elections commission of the OSCE, it was heard in the broadcast.

As agreed, every political party which is running in the elections will have access to 90 minutes of Srpska Television programs and 60 minutes of radio programs and one page in GLAS SRPSKI.

All presidential candidates will also be presented to the public according to the same principle, and the timetable will be estblished by drawing lots.

B-H: Karadzic To Address SDS Assembly Session in Pale

LD2806103696 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 0905 GMT 28 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Sarajevo, 28 Jun (SRNA)—The second session of the assembly of the Serb Democratic Party [SDS] is to begin in Pale today with an address by SDS Chairman Radovan Karadzic.

It is expected that the party chairman will briefly review everything that has happened to the Serb people from 1990, when the first electoral assembly of the SDS was held, up to today in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina, and set out his vision of the future of the Serb Republic, led by the SDS.

The party chairman's speech will also focus on the forthcoming elections and electoral activities in the Serb Republic, and extensive debate on this subject is expected. [passage omitted]

According to the proposed agenda, members of the assembly should reelect Karadzic as SDS chairman.

Today's assembly session is about elections because, apart from the chairman and main committee, members of the statute council and the party's supervisory committee are to be elected.

The assembly will also consider and approve the party statute and program, and a code of conduct for its members.

The session of the highest body of the party begins at 1600.

B-H: Karadzic Congratulates Serb Army on Patron Saint Day

LD2706200796 Pale Srpska Televizija in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 27 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Radovan Karadzic, president of the Serb Republic and supreme commander of the armed forces of the Serb Republic, has addressed the following greetings to soldiers and officers of the army of the Serb Republic on the occasion of St. Vitus's Day, the patron saint day of the army of the Serb Republic:

Soldiers and officers of the army of the Serb Republic, I wish you a happy patron saint day. When I congratulated you on St. Vitus's day last year, I said I wished we might celebrate it next time in peace and in our state. With God's help it is so—we are celebrating St. Vitus's Day in peace, in freedom, and in our state.

All attempts to diminish our statehood [drzavnost] and our future prospects only prove that we are on the right path. No one gave us our state as a gift; we fought for it with the political and military efforts of the whole people and won. The sacrifices we made in this war are blessed because they were consciously made for the future of our people. Let us recall now all the victims with love and gratitude.

By wise and skilful policies, we made even stronger the state we have gained and defended. However, we have to be prepared to defend it militarily should it be attacked. This is why we have to have an army worthy of the Serb military tradition to which you also contributed your share of glory and splendor.

Congratulating you on the patron saint day as one of the most glorious Serb generations, I would like to wish you and your families happiness now and in the future, greetings from Radovan Karadzic, president of the Serb Republic.

B-H: All 'Major Open Problems' in Mostar Elections Solved

AU2806085896 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 0800 GMT 28 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The advisory council to the EU Administration for Mostar, which consists of five Bosniaks, five Croats, and five representatives of other peoples, met for the last time last night on the eve of the 30 June Mostar local elections. They discussed the final preparations for the elections.

East Mostar Mayor Safet Orucevic said that it had been agreed that he and West Mostar Mayor Brajkovic would issue an appeal to all Mostar residents not to allow anyone to disturb the elections by thoughtless behavior.

After the meeting, Brajkovic stated there were no longer any major open problems regarding the elections. There are minor difficulties concerning the polling stations and main candidates on the lists, however, this would be overcome before the elections, Brajkovic said.

B-H: Usora Citizens Favor Establishing Croat Municipality

LD2706183596 Mostar Croatian Radio Herceg-Bosna in Serbo-Croatian 1600 GMT 28 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The results of a referendum in which people of Usora [between Tesanj and Doboj, central Bosnia] voted whether the municipality of Usora should be established were announced today. Boro Jelic reports:

[Jelic] After the people of Usora had their say at the referendum organized on 13 and 14 June in Usora and [for refugees] in countries of Western Europe on the establishment of the municipality of Usora, the coordination committee issued a statement on the results of the referendum.

According to gathered data, 99 percent of people living in Usora and those who came to Usora to vote were in favor of the establishment of the municipality of Usora. If we look at the total number of those eligible to vote—including people abroad, refugees, and displaced persons—56.06 percent of people voted in favor of the municipality of Usora.

Nedeljko Mandic, the chairman of the coordinating committee in charge of the referendum, has pointed out that the Croats in Usora thus expressed their wish to have a municipality with a Croat majority. Without the local administration, the very survival of the Croat identity would have been called into question.

The referendum results are to be sent to the Federal [Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation] Government and the Federal Constitutive Assembly in support of the request already submitted to the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina. There has never been any reply to this request although Buzim and Celic were constituted as municipalities with a Muslim majority in the meantime.

We hope, Nedeljko Mandic said, that this initiative will be received with understanding on the part of the Federal Government and assembly as it is based on the Dayton agreement and the Federal Constitution.

B-H: HDZ Says Vote for Opposition Means 'More Conflicts'

LD2706174896 Mostar Croatian Radio Herceg-Bosna in Serbo-Croatian 1600 GMT 27 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The Mostar committee of the Croatian Democratic Union [HDZ] today issued its election statement for the members of the HDZ of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croat men and women resident in Mostar.

The proclamation reads: The strength of our union, our ability to defend ourselves, our political maturity and patriotism rose to the surface in this area, under the leadership of the HDZ, at the most fateful moments of our struggle for survival and for the right to live. We survived and won in the face of death that was intended to be our lot. Life is imposing new trials on us and demanding new victories. The forthcoming elections in Mostar—the statement by the HDZ Mostar committee says—are our new historic opportunity to be the victors. Those who won the war with us will win with us in peace too. By voting for the HDZ list you will vote for peace, freedom, religious, national and cultural identity, personal safety, and the safety of your property and the sacred right to be the masters in your own home. If you vote for anyone else, you will vote for more conflicts, more victims, more destruction, for being outvoted, and political inferiority, for expulsion and a path of no return. If you do not vote at all, you will vote for the enemy. Therefore, vote for the HDZ and win.

This is said in the election statement of the HDZ Mostar committee.

B-H: Opposition Criticizes Situation in Western Mostar

LD2706224996 Sarajevo Televizija Bosne i Hercegovine in Serbo-Croatian 2100 GMT 27 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] A large explosion destroyed a bar in the western part of Mostar last night, the EU spokesman in Mostar, Howard Fox, said today. He said that the San Remo bar was destroyed, but there were no casualties. We do not think that this has anything to do with the Sunday [30 June] vote, Fox said.

Although everyone agrees that the elections in Mostar are a huge test for democracy, pressure on the candidates of the united list, which recently escalated in the western part of the town, show that the conditions for holding elections are far from regular. We asked representatives of the parties forming the united list to comment in their bases in Sarajevo on what happened in the part of the town controlled by the Croat Defense Council [HVO].

[Reporter Dalida Jugo] According to Gradimir Gojer, a Social Democratic Party official, the latest events in Mostar represent the continuation of the fascist logic which keeps the western part of Mostar in complete darkness.

[Begin Gojer recording] Unfortunately, the elections are expected to be held under conditions where everyone who does not share the HDZ beliefs, all those who do not follow the logic of such a politically anachronistic old man as Franjo Tudjman, are being harassed or expelled. We believe that these elections will be neither genuine nor regular. [end recording]

[Jugo] Mujo Kafedzic believes that Muslim Bosniak Organization officials decided to run in the elections because they believed that the international community would ensure at least a minimum of safety for their campaign.

[Begin Kafedzic recording] We are going for elections in a situation burdened by a series of dangers. Our candidates are under unheard of pressure, they are being forced to withdraw their names from the lists because they are being threatened with murder, with having their houses blown up, or their children killed. [end recording]

[Jugo] Sejfudin Tokic, the president of the Union of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Social Democrats, accuses the international community, which does not guarantee the candidates' safety, for what is happening in Mostar.

[Begin Tokic recording] The severity of the pressure which candidates of the united list of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the candidates of the five opposition parties, are facing shows how important it is that these parties offer an alternative, a political option, and are putting forward candidates who could unite the town and start building Mostar tomorrow for the residents of Mostar under more peaceful conditions despite the Croatian Democratic Union and the Party of Democratic Action. [end recording]

[Jugo] The Republican Party, whose candidates will appear on the united list of Bosnia-Herzegovina, condemn the events in Mostar too. They said this to the administrator of Mostar, Mr. Ricard Perez Casado, the party chairman, Stjepan Kljujic, told a press conference today.

B-H: Mostar HDZ Committee Urges Non-Croats To Vote

LD2706183296 Mostar Croatian Radio Herceg-Bosna in Serbo-Croatian 1600 GMT 27 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The Mostar committee of the Croatian Democratic Union [HDZ] has issued an election appeal to non-Croats in Mostar.

The appeal reads: Fellow citizens, recognize the winners in the forthcoming local elections and vote for the HDZ list. Your vote for the HDZ is a vote for peace, freedom, human rights, religious and ethnic tolerance, personal safety and safety of your property, and the return of your families. Any other choice will be a vote for the continuation of the war, for complete uncertainty, shared poverty, the continuation of personal and family agony, hopelessness and no future. You have opted for Mostar, now opt for the HDZ; be winners.

This is stated in the election appeal that the HDZ of Mostar has addressed to the non-Croats in Mostar.

B-H: 4 Opposition Candidates Drop Out of Mostar Elections

AU2706172196 Paris AFP in English 1705 GMT 27 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Mostar, Bosnia-Herzegovina, June 27 (AFP)—The head of an opposition list in Mostar Thursday confirmed that four of its candidates had dropped out of Sunday's municipal elections, the first post-war polls in Bosnia.

Jole Musa, the head of the Unified Democrats list which groups representatives of Muslims, Serbs and Croats, said that he did not know exactly why they had dropped out.

"There was a lot of pressure and a lot of phone threats which were very, very ugly. There are people who feel less brave and a little less secure than I am who would want to withdraw from the list. We don't feel damaged at all because these four people have left us," he said.

An official at the Unified Democrats office told AFP that the four were Drago Mateskovic, Pero Pervan, Andrija David Skobic and Zeljko Rebac.

On Tuesday, Musa reported that Mateskovic had been attacked by men who went to his office and twisted his arm. He said he himself and three other candidates had received threats.

The Unified Democrats groups the Social Democratic Party, the Croatian Peasants Party, the Union of Social Democrats from Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Muslim Bosnian Organisation and the Republican Party.

Sunday's elections, which are being supervised by the European Union, are intended to help reunite Mostar which is split between Muslims and Croats who fought for 11 months in 1993 and 1994.

B-H: RS Radio-TV Presents Election Coverage Plan

AU2706192896 Belgrade BETA in Serbo-Croatian 1706 GMT 27 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Pale, 27 June (BETA)—The election campaign in the Serb Republic will be covered by the media exclusively in compliance with the rules prescribed by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, representatives of the state radio and television in Pale stated at today's meeting with party representatives.

Of the 24 parties registered in the Serb Republic, representatives of only 10 parties attended the promotional meeting organized by Serb Radio-Television before tonight's drawing of lots.

The drawing of lots tonight will be broadcast live by the state radio and television, and after that, beginning on 9 July, every party will present its program under the same conditions.

Radio and television debates have also been anticipated, at which party leaders will be answering viewers' and listeners' questions.

B-H: LBO Fails To Form Coalition; Will Run Alone

AU2806075796 Sarajevo DNEVNI AVAZ in Serbo-Croatian 26 Jun 96 p 6

[Aticle by A. Redzepagic: "Split Due to the Election 'Cake'"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] "The talks of the LBO [Liberal Bosniak Organization] regarding possible coalitions took a long time. An agreement was not reached although the party's political concepts were not controversial. However, this does not exclude the possibility of various combinations of coalitions, such as the ones, for instance, in Mostar. The problem was one of personalities and the percentage size of each individual coalition member party in the election results," said Salih Foco, vice president of the LBO, at yesterday's conference in Sarajevo. He was explaining why they failed to form a coalition for the September elections.

According to him, the LBO will fare better at the forthcoming elections by running independently. "We are sorry that there is no coalition with the Party for Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Liberal Party, and the Party of Economic Prosperity, but we can do it alone," claims Foco. [passage omitted]

B-H: Tuzla Council Rejects Croat Request for Municipality

LD2706191596 Mostar Croatian Radio Herceg-Bosna in Serbo-Croatian 1600 GMT 27 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The Muslim authorities in Tuzla have reacted negatively to the request for the establishment of a Croat municipality of Soli. Zvonimir Banovic reports:

[Banovic] As expected, the official opinion of the temporary municipal council of Tuzla on the Croats' request for a municipality of Soli is negative. This is the reply we were given today to our request submitted some 10 days ago, Ivica Marinovic, the president of the initiative committee for the municipality of Soli, said today.

The reply, which is in effect necessary at this stage of legal preparations only for the sake of formalities and which was signed by Marijan Simic, the chairman of Tuzla council, says, among other things, that such an initiative by the Croats through the Croatian Democratic Union [HDZ] is to be interpreted as putting into question the elections and the implementation of the Dayton agreement. It directly accuses the HDZ of destroying the Federation. [passage omitted]

We shall soon organize a referendum on the issue in line with the instructions of the federal Justice Ministry, Marinovic said. Depending on the result, and we have no doubt that it will be favorable, we shall prepare a draft federal law on the establishment of the municipality of Soli. Marinovic also said that the committee in charge of the referendum would be appointed tomorrow. It will carry out its task quickly enough for the municipality of Soli to be set up in time for the elections.

B-H: Gen Milovanovic Addresses Army on Patron Saint's Day

LD2706230696 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 2025 GMT 27 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Banja Luka, 27 Jun (TANJUG)—A ceremony marking the Day of St. Vitus, the patron saint of the [Bosnian] Serb Republic army, was held in the Serb Republic Army Club in Banja Luka this evening.

Lieutenant Colonel General Manojlo Milovanovic, the chief of the Serb Republic army's general staff, said that this was the first time that St. Vitus's Day was celebrated in peace, despite "different views on what kind of peace this is."

"We have won the Serb Republic and it is the first time in this region that we have a state for which we have to fight to ensure that no one ever again takes away from us the ethnic and historic territories that have been ours for centuries," Milovanovic said. He added that "part of that territory has been taken away by force or by political means."

He recalled that the Serb Republic army had fought together with the people in exceptionally hard conditions, especially during the last year of the war which saw the formation of a strong alliance against the Serbs, which received military aid from abroad and had NATO's direct participation.

The chief of the Serb Republic Army General Staff stressed that the Serb Republic army had carried out important organizational changes and thus created favorable conditions for the army to function well.

"The army of the Serb Republic has been reorganized with very modest means and this achievement is close to being one of the greatest, even impossible, war achievements," he said. "At present we have to take care of the families of soldiers who have been killed, of invalids, and of demobilized soldiers. By taking care of them and their families we are building a new Serb army and strengthening the defense of the Serb Republic."

Milovanovic recalled that the Serb people made great sacrifices and suffered greatly in the war, although less so in comparison to previous wars and bearing in mind the technology and power against which they fought.

"Our St. Vitus spirit is not that of a conqueror but of a liberator—that is why we resist being enslaved and that is our connection with St. Vitus's Day," he said.

Ratko Mladic, the chief of the General Staff of the Army of the Serb Republic, sent his greetings to members of the army of the Serb Republic on the occasion of their patron saint's day.

The meeting was attended by Prime Minister Gojko Klickovic, members of the General Staff of the Army of the Serb Republic, members of the First Krajina Corps, members of the air force and air defense, Banja Luka Bishop Jefrem, Banja Luka Mayor Predrag Radic, several ministers, and many other guests. [passage omitted]

B-H: Army, HVO Said Ready To Implement 'Train and Equip Program'

AU2706202296 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 27 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Generals Rasim Delic and Zivko Budimir met today with U.S. Gen. Weissman, U.S. State Department representative for the implementation of the peace agreement for Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Press Center of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina reports.

During the talks, the Army of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Croatian Defense Council [HVO] confirmed their readiness to start implementing the Train and Equip Program when the defense law is adopted and to participate actively in the preparations for its realization now.

Gen. Weissman was asked to ensure the standard of the equipment that will be delivered. The Army of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina will not accept equipment that is being dropped from use in European countries.

The participants in the talks also demanded that the obligations from the peace agreement for Bosnia-Herzegovina be met. This refers to the removal of criminal Ratko Mladic from his post in the army of the Serb entity.

This was stated in a communique issued by the Army Press Center.

Croatia: Continued Rejection of EU 'Regional Approach' Seen

LD2706141896 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1311 GMT 27 Jun 96

[By Savo Tomasevic]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Zagreb, June 27 (TANJUG)—Croatia still rejects the strategy of 'regional approach' advocated by the European Union for bringing about reconciliation and economic reconstruction of newly-created states in the area of former Yugoslavia.

In latest commentaries and reactions, Croatian papers and politicians claim that the new EU strategy is an attempt to revive Balkan associations and sketch out a new Euroslavia.

Earlier this week, EU officials once again stated to Croatia the EU criteria for cooperation in the former Yugoslavia, based on the strategy of regional approach.

European Commission Special Envoy to Croatia Fulvio Paolini met with Croatian Vice-Prime Minister Ljerka Mintas-Hodak and stressed that as of now 'regional approach' would serve as a basis in establishing ties between Croatia and European integration.

Ljerka Mintas-Hondak expressed Croatia's dissatisfaction with such a stand and pointed to advantages of individual approaches, according to a brief statement released after their meeting.

That is Croatia's latest reaction to the EU criteria for cooperation with countries in the former yugoslavia.

In early June, Croatian President Franjo Tudjman met in Zagreb with EU Chairman of Ministerial Council and Italian Foreign Minister Lamberto Dini and EU Commission President Jacques Santer. During the meeting, Tudjman stated Croatia's opposition to the Balkan regional approach since, as he said, Croatia had no historical, cultural, political links with the Balkans.

Several days after his visit to Zagreb, Santer said that Tudjman had not fully understood the proposal.

In an interview with the weekly NACIONAL, EU envoy Paolini said that the European Union was interested in the establishment of economic ties between Croatia, Serbia, Bosnia and Macedonia [FYROM], primarily through free movement of people and commodities.

He said that the European Union would not approve the creation of new economic barriers between these states and that it wanted to obtain free movement of commodities from Slovenia to Greece.

Paolini may have denied claims that the European Union wants to create a new Yugoslavia but Croatian officials are still opposed to regional approach and maintain that it is almost an ultimatum to Croatia which, as Tudjman said, wants to joint Central European institutions.

Croatia: Possible Outcomes of Announced Coalition Analyzed

AU2606161596 Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 24 Jun 96 p 5

[Article by Branko Podgornik: "Turmoil in the Center: Will the HDZ Share Power on All Levels?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] When the leadership of the state and the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community] invited the opposition center parties to a long-term cooperation, it was an obvious change in strategy. Before that the HDZ had tried to monopolize power by getting the party majority, but lately they tend to share power on all levels—including the state level—with other parties, primarily the HSLS [Croatian Social Liberal Party] and the HSS [Croatian Peasants Party].

The HDZ does not seem to be counting on unconditional support from their voters anymore. Under normal conditions, the chances are that none of the parties will get a majority in the parliament in the next parliamentary elections, which are scheduled to be held in three years. The HDZ is preparing for a coalition with a gradual increase of its share in the proportional election system according to the election law.

Looking for a partner among the center parties, the HDZ is looking for a new additional backing for its policy. The new inclination was already obvious in February, during the session of the Central Committee of the HDZ, when President Tudjman asked himself rhetorically why he had not given up membership in the HDZ when elected president, and answered: Because it was in the state's interests. The state's interests are also the justification for the cooperation with the center parties. The HDZ would be worse off without President Tudjman than he would be without them, as we know.

Looking for Counterbalance

Having taken that step, the Presidential Palace keeps its distance from the original faction of the HDZ in a certain way. As the president does not want to be left alone in the party with the original faction, he has been looking for a counterbalance on the left for years. His first search began in July 1991, when a turmoil began in the HDZ. The president asked Drazen Budisa to enter the government and restore the balance. However, Budisa stipulated that all other parliamentary parties enter the government, too, and the coalition Government of Democratic Unity was formed in early August.

A left faction in the HDZ separated from the party in the spring of 1994, which shattered the balance in the party again, and the HDZ was in danger of losing the majority in the parliament. Once more, through his associates, the president of the Republic asked Budisa for a coalition of the HDZ and the HSLS. However, Budisa refused. The suggestion to the HSLS was repeated during the crisis in Zagreb. The Lower Council of the HSLS, under the leadership of Drazen Budisa, seems to be ready to enter the partnership with the party in power this time, although the Chief Council has terminated all contacts between the parties (for the time being).

If the Liberals do not solve the conflict about the cooperation with the HDZ, their party might undergo a division, and the outcome is not predictable. All members who favor the idea of cooperation with the party in power are not likely to transfer to the HDZ, but individuals might do so. Certain HSLS representatives in the parliament might also form a new parliamentary faction within the party and cooperate with the HDZ in voting on important issues. That would enable the HDZ to have a two-thirds majority—or at least a simple majority—in the parliament, provided that all HDZ representatives remain obedient.

New Parliament 95 Shaking

The leadership of the HDZ will certainly offer cooperation to the HSS, too, as well as to the New Parliament 95 five-member alliance, of which the HSS is the leader. Marko Veselica, the chairman of the HKDU [Croatian Christian Democratic Union], has already been invited to cooperate. The outcome of those talks has not been made known, but similar offers on the part of the HDZ are due to shake the alliance of five little by little—just as the offer to the Liberals shook the opposition alliance of seven parties in Zagreb. The transfer of individual members from the parties of the New Parliament 95 to the HDZ are also possible, as well as other forms of cooperation.

Mathematically, the possible coalition of the HDZ with the center parties can bring results very soon, because a new majority will be formed in the parliament. Whether that coalition will entail political success and greater support of voters depends on whether it will change the present policy, primarily in the field of Croatian internal affairs. As we can remember, many HDZ analysts estimated that the HDZ had received great support on the state level in the October elections because the occupied territories had been liberated. However, the HDZ has been losing support on the local level, because it does little to solve the problems of living standard. In other words, common people are putting pressure on the HDZ to change the economic and social policies, and—as the Zagreb crisis has shown—to speed up the process of democratization. The announcements of new coalitions in the center have given no answer to those political questions yet, although it is actually the starting point of everything.

Three Questions for the Opposition

The opposition parties have three questions to answer. Will they enter the coalition with the HDZ to maintain the present policy, with President Tudjman as the leader? Will they perhaps enter the coalition to change the present policy, again with President Tudjman as the leader? There is also the third possibility, and it is gaining supporters among the opposition rapidly—to change the present policy without President Tudjman, with one or more of his counter-candidates in the presidential elections. These dilemmas being faced by the opposition are also being faced by the president of the Republic and by the HDZ.

If a coalition is formed in the center, and the present policy is not changed, the center parties will lose votes—and the HSLS has already been losing them. If the coalition changes the economic and social policies and attitude toward democracy, the support will increase.

However, the center coalition might also result in the strengthening of the moderate left option—the Social Democratic Party. It could also spur the alliance of the moderate right, which is at the moment quite uninfluential and dispersed in the HDZ and small and big opposition parties. However, one thing is sure: The announcement of the coalition of the center, having come from the highest place, shows that Croatia is on its way out of a "one-party" system.

Croatia: Railroad Traffic to Eastern Slavonia Resumes

LD2706151896 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1434 GMT 27 Jun 96

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Mirkovci, June 27 (TANJUG)—Railway traffic between the Serb region of eastern Slavonia, Barania and Western Srem, and Vinkovci, a railway junction in Croatia, resumed Thursday after more than five years of interruption.

U.N. administrator in the region Jacques Klein, who was aboard the first train that arrived in Mirkovci, said this was the second important step in the mutual recognition of Yugoslavia and Croatia, the first being the opening of the Belgrade-Zagreb motorway.

Klein said the resumption of railway traffic should make it possible for people to live normally, and said railway traffic between Vinkovci, and Sid in Yugoslavia, would also resume soon.

The closing of the railway between Vinkovci and Mirkovci following Croatia's forcible secession from the former Yugoslavia in 1991 severed the railway traffic between Belgrade and Zagreb.

FYROM: Gligorov Departs on Visit to Turkey

LD2706154596 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1455 GMT 27 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Skopje, 27 Jun (TANJUG)—Macedonian [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] President Kiro Gligorov left this afternoon on a four-day official visit to Turkey at the invitation of Turkish President Suleyman Demirel.

It has been announced in Skopje that during his visit to Turkey Gligorov will "continue the political dialogue at the highest level" between the two countries. An agreement on friendship and cooperation signed last year during Demirel's visit to Macedonia marked the official start of this dialogue.

It is expected in Skopje that the two presidents will discuss other issues, too—the conditions in the region in particular. Special attention will be attached to bilateral cooperation and will focus on economic relations. [passage omitted]

FYROM: Former Minister Examines Country's Strategic Position

AU2606151396 Skopje PULS in Macedonian 21 Jun 96 pp 20-22

[Article by Trajan Gocevski, former defense minister and dean of the Faculty of Philosophy in Skopje: "Danger of 'Cold Peace'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] When they deserted the "Eastern Empire" and turned to the Western Alliance, the East European countries actually made it possible for NATO forces to gain access to the Russian border. This endangers Russia's military, political, and strategic position. As a result, Russia has started to react nervously. This was confirmed in a recent statement by Yuriy Trushin, head of the Russian Embassy in the Republic of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM], when he said: "When NATO's military and political structures are moved closer to Russia, a new situation will be created, and our state will give it a proper consideration. I say that the answer will be appropriate and that it will not lead to anything good. Everything will be changed then and a new arms race will begin."

This warning must be taken seriously. In spite of its unfavorable strategic position, political instability, and economic crisis, Russia and the CIS today represent a respectable force that stretches over an enormous territory. It has a large population, natural resources, scientific potential, advanced technology, including space technology, and substantial forces and armament, including nuclear armament, which can any time endanger the achievements of civilization on a global scale. The recent activities of Russian diplomacy, which takes every opportunity to emphasize Russia's role in creating the new world and European security architecture, have been moving precisely in this direction.

In our opinion, any improvised assessment on the new constellation of the overall military, political, geographic, and strategic relations in Europe could lead to the wrong conclusion.

Historical experience tells us that this situation happens whenever the superpowers decide on their spheres of influence in an express way, without taking into consideration the interests and views of other states, even if they are their allies. As far as the position of the United States and NATO in the new constellation is concerned, it can be assessed as very favorable. Namely, they came out as winners in the decades-long competition in many fields. They broke up and removed the rival military bloc, and they dissolved the leading state of that political and military grouping. Besides being militarily and strategically superior, the United States and its allies are also the leading force on the global political and economic plane.

In brief, after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the positions of the Atlantic Alliance were particularly reinforced and fortified in the Persian Gulf, the Gulf of Aden, the Red Sea, the Adriatic, Southeast Europe, and the Balkans. The strategic vacuum that was created in Europe has gradually begun to be filled by the Partnership for Peace Initiative, and in the next stage it will be filled by the direct enlargement of the Western Alliance with the admission of the countries of the former rival bloc and others. These U.S. and NATO intentions disturb Russia, which feels it is in direct danger of an expansion towards its border. The U.S. efforts to expand to the East come, however, as a result of its position as "winner of the cold war," which makes it the main arbiter in the establishment of new relations. In our opinion, however, if this position is overemphasized, it could lead to new conflicts and a "cold peace."

It is our opinion that in the future, particularly as regards the new European security architecture, the views and interests of the EU member states, primarily Germany on the one side and Russia on the other, will have to be more respected. If all this is done in an unconstrained atmosphere and with mutual respect, relations will be positively promoted. On the other hand, if relations are established only from the point of view of the current political, economic, and military advantages of the United States and NATO, we will then surely enter into a new phase of relations that will be based on rivalry and cold peace.

Can the world's order be exclusively based on the interests, positions, and achievements of only one superpower? We believe that this is not possible, let alone desirable. Today, whether we want to admit it or not, there are a number of centers of political, economic, and military power, which cannot and should not be disregarded in the shaping of global relations. Without any intention to discuss these centers at length, we nevertheless mention the following:

a) Europe, with the European Union, is becoming a large power with a respectable capacity for decisionmaking, and its future leader will be Germany;

b) Russia and the CIS, after consolidating themselves politically and economically, will become the next future center of political, economic, and military power whose interests will have to be respected;

c) The countries that are close to Turkey, headed by Turkey itself, also have prospects of becoming a new power center that can affect the establishment of new geographical and strategic relations;

d) China, with its own power and with the possible amelioration of its relations with Russia, will also become a potential new power center;

e) Japan, with its economic and technological expansion and potential, represents a reality on the global plane that will not be bypassed in the establishment of new relations in the world, and so on.

There arises the question of the strategic position of the Republic of Macedonia in the conditions of the present strategic vacuum we have mentioned, which is openly, but sometimes covertly, being filled.

Speaking of our country, we can say that, despite the tensions in its vicinity and the war waged in former Yugoslavia, it managed to achieve its independence, sovereignty, and statehood by peaceful and legitimate means. It has constructed a political system on the pattern of the western democracies with a civil concept and an economic system based on the market economy and private ownership. It has asserted itself in the world with its principled policy, its civilized approach to resolving disputes, the peaceful separation from the former state, the peaceful retreat of the Yugoslav National Army, and its respect for international law whenever international issues are to be resolved.

Because of this, it did not start a war with any of the warring sides, and it did not place itself at the disposal of any of the warring sides. Today it is not faced with the high risk of being endangered as a result of the strategic goals of any of the states in its immediate or larger vicinity. Analyses show that there are a number of things that could endanger our country's security, such as the following:

a) Possible escalation of the Kosovo problem and the way in which it is solved, that is, the selection of means, methods, and the timing of its solution;

b) Definition of the border with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and its international legalization and the possibility of a conflict if any of the parties wishes it;

c) Efforts to redefine the status of some parts of Macedonian territory (some autonomies) by which some of the neighboring countries might obtain a strategic advantage as is advocated by some political subjects in the country, which could irritate other Balkan countries.

On the other hand, being a part of the Balkans and Europe, Macedonia is affected by all the changes on the geographical and strategic plane that are taking place in the region. All these influences are reflected in its own position. Some analyses show that Macedonia is in an exceptionally positive situation compared with the other states formed after the fall of former Yugoslavia. Nevertheless, it can also be seen that regarding all its determinations matters have not been finally clarified, which is actually not something that depends on Macedonia itself, and many times it does not depend on us at all. We believe that our country has made big steps in this direction and it has clearly stated its position, interests, and determinations. A number of these have been accomplished, others are in the phase of negotiations with partners, and the rest will probably be solved in the future over the longer term.

Namely, the policy for a peaceful resolution of the Yugoslav crisis, which has been shown to be the only solution, brought great advantages to our country:

—The policy of equidistance with the neighbors has been shown to be the best solution because if we had leaned toward any of our neighbors, we could have caused reactions from other states and thus complicated our position in the Balkans;

—The foundation of the civil defense and protection system on the pattern of the European states, and above all the establishment of the Armed Forces (Macedonian Army) according to NATO standards, has shown that our current defense policy is proficient and acceptable and that our state aspires to association with NATO;

—The fact that we rely on collective systems of defense makes us a modern state that sees its security at large, following the example of integral security rather than narrow interests and momentary positions;

—The ideas and efforts for the admission of our country and its defense in Europe's defense architecture, through the defense identity of the European Union, is another civilized issue of our policy that has proven to be of vital importance for multilateral cooperation and overcoming fragmentation in Europe;

—Our country's inclusion in the Partnership for Peace as an antechamber to membership in NATO, which is our ultimate goal, is another matter of great importance for our security. In spite of the program's many negative aspects for the countries that join it, in the sense that their military capacities, budget, equipment, planning, and so on are controlled, it is a stage through which one must pass to achieve regular membership, which is neither simple nor cheap, nor without difficulties;

—The individual program for cooperation with NATO, which was highly assessed, gives us hope of future prospects in these relations, particularly regarding cooperation within the framework of the North Atlantic Council, of which our country is a member;

—The creation of conditions for our country's participation in various NATO activities and within the Partnership for Peace Program is further confirmation of the right directions of our overall defense and security policy;

—Negotiations on NATO enlargement have started, in which our country is an active participant. Our country is very much involved in the efforts to enlarge NATO's southern flank and alleviate Russia's complaints about this process.

According to the assessments of our Foreign Minister Frckovski, "our request for membership is of logical priority, because only through a collective security system that is created by the Alliance can we realize Macedonia's interests, and Albania and Macedonia are the two key countries for geographical and strategic control and stabilization in the region." These negotiations have created the bases for our state's association with this military alliance, which is the ultimate determination and goal of our policy;

—Our cooperation with the Council of Europe, the OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe], European Union, and other European and world associations gives us hope that our position, in the geographical and strategic sense, will be favorable and acceptable.

In spite of all these advantages in our country and our immediate environment, careful analysts will observe that U.S. interest in this region, which is more visible and precise, and Russia's interest, which is undefined, is becoming more obvious each day. However, in some subtle spheres, they are still at a distance and waiting, which is particularly surprising regarding their diplomatic missions in our country, their international recognition under our constitutional name, and our relations in some international associations, and so on.

This indicates that we must be cautious and restrained in making assessments about our position in terms of the superpowers' strategic interests in our territory and, above all, our state. A step forward was made with the guarantees given for our independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity through the UN and U.S. preventive forces, which were successful and made Macedonia be treated as an equal subject in international relations. It made Macedonia seriously accepted in the international community, as a factor of stability that makes constructive proposals for the resolution of the regional problems.

Furthermore, we can definitely evaluate this relationship towards our country as positive. It opens future possibilities for more intensive diplomatic activity to resolve all open issues. The process of intensification of our international activity has already begun. It is oriented towards the European states, European Union, and North Atlantic Alliance on a political, economic, and military plane, and it is producing substantial results. All this gives rise to optimism in the sense that these activities will be fruitful also in the sphere of our country's strategic determinations, in conformity with the determinations of our policy and our national interests.

Our military, political, geographical, and strategic position is further burdened by a number of controversies that will have to be taken into consideration in our future policymaking. In short, these are as follows:

—There are still undefined signals regarding the importance of our region for NATO and for the United States as its leading force. This can be supported by the following statement by Mr. Victor Comras: "There are three specific areas in which we see U.S. interest: First, Macedonia is the key country for stability in the southern Balkans and in the Aegean region; second, you are building a democratic state that shares the principles of Western Europe and the North Atlantic Alliance; and third, there is the charming hospitality of the Macedonian nation. There are countries that are located at important strategic points, such as, for instance, Iran and Iraq, but they are not responsible members of the world community and their policies do not permit us to build close and friendly relations," (interview for NOVA MAKEDONIJA 12 June 1996). Does this mean that U.S. diplomacy does not consider our location to be important in the geographical and strategic sense, which leads to other conclusions?

Russia's reaction to our policy for NATO membership is aimed at a possible "understanding" of its previous rival and respected partner in its national interests in these territories, as was the case previously in history. We support this view with the following statement of Mr. Trushin: "It is sufficient to recognize our geographical, political, and strategic reality to understand Russia's place and role. Now, as far as NATO is concerned, our position towards the Alliance is generally known. We are against NATO's expansion in the sense of its military infrastructure. However, we are pleased to note that our voice was ultimately heard. The latest session in Berlin shows that a gradual adaptation to the changed reality in the multipolar world has begun. For the first time, it was noted that NATO is one of the components of the system of common European security. It is not the only one, but one of the components, together with all the other structures. We believe that NATO's political expansion is possible, without its military structures approaching Russia, that is, its nuclear armament, NATO bases, and huge military exercises. We express our concern because NATO's expansion is not just a question of the internal security of a country, but of the overall situation in Europe. This objectively creates a new geographical and strategic situation and, above all, a new military situation, which casts doubt on the military agreements made with the United States at the time of the USSR." If we add to this the statement that "Macedonia in NATO will mean a dislocation in overall security in Europe," the real idea of this former superpower concerning our geographical and strategic position and prospects becomes quite clear. (NOVA MAKEDONIJA of 10 June 1996).

In our opinion, which is based on an analyses of a number of military strategists and analysts, the valley of the Morava and Vardar Rivers remains a transversal on southeastern routes that is of great geographical and strategic importance and has the capacity for the movement of people and military facilities in particular situations, equally regarding our territory, southern Europe, and in general. So, depending on how global relations, including U.S.-NATO and Russia-CIS relations, are evaluated, the strategic importance of our territory and of our country will be defined.

The particular relations that have been established between our country and our neighbors represent an enigma in the establishment of strategic positions and relations in the region.

Namely, recognition of the state but not the nation by the Republic of Bulgaria, the fact that Greece has not recognized Macedonia under its constitutional name, Serbia's recognition without an internationally marked and accepted border, and Albania's conditions that the Albanian minority in Macedonia be given special status and recognized as a constituent nation are matters that complicate our geographical and strategic position in the Balkans and in general, which could cause destabilization should any of the above mentioned neighborly requests be observed.

Macedonia's admission to the United Nations under an interim name (for two months only, as was then suggested) and the continuation of this status until today suggests that the countries with a lot of influence in the world, including the United States, are either not engaged enough or have different positions regarding this question, which raises doubts in relation to their sincere wish to overcome this vitally important issue for our country. The fact that the EU also communicates with our state not under its constitutional name, but under the interim FYROM, suggests that this problem cannot be resolved in this European association, which is of enormous importance for future relations in Europe, although the Union claims that the Republic of Macedonia has the right to decide its name and that no one has the right to impose a name that a state does not accept.

The visa regimes that nearly all European states have introduced for our country also confirm that our country is regarded in the same way as other states that waged war or do not accept civilized standards of behavior in international communications.

The economic embargo that a member state of NATO and the EU imposed on us without reason and the fact that our country did not receive compensation for the losses it suffered from the UN sanctions against our northern neighbor also suggest that different measures are applied to our country, which puzzles us, but which is true.

The interrelated interests in this region, which are of apolitical, economic, military, confessional, religious, ideological, or other nature, also complicate our strategic position, particularly from the point of view of our interesting determination, that is, our orientation towards association with the western military alliance. Namely, on a global level, numerous interests have been intermingled in a small area, which complicates the situation on the one side and burdens clarification on the other.

These, as well as a number of other open questions related to our geographical and strategic position, call for the construction of an adequate and respectable defense and protective system that will be responsive to our potential and the possible sources of danger, a system that will provide the Republic of Macedonia with a secure and peaceful development in the controversial Balkan region.

Furthermore, our defense, protection, and security system must be included in the collective systems of security and defense. This will offer additional support to our defense system in the maintenance of peace, independence, sovereignty, and the territorial integrity of our country. Moreover, our country's membership in NATO, which is our policy's ultimate goal, if it comes about, will represent another strong guarantee for our sovereignty and territorial integrity.

In our view, in these analyses there remains the possibility of a neutral status for Macedonia, which could open up long-term prospects in the sense of additional guarantees for its sovereignty and territorial integrity in the Balkan region.

Finally, when we speak about the possible advantages that our territory can offer in the sense of its geographical, political, and strategic position, we can conclude as follows:

—The direct appetites that our close neighborhood expresses for the Republic of Macedonia tend to have a negative impact on the geographical and political factor of our safety and security;

—The different interests of our neighbors and their divergent interests in relation to Macedonia can be used as a factor of our security and as a factor for deflecting possible aggression;

—The explicit interest in our territory, which comes from all sides, and the efforts in this direction may lead to neutralization. Therefore, there is a possibility for our country to obtain neutral status, which is one of the possible long-term prospects;

—Being in the center of communications and in the center of traffic routes between Europe and the Near and the Middle East, the territory of Macedonia holds a key position for the security in the Balkans, but also for Europe in general. Therefore, it is of strategic importance for the leading forces in the world;

—The assessment that if a new crisis starts in Macedonia it will spin out of control and will undoubtedly grow into a new Balkan war that would shake Europe, and this is not unthinkable, could also be a factor in deflecting an aggression against us and strengthening our strategic position in the region and at large.

Finally, we can conclude that the geographical, political, and strategic position of the Republic of Macedonia in the present constellation of relations is complicated, many-sided, barely predictable, and dynamic. It needs to be constantly reassessed according to the altered relations in the Balkans and Europe. On the basis of these assessments, adequate political and other measures must be taken to find the optimum solutions for its security, defense, and protection. The priority in all activities of state bodies and other institutions of the system on political, military, economic, and other planes, must be to maintain peace, security, independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of the country, as essential conditions for its prosperity. (The author is dean of the Faculty of Philosophy in Skopje and former minister of defense.)

FYROM: General Director of Radio-Television Replaced

LD2706164796 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1530 GMT 27 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Skopje, 27 Jun (TANJUG)—A majority of deputies of the governing tripartite coalition in the Macedonian [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] Assembly today relieved Melpomeni Korneti of her duties as general director of the state-run Macedonian radio-television.

Slobodan Trajkovski, who has worked as an editor, was appointed the new director.

The change at the top of the state radio-television was expected in political circles in Skopje after the former ruling tripartite coalition Alliance for Macedonia collapsed and the Liberals were removed from power. Korneti was appointed general director of Macedonian radio-television as a political appointee from the Liberal Party whose chairman is Stojan Andov.

By today's change at the top of Macedonian radio-television the ruling Social Democratic Alliance of Macedonia, headed by Prime Minister Branko Crvenkovski, has shown beyond any doubt, on the eve of the local elections, that members of the opposition could not remain in leading posts in state institutions, it is assessed in Skopje today. [passage omitted]

Poland: France's Barnier: Patience Needed Regarding NATO, EU

BR2706122496 Paris LE FIGARO in French 27 Jun 96 p 6

[Article by Stephane Kovacs: "Barnier Curbs Warsaw's Impatience"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] "It is not pure coincidence that Jacques Chirac chose Poland as the first leg of his Central European trip. He will deliver a major speech on EU enlargement." Preparations for the French president's visit on 11, 12, and 13 September, among other reasons, brought Michel Barnier, French minister delegate for European affairs, to Warsaw on Tuesday [25 June]. [passage omitted]

Colonel Pawel Seydak [name as published], deputy director at the Defense Ministry's International Security Department, says: "According to NATO estimates, we are at the top of the class. We would be able to join NATO immediately if we were asked to do so." [passage omitted]

Michel Barnier cautiously remarks: "NATO must take into account Moscow's concerns. Where the EU is concerned, membership negotiations will probably start in 1998. Poland still has a long way to go, and it will not be granted any shortcut."

Poland: Agreements Signed During Kuchma Visit Examined

WS2706122096 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 27 Jun 96 p 19

[Article by Edward Krzemien and Jacek Pawlicki: "After Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma's Visit; From Agreement to Agreement"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *"I would like to invite you to Ukraine. Invest now because tomorrow the Ukrainian market might not accommodate all those willing to invest," President Kuchma encouraged Polish businessmen in the course of his two-day visit.*

Ukraine is the "rising star" on the horizon of Polish exports to the East. Over the first four months of 1996, we exported goods worth a total of $272.1 million. Poland is Ukraine's number-one trading partner in Central and East Europe, the fourth in the world.

At a meeting with heads of the largest Polish companies grouped within the National Chamber of Commerce held on Tuesday [25 June], President Kuchma argued that the time is ripe for the former CEMA states to "rediscover" each other and march toward the West together. Ukrainian Industry Minister Valeriy Mazur, who accompanied the president, said his country is prepared to increase imports of coking coal from Poland. It urgently needs 9 million tonnes.

Minister Mazur invited Polish companies to visit the building site of a huge integrated metallurgical plant in Kryvyy Rih. Polish Industry Minister Klemens Scierski said "we could take part in completing the construction work in exchange for shares."

What are the fruits of Kuchma's visit? A number of economic agreements, among them one on reciprocal recognition of industrial goods certificates and on cooperation between the ministries of industry of both states.

No agreement was signed on military and technical cooperation that would provide for supplies of spare parts for military equipment used by the Polish Armed Forces.

The Ukrainians were very keen on signing that agreement because they want us to purchase spare parts for military equipment from them and not from the Russians. Our experts, however, did not approve the draft. They suggest that the word "military" be dropped and that the cooperation agreement provide for general technical cooperation. Negotiations are to be held over the next three months.

A guarantee fund is to be established for Polish investments in Ukraine and Ukrainian investments in Poland. We would contribute $100 million, partly in shares in privatized companies. The Ukrainian contribution would be guaranteed entirely by stakes held by the state in domestic companies.

Poland: Polish, Lithuanian PM's Sign Free Trade Accord

LD2706121996 Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network in Lithuanian 1100 GMT 27 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] After the conclusion of negotiations between governmental delegations of Lithuania and Poland, the prime ministers of both countries signed a free trade agreement in Warsaw today. For Lithuania, this agreement constitutes a very important step in getting closer to the countries of Central Europe and integrating into other European structures. The agreement was signed during the fist day of a visit to Poland by Lithuanian Prime Minister Mindaugas Stankevicius. [passage omitted]

Poland: Eastern Trilateral Strategic Cooperation Discussed

96EP0077A Warsaw POLITYKA in Polish 8 Jun 96 No 23, pp 66-67

[Article by Adam Krzeminski: "The Triangle on the Bug River: Ukraine, Belarus, and Poland Desire a Common Strategy"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *History is indeed dancing a waltz, as Kisiel said. Were a delegation from Lithuania also to sit down at the table, we might say that, after almost exactly 200 years, the former Commonwealth of Four Nations has risen from the ashes and is preparing itself for the 21st century.*

Belarusians, Ukrainians, and Poles discussing a common security zone in Europe? That could have happened 250 or 77 years ago, but now? Still, those who are bothered (or inspired) by historical parallels should take heed. Side by side with the three flags of the countries of the "Triangle on the Bug River" a U.S. flag stood as well on the conference room table of Parkowa Hotel. The American observer arrived direct from Washington. Likewise the presence of that big power on the other "flank," Russia, cast a shadow over the room. It sufficed to enter the hotel's garden in order to see across the street the formidable outline of the Russian, once Soviet, embassy.

And yet, that conference, organized by the Euro-Atlantic Association, created a sensation. Bilateral meetings have taken place before; barely a week previously there was the well-attended Polish-Ukrainian meeting on "The Renaissance of Ukraine." But there has never before occurred such a "Triangle" meeting devoted to issues of security and the consequences of NATO expansion, and such a fairly high-level one at that. Belarus was represented by, among others, Ivan Antonovich, deputy minister of foreign affairs, and Presidential Adviser Sergey Posokhov, and also by Zyanon Paznyak, spokesman for the opposition Belarusan National Front. Ukraine was represented by Oleg Chernousenko, chairman of the Parliamentary Committee on Defense, General Vadim Grechaninov of the Ukrainian Atlantic Council, and presidential adviser Andrey Fialko. On the Polish side the deliberations were inaugurated by Bronislaw Geremek, head of the Sejm Foreign Affairs Committee, and chaired by former Defense Minister Janusz Onyszkiewicz. On the other hand, Poland was not represented by too many official representatives of our "government side," which may have created the impression that, following the 1993 parliamentary elections, the official Polish "Ostpolitik" has become more pro-Moscow and less neutral between the West and the East. That would be a mistaken impression considering that Polish President Aleksander Kwasniewski first visited Lithuania and Belarus before going to Moscow. Still, this may also be the correct impression because our official policy on Ukraine is indeed too vague. Hence Marcin Krol's dramatic appeal in ZYCIE GOSPODARCZE for Poland's greater commitment to strengthening the ties between Ukraine and the West, especially in view of the increasingly pro-Moscow orientation of Belarus. At the same time, gentlemen, entertain no illusions! At the "Renaissance of Ukraine" conference former Finance Minister Andrzej Olechowski concisely defined our possibilities vis-a-vis our Ukrainian neighbor: "When in 1994 I met for the first time with the Ukrainian minister of foreign affairs, I felt like a 10-year-old prince who is scheduled to wed an eight-year-old princess. But by what means and how?"

In the Absence of Nuptials

A wedding was not the point at Parkowa Hotel. The political geography of the "Triangle on the Bug River" is too diversified for that. Poland is on a smooth path toward NATO and the European Union. Belarus has blocked reforms and is turning eastward and uniting itself with Russia, while its democratic opposition is becoming more and more visible. Ukraine is, to be sure, a member of the CIS, but it has not ratified all the agreements with Russia and it is not only trying to keep its neutrality but also clearly emphasizing that it belongs in Central Europe; not only is that country an associate member of CEFTA, but also authoritative Ukrainian politicians are clearly saying that in the long run Ukraine would like to join the European Union at least. In this context, achieving a community of interests within the "Triangle on the Bug River" is extremely difficult.

All the more so considering that the growing divergence between Ukraine and Belarus is not only strategic but generational. For while the Belarusan Government side is represented by elderly people, those with long "Soviet" memories, who have considerable trouble understanding their democratic opposition, which is a generation younger, Ukraine is (just like Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia) represented by young technocrats who have already gotten used to the West and are aware of their potentialities. This is not an impression produced solely by these two meetings. All the countries and societies in our region are not ready yet; they have not completed their transformation and are just beginning to explore their new identity and their new place in the sun. "Don't write off Belarus," I was told recently by Lithuanian politicians. "The process of emancipation may be halted, but it cannot be reversed. Belarus was the big winner in the USSR era, while Russia, outside Moscow and Leningrad, was the big loser. Smolensk became one big ruin while Vitebsk flourished. That's what Belarusan President Lukashenka is betting on. But the old times will not return. The Russians are not going to subsidize Belarus."

The Ukrainian "Rapacki Plan"

Our "Triangle on the Bug River" may be somewhat skewed, but still it may have its own logic, which surprisingly resembles the game for local detente played between East and West in the 1960's and 1970's. Poland is not yet in NATO, but already a new "Rapacki Plan" and division of roles in the East are appearing. If we are to apply an analogy from the recent past, nowadays Poland's former role is played by Ukraine and that of Czechoslovakia or the GDR by Belarus. The dogmatic comments and inaccessibility of the Belarusan adviser seemed right out of the arsenal of Husak and Honecker. He said, "NATO is a threat to us," and "NATO is a relic of the past era and the changes it is undergoing are merely cosmetic and cannot be treated seriously." The Ukrainians reacted differently; they view NATO as the sole functioning security system in Europe, and to them the fact that the countries of Central-East Europe have a chance to join the Euroatlantic structures has protected these countries from the Yugoslav disaster.

Their Own Geometry

One problem is nuclear arms. The Ukrainians declared to the Poles, "We understand that in your attempts to join NATO you cannot pose conditions and reject in advance the possibility that nuclear weapons may be stationed on your territory. But Ukraine, which has—under pressure—given up its nuclear arms, would not understand why such arms should be deployed in Poland. Therefore, Ukraine should propose a nuclear-free zone in Central-East Europe."

The Polish answers to both positions were resolute as regards NATO and waffling as regards nuclear arms. "No one wants nuclear weapons," said Janusz Onyszkiewicz, "but we cannot in advance renounce the rights and obligations associated with membership in NATO, which is a defensive alliance and one incapable of an aggressive policy, 'inasmuch as it is based on the democratic principle of unanimity.' And indeed, wherever just one nay suffices to dam up a majority of yeas there are no wars of aggression. We know that from our own history."

Besides, recent history unites but also divides us. While in the last few years Poland has been focusing most of its energies on (successfully) becoming linked to the West, our neighbors have been, despite all the differences among them, trying to create their own geometry. In particular, the Ukrainians have often been speaking of "Baltic-Black Sea cooperation"—from the Baltic countries to the Crimea. And here history is indeed dancing a waltz. It so happens that half a century after Poland was snatched from the grip of the East and inoculated in the West, which has paradoxically created the conditions for a new Polish-German symbiosis, ideas of resurrecting, as it were, the ancient Polish Commonwealth—this time without us and with Ukraine playing a major role—are arising east of our border. That is good. We should support this, but only from our side of the fence, as members of the EU [European Union] and NATO. Not only in order to avoid the charge of "re-Polonization" of anything but also because Poland (like Germany) cannot afford to vacillate between the East and the West. Only as a closely linked part of the West can we pursue an open and mild Eastern policy.

Easy Border Crossings

Practical examples already exist. Suffice it to utilize the Polish-German experiences in the last quarter-century. Thus it might be possible to establish a permanent "Bug River Triangle" Forum, sponsor an Award of Three Foreign Ministries (by analogy with the Polish-German award), propagate a joint textbook conference, establish sister-city partnerships, establish a foundation for joint projects, initiate regular panel discussions on television, establish a joint periodical resembling the Polish-German DIALOGUE, and consider again the idea of a Eurouniversity in Grodno—precisely there and not in, e.g., Przemysl.

Nowadays we in the "Triangle on the Bug River" are not linked by any deep shared interests. The orientations of Belarus, Ukraine, and Poland are too diverse for that at present. But still, we most certainly do have some shared interests. If the Bug River is soon to become the boundary of the European Union and NATO, then we all are concerned that it would not become the boundary between two worlds armed to their teeth or a "waterfall of civilization." The Triangle on the Bug River should guarantee a Europe of easy border crossings. But for that to happen we all must accept the same system of values and abandon Cold War myths for good.

Poland: Sejm Rejects No-Confidence Motion in Kaczmarek

LD2806082496 Warsaw PAP in Polish 0744 GMT 28 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Warsaw, 28 Jun—The Sejm rejected the deputies' motion of no confidence in Privatization Minister Wieslaw Kaczmarek this morning.

The motion was supported by 124 deputies, 187 were against, and 95 abstained.

Poland: Waning Popularity of SLD Discussed

WS2706111196 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 27 Jun 96 p 6

[Article by Agata Nowakowska: "Alliance Plunging; We Asked SLD Politicians Why They Were Losing Voters"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *In June, the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD] had the lowest support noted in months. Is this a passing crisis or an indication of something far more serious?*

The SLD continues to be the most popular political grouping, yet since May it has lost 6 percent of its supporters. It now has 18-percent support. The Movement for the Reconstruction of Poland is close behind with 16 percent.

Jozef Oleksy, chairman of the Social Democracy of the Republic of Poland [SdRP], and SdRP Secretary Jerzy Szmajdzinski dismiss the unpleasant topic lightly. "This is no real problem, it is merely an incident. We are waiting to see the next poll results," said Oleksy. Szmajdzinski added: "We are looking into the issue and analyzing it."

Izabella Sierakowska, SdRP deputy chairman and an SLD deputy, claims that the decline of the party's popularity is a result of "the difficult decision on the bankruptcy of the Gdansk Shipyard, which was misinterpreted by Solidarity and the confusion surrounding the Concordat": "After the meeting between the SLD and Aleksander Kwasniewski, his spokesman misled reporters by telling them that the president had succeeded in persuading some of the SLD deputies that the Concordat should be ratified quickly. We were bombarded by telephone calls from outraged voters."

Sierakowska claims that "people's expectations are too high": "They keep on hearing about economic growth and budget revenues, so they begin to wonder why they are not prospering. The government makes unpopular decisions, but there is a price tag on reforms."

Jan Zaciura, chairman of the Polish Teachers Union and an SLD deputy, believes that teachers and those employed in the health-care system are becoming disappointed with the SLD because of the poor condition of the public sector.

SLD Spokesman Andrzej Urbanczyk: "You always have to pay a price for governing. The waning support has to do with the witch hunt launched against former Prime Minister Oleksy because the party leaders were forced to focus on warding off attacks and not on the SLD platform. The SLD is currently in the position of 'lone crusader.' The Polish Peasant Party [PSL] not only wants [Privatization] Minister Kaczmarek dismissed, but also very often behaves as if it were an opposition party. If we succeed in overcoming the crisis in our relations with the PSL, our popularity will sink no further."

Poland: Political Scene, Parties Analyzed

96EP0076A Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA (Weekend edition) in Polish 1-2 Jun 96 pp 6-7

[Article by Ernest Skalski: "The Party Market"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Poland can grow stronger and people's lives can be better off on condition that the coalition governing Poland grows stronger and becomes better off.*

The coalition is, to its benefit, ready to work on reforming the state and the economy. Contrary to accusations, the postcommunists are not at all preserving the order of the PRL [Polish People's Republic] era but are creatively transforming it under new conditions. Principally, they are adapting to the market economy the system for appointments to positions in the government and in the economy and, in harmony with the spirit of the time, they are establishing and staffing quasi-market administrative-economic structures such as agencies, one-person Treasury companies, holding companies, conglomerates, and compulsory phony economic self-governments.

The agencies established under Solidarity governments perfectly fit the present rulers. These agencies exist parallel to the ministries of industry, agriculture (there are even two), and foreign economic relations. As for the conglomerates, which are the work of the current ruling coalition, these associate both well-performing and money-losing sugar plants, while others associate coal mines on the same principle. In both cases these structures support parasitic enterprises at the expense of subsector growth and taxpayer money. Nowadays, under the law on economic self-government, all the enterprises, the biggest and the smallest, are to be corralled into several bureaucratic structures.

At the Expense of the Economy

Under the command-economy system in the socialist era the government used to allocate foreign exchange, designate implementers and processing capacities, distribute raw materials and machinery, and provide housing and automobile vouchers. But now instead it can distribute positions, stocks, and blocks of shares; allocate licenses and quotas; provide loan guarantees based on our taxes, and so forth.

At its departure real socialism left behind the licensing of only a few kinds of economic activity (among other things, anything related to arms manufacturing, drugs, noble metals and precious stones). Nowadays the government's licensing powers have been widened to several dozen kinds of such activity. And not only in subsectors, such as the petroleum industry. A government that cannot cope with a group of greedy taxicab drivers is making preparations to license and limit transportation services. It is also to introduce the licensing of tourist services (and additionally require a higher educational background of the entrepreneurs managing such services). It has even required expensive and cumbersome testing of the safety of products with quality labels manufactured by well-known companies. In general, the principle that government monitoring protects the consumer better than does market competition has been reintroduced.

This is how a corruption-breeding network of institutional and personal expectations and dependent relationships is arising while at the same time strengthening the present authorities. In this way some people are given administrative positions while at the same time waxing rich from bribes. Thus people with the right connections obtain executive posts and a quasi-monopolistic position in some or other market subsectors. As for the others, those at a lower social level, these bear the expense of it all but believe that they owe their jobs to such arrangements because then money-losing plants are kept operating to fulfill wasteful government orders. This is a patronage system based on the support of influential persons and the votes of little people.

This system requires an economy that is incompletely a market one. Under a genuinely liberal system, where the government merely establishes and safeguards equal treatment under law for all, there is little room for patronage because the government has little to offer.

To give, one must have. In addition to the ramified structures that are more or less of the administrative kind, a budget comprising the largest possible part of the GNP is needed by the government so that it may "give" and rule.

And in order to have, taking is needed. This means high taxes, high insurance premiums, and high customs duties. In addition, a large state-owned sector in the economy is necessary, along with an extensive system of state ownership of shares in one-person Treasury companies and privatized enterprises. After all, what is defined as privatization reduces most often to the sale of a minority block of shares. The government is not relinquishing its monopoly on power industry, postal services, telecommunications, and railroads, along with its virtual monopoly on insurance. Then also there are the powers of individual government decisionmakers to issue licenses, provide loan guarantees, and place orders with factories. The low overall efficiency of such a system is less important than its high efficiency as regards appointments to decisionmaking posts. This is the fundamental reason why the Left is continuing the transformation under the principle of "little and slowly."

And that is popular. People believe that chaos on the market will be replaced by order and control, which some fail to associate with limited choice, high prices, low quality, and, for example, a fuel shortage. A state that generates parasitic corruption and impedes economic progress is generally viewed as just and more human than the free interplay of market forces.

A large segment of the public still remembers the difficult period of radical changes at the beginning of the transformation and is prone to support the procrastination of the Left. Not everyone realizes that it was precisely those radical changes that have assured the current economic growth rather than their subsequent slowdown, which in time is bound to impede that growth and in the future may threaten stagnation.

The Semaphore Effect

Halfway measures and negligence are not spectacular. The government governs somehow. Many declarations are being made, a little is being planned, resolutions are being passed, and everything proceeds more or less normally, but essentially the process of transformation is coming to a halt. Politically speaking this will not be a threat to the Left for many years, because few people will be outraged by the slowness of improvements in the quality of life.

The circumstances favoring domination by the SLD [Democratic Left Alliance] are linked to the existence of a lasting social base of support for that party. Its adversaries view it almost exclusively as the successor of the PZPR [Polish United Workers Party] and preserver of the PRL [Polish People's Republic], but this by now corresponds to reality less and less.

Longing for the PRL of course exists and attracts more votes to the SLD, but there do not exist any significant social groups that would want to restore it or believe that its restoration is at all possible. On the other hand, as in any other country, there exists a strong left-leaning trend that somehow fits in with a market economy and parliamentary democracy.

This means aspirations toward a fairly egalitarian distribution of goods and to burdening the government with responsibility for one's personal fate. In Poland, following the years of real socialism, these aspirations are particularly strong and most of the people entertaining them link them to the PRL tradition. That also is why a party that derives from such traditions and refers to them to some extent but at the same time declares itself to be promarket, prodemocracy, and moreover able to talk with Russia, has proved attractive to a large and quite diverse electorate. And for the time being it is meeting most of the expectations of that electorate because it is effectively governing in an era of economic growth and improvements in living standards, which always and everywhere is good for the governing party's popularity.

Such a party has the support of not just many but also important voters. The middle class and the businessmen, who had previously been courted without success by the Liberal-Democratic Congress party, whose support is being awaited by the rightist wing of the Freedom Union, and whom nowadays the Movement of the Hundred is wooing, are voting for the most part for the SLD. It seems that the Marxists are aware that while the class consciousness of these social groups should prompt them to vote in favor of the forces striving to liberalize the economy and restrict the role of the state, the choice is being made not by them as a class but personally by individuals who guide themselves not by their class interests but by their personal interests. One can be opposed to government licensing of economic activity yet at the same time accept an arrangement under which one has oneself an opportunity to be granted a license. Businessmen do not necessarily vote for the principles they acknowledge; instead, they vote for individuals who shall govern the country or the community and with whom deals can be struck.

The postcommunist governments and the previous Solidarity ones can be readily contrasted on ideological grounds, with special consideration of the past, that being anyhow the principal factor distinguishing them. But in economic policy the dividing line is not as clear. Let me remind the reader that the existing economic agencies had originally been established by the Solidarity governments. The present governing coalition is applying the tax vise, but it was Minister of Finance Osiatynski who had one year refrained from adjusting upward the tax brackets in accordance with inflation. Similarly, the exorbitant insurance premiums were applied before the current governing coalition. This also applies to many licenses and customs duties. The "wild liberalism" of the Solidarity governments had actually been only moderately liberal, especially during the Suchocka administration, considering that former Prime Minister Hanna Suchocka had to make concessions to both the Polish Peasant Party and Janowski's Peasant Accord party and the coalition Solidarity while at the same time paying due heed to the xenophobic Christian-National Union. Besides, the Freedom Union party, too, that main force of the previous governments, was rather too socialist to be liberal.

The difference between the economic policies of that previous coalition and the current one is quantitative, but this is the kind of quantity that is gradually turning into quality. That will be sensed, however, only after awhile. Ours is not a mature democracy with a solidly grounded market economy, that is, a system that can withhold major shocks while sometimes oscillating to the left with social democrats and sometimes to the right with the Right. In Poland the institutions and norms of this new system are only beginning to evolve, along with lasting alignments of interest groups. Present-day solutions may affect the shape of the economy, the government, and the society for generations to come—but by now within the framework of the parliamentary system and some market economy. Whether over a period of 10 years our growth rate will persist at the 7-percent level or decline to 3 percent will determine whether we shall within the present generation catch up with Portugal and Greece or permanently remain at the tail end of Europe as it integrates.

Thus, the seemingly quantitative and minor differences between the moderately liberal option and the leftist option as implemented by the SLD represent a kind of semaphore switch; the trains will for a while travel in the same direction but ultimately the tracks diverge.

The leftist, statist kind of governance, which is by nature less efficient than its liberal counterpart, means choosing a definitely worse and wasteful road. Hence also the leftists should be removed from power and replaced by another governing formation. Still, even if there exists a chance for dislodging the SLD from power, that may be a change for the worse.

The Counterreformation Trinity

The diverse Solidarity groupings follow two mutually opposed orientations, both being natural enemies of the SLD. One orientation is liberal and the other rightist and anticommunist. The liberals include Freedom Union, the Movement of the Hundred, Aleksander Hall's Conservatives, possibly Center Accord, and probably some others. These groupings are opposed to governance by the Democratic Left Alliance not just because of its postcommunist nature but also because it is becoming a brake on changes, with the latter consideration being more important to many in these groupings.

Were the liberal center to assume power, it would wreak no miracle but privatization would proceed more rapidly and consistently, the economy would become much freer and more efficient, and the lagging reforms of local government administration, insurance, education, and health service would become more radical than in the Leftist version and not take as long. That would afford an opportunity for an optimal variant of growth.

That entire liberal orientation is capable of achieving internal consensus. It could also accommodate even the left-wing faction of the Freedom Union party. Even so, its combined strength is hardly thought to account for more than 10 percent of the national vote. Thus it does not look like there will be a liberal government in the foreseeable future.

As for the other, rightist orientation, it is principally, or even exclusively, anticommunist. It consists of Jan Olszewski's Movement for the Reconstruction of Poland (ROP), which has gained political prominence ever since the presidential elections, and NSZZ [Solidarity Trade Union], plus fringe parties.

Both Solidarity and the ROP believe themselves to be rightist but proclaim a leftist populism. Thus, Solidarity supports a utopian *powszechne uwlaszczenie* [phrase meaning the creation of a broad-based property-owning class in Poland by sharing state-run firms and other public assets among citizens in the form of coupons that could be used to obtain land, homes, or stock shares] in lieu of maligned privatization, while the ROP advocates a review of the already taken and implemented privatization decisions.

Solidarity defends big state plants because that is where most of its membership is from. The ROP produces the impression that the economy is not its concern, as it were. Its "Contract With Poland" simply states something like everything for everyone. Such conflicting platform planks as, e.g., tax cuts combined with greater government spending, render impossible pursuing any coherent policy in the event that the ROP becomes the governing party, but they may be useful in winning votes. The ROP and NSZZ count chiefly on voters whose anticommunism obscures to them all other aspects of reality, as well as on people who feel frustrated and hostile to ongoing changes. During Solidarity governments the attacks on "wild liberalism" and "thievish privatization" motivated voters to support the Left, which paralleled these attacks but seemed to be a more effective barrier to transformations. Now that the Left is in charge of the government, the ballots of frustrated voters may be garnered by the populist Right.

Current polls indicate that, taken jointly, the ROP and Solidarity can threaten the SLD's position in the coming elections. They may join forces because their platforms are not markedly different. But their rapprochement is being obstructed by the personal ambitions of their leaders—that nemesis of the Right—and by major differences in tactics.

NSZZ Solidarity includes, among others, supporters of Walesa and of a broad post-Solidarity coalition. But, within this orientation, the ROP's Jan Olszewski wants no other allies than Solidarity, and it is not yet known whether he will conclude an alliance with it before the elections. If there is no alliance then many of those who had voted for this orientation will become disappointed, and it is not certain for whom they will next cast their votes. The relatively strong positions of the ROP's Olszewski and NSZZ Solidarity's chairman Krzaklewski may not last. Their groupings were not represented in the Sejm in 1993 and, if they compete separately in the 1997 elections, then they may not score significant success, especially considering that the ROP lacks an organizational underpinning and ability, as well as money.

Simple arithmetic shows that the entire broad post-Solidarity orientation headed by Walesa will win more votes than the SLD. But in a democratic system removing from power the postcommunists, who were democratically legitimized for governing, would not be the same as overthrowing communist dictatorship. Following the toppling of that dictatorship in 1989 a great and historic prospect of independence, democracy, and a market economy has opened before Poland and been to a large extent utilized. Nowadays, assuming that the postcommunists lose the next elections and willingly relinquish power, no new revolutionary changes are in the offing, and instead the emerging prospect would be that of an acute political struggle for what kind of social and economic policies should be pursued. That is because, contrary to the appellation of the party headed by Olszewski, we face not the task of reconstructing Poland from its ruins but that of major policy revisions, and that is how most voters view it.

And hence, the all-embracing post-Solidarity bloc appears unrealistic and unnecessary, except that not everyone has the courage to say it. Besides, an alliance between NSZZ Solidarity and the ROP may repel by its radicalism many voters who prefer stability and who have bad memories of Balcerowicz's reforms. Still that pair of parties may reckon on predominance if it will combine its forces with the Polish Peasant Party [PSL], which, as the partner of the governing SLD since 1993, has been an element of that stability so desired by many voters.

The PSL has repeatedly emphasized that its coalition with the SLD is of a purely pragmatic nature, and that it is free to conclude an alliance with any other party, even practically with the rightist nationalists, provided that it will derive advantages from it. If it is in alliance with the ROP and NSZZ Solidarity, then the PSL's standing would be stronger than in a coalition with the SLD.

The ROP is unable to establish cooperation with the Freedom Union party, even though the latter's leaders spent years in the anticommunist opposition, and some were even imprisoned, and even though it is the greatest force in the opposition to the postcommunist Left. To "real" rightists like the ROP the Freedom Union is leftist, "pinko," and hated even more than the SLD.

On the other hand, that rightist movement can cooperate with the PSL, the former ZSL [United Peasant Party], which appropriated its name from the genuine Mikolajczyk Polish Peasant Party after having Mikolajczyk murdered jointly with the then Communist authorities. For decades, as the ZSL, that party had been part of the Communist power structure. In return for high positions and perks, it pursued an antipeasant policy. Now, without even making any apologies—something that Kwasniewski proved capable of—it is cogoverning with the postcommunists and is ready to remain their partner unless the rightists make a better offer. And all this does not prevent the rightists from wanting to ally themselves with the PSL. ROP Chairman Olszewski decides who is and who is not a communist in the Third Polish Republic.

It would seem that the rightists, being so ready to cooperate with the PSL, are not as ideologically principled as they proclaim themselves to be, and also that their preoccupation with the past is calculated to attract those voters who can see nothing except the past. As for their current policies, both the ROP and NSZZ Solidarity fit in quite well with the PSL, which protects obsolete, small-scale agriculture just as Solidarity protects jobs in inefficient state plants. This entire counterreformation trio is xenophobic and opposed to change, to the country's opening to the world, and to integration with Europe. Even if it expresses its opposition only furtively, its attitude is quite clear to everyone.

Unfortunately, at present a Solidarity-ROP-PSL alignment appears to be the only realistic alternative to domination by the SLD.

Poland: Advisers to Prime Minister Profiled

96EP0077B Warsaw POLITYKA in Polish 15 Jun 96 No 24, pp 27-29

[Article by Mariusz Janicki: "The Ear of the Prime Minister: Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz Has Finished Picking His Team of Advisers"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Being an adviser is not an easy job. Those in power rarely listen to their confidants, and if they do, not too attentively. Usually being an adviser also means becoming politically branded and the label sticks for a long time to one's title of professor or Ph.D., which may be a problem, especially when the political wheel turns full circle. Nevertheless, there always are some people willing to take on this job. Four months after he first took office, Prime Minister Cimoszewicz has finally presented his team of advisers.*

Advisory teams have so far played various roles—from the clannish circle of political friends, party men as might be said in the case of ex-Prime Minister Jan Olszewski, to the ramified and virtually Byzantine, and thus necessarily sham structures, that former President Walesa gathered round himself in the form of a dozen or so councils (totaling 500 members). We learned about their accomplishments chiefly on the occasion of spectacular dismissals of their widely known chairmen. Sometimes we also have encountered creations strange from the point of view of logic: The Political Advisory Committee under the minister of internal affairs was repeatedly embroiled in conflicts with its superior, irrespective of the minister's political hue at that.

To some politicians experts served as an ornament for pluralism's sake, especially when they could thus appoint popular public figures as their advisers, while to others they afforded an opportunity to emerge from a political ghetto, as in the case of the famous Consultative Council under General Jaruzelski in the 1980's.

Passions have been inflamed by both the advisers themselves (such as, e.g., Andrzej Drawicz and Jerzy Milewski, who had quite unexpectedly begun to advise the then Prime Minister Oleksy) and by the coordinators of the advisory teams. Suffice it here to mention Franciszek Mieczka, the gray eminence of the cabinet of Waldemar Pawlak, or Andrzej Ankiewicz, a former Security Service man whose nomination as the coordinator of Jozef Oleksy's advisory team evoked protests from the opposition. Besides, we most often learned about the advisers and their coordinators on occasions that were not particularly linked to the nature of their work.

Public and Secret Lists

The advisory team that Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz succeeded in getting together (see box) looks interesting, although several questions beg to be asked. It is likely that the prime minister has deliberately refrained from inviting television stars to be on his team, even though a couple of such names can be found on the list. He also refrained from a partisan approach. Yes, it is true, he has not set up a team of people from his own party alone, but he has not either invited any individuals who are prominently linked to the opposition, especially economists.

Besides, it is not unlikely that Cimoszewicz has had trouble in attracting people on whom he had counted, because it took him such a long time, on the installment plan so to speak, to finish completing that team.

Andrzej Barcikowski, chief of Prime Minister Cimoszewicz's team of consultants and advisers—who in 1995-96 directed the Office of the Supervising Council of Polski Bank Rozwoju and during 1984-90 headed the Team for Analysis and Forecasts under the PZPR [Polish United Workers Party] Central Committee—denies such suppositions, saying, "We met with no refusals; on the contrary, we have a second list of consultants desirous of advising Prime Minister Cimoszewicz but reluctant to have their names made public for political or social considerations. I shall only say that the prime minister asked Lech Falandysz, former chief of staff to former President Walesa, for advice on regulations concerning accessibility of firearms and has not met with a refusal."

The extent to which the newly appointed advisers identify themselves with government policies and the political orientation of the governing coalition varies. Michal Komar, in the past associated with moderate dissidents during the Polish People's Republic era, said, "I don't identify myself ideologically with the current government and my views are not those of the current coalition, but Prime Minister Cimoszewicz is the head of the cabinet of the Polish Republic and I see no reason to refuse him the right to familiarize himself with different opinions, including mine. Besides, if I notice that my counsels have no resonance, then I shall consider my remaining on the team as senseless."

The Mayor of Poznan Wojciech Szczesny Kaczmarek is similarly cautious. "I represent the Association of Polish Cities, more than 200 municipal centers, and the prime minister should be able to obtain first-hand information; the organization I chair is nonpartisan, although of a certainty it is to some extent political, and this too is how I view my role as an adviser. I am to represent municipal affairs to whoever is the prime minister and refrain from a partisan approach in doing so."

"I Advise, Therefore I Accept"

Krzysztof Teodor Toeplitz, an explicit supporter of the successive leftist cabinets since 1993, takes a different stance. "First of all, an invitation to advise the prime minister means acceptance of the expert's previous activities, including political ones. On the other hand, consenting to advise likewise means evident acceptance of the political visage of the governing coalition and reflects goodwill for that administration."

This opinion was partially confirmed by Witold Zaraska: "Since the prime minister has asked me to advise him on economic matters, this means that he has evaluated my possibilities and qualifications for that domain and not my political views." Thereupon, the head of Exbud construction company defined his approach more precisely: "To me there exists a clear distinction between advising and politics. I don't link my decision to accept becoming the prime minister's adviser to any political orientation."

In other cases a special role is played by personal esteem of Prime Minister Cimoszewicz, perhaps even to a greater extent than ideological ties to the governing alignment as a whole. This appears to be so in the case of Leon Kurowski, who had for 10 years been dean of the Chair of the State Budget at the Main School of Commerce. Kurowski emphasized, "I'm completely in accord with the policy of the coalition, and especially of Prime Minister Cimoszewicz, whom I admire greatly—I remember him from as far back as the Department of Law and Administration, Warsaw University, where I used to lecture."

Many of the advisers have leftist leanings, but for the most part they do not engage in active politics (there is only one Sejm deputy among the advisers on international affairs, and only one party activist). In this respect the team's image is favorable because, as a rule, a strictly partisan approach is not very compatible with cool and objective criticism. Such besides was the concept of the Council of Ministers.

Barcikowski prefers not to use the word "adviser" on the grounds that "This means a person who is politically linked to the person he advises; a consultant, on the other hand, is to me an independent expert who offers his knowledge and not his views. Seen from this standpoint, Stefan Kurowski, who is known for his rightist views, has something valuable to say on economic matters to the prime minister. We picked as experts individuals who represent not only their fields of knowledge but also broader constituencies. I realize that this may involve an element of lobbying personal or group interests, but I am not afraid of that. The prime minister will find a way out commensurate with national interest."

Abundance and Gaps

Now about the puzzlements. Perhaps the greatest is the presence of Stefan Kurowski on the list. Consider that Professor Kurowski had until quite recently been the leading economic expert of the Confederation for an Independent Poland. It was he who authored the famous concept of the "dried-out sponge," intended to symbolize a Polish economy from which money had been squeezed out; the way out of this situation was to print money. Nevertheless, recent comments by that controversial professor point to an evolution of his views, to such an extent that an economic expert close to the governing coalition (also one of the prime minister's advisers) declared that Stefan Kurowski's current views are quite in accord with his own.

Another puzzlement concerns the scant number of people advising the prime minister on international affairs. Besides, all the four experts concerned (see box) had previously worked with Prime Minister Oleksy. No disrespect to them is intended but it is not difficult to notice that they represent (to a greater or lesser extent) a rather identical approach to the nation's foreign policy: a course toward Europe, naturally, but also greater rapprochement with Russia. It might be advisable to listen to the voices of experts holding a different opinion, if only to enrich the range of views (Andrzej Micewski is to join the group of international advisers, but his views are similar to theirs).

The third, and perhaps the most greatest, puzzlement is that, although the list seems to abound in names and domains of interest, it contains several major gaps. Perplexing is, e.g., the absence of specialists on domestic security, crime, national defense, health (just one, Witold Zatonski, is too little), education, ecology, trade unions, the disabled, and national minorities. These fields denote important national issues that are currently the domain of heated disputes, and it is difficult to assume that the prime minister wants to refrain from taking part in them with the assistance of, precisely, his advisers.

Ranking of Domains of Interest to Prime Minister Cimoszewicz (by number of consultants in particular domains):

Economy and business — 13

Social policy — 8

Legislation, law, the constitution — 6

Social malaise — 2

Local governments — 2

Culture — 2

The media, publishing — 2

Agriculture — 1

It is questionable whether the entire complex domain of culture can be represented before the head of state by Kazimierz Kutz and Krzysztof Teodor Toeplitz; they are well-known and valued persons, but, after all, they are only two. Similar reflections apply to experts in other fields.

The Substitute Ear of the Prime Minister

The domains mentioned above are surely included to some extent in the scope of interests of those picked for the prime minister's team of experts, but one can think of theoreticians and practitioners who are more conversant with these domains.

Of course, all these comments and doubts will make sense once the work of the team of consultants begins to exert some tangible influence on the actions and decisions of the head of state and, indirectly, of the entire Council of Ministers. Let us not forget that the prime minister can also avail himself of experts on the staff of that council and within the individual ministries and various other groups of specialists. He does not have to depend solely on his personal team of advisers, but because he has invited their collaboration, he probably intends to benefit from it.

The operating procedure recommended to the advisers by their team coordinator Andrzej Barcikowski, who was appointed by the prime minister, seems to indicate that real and not make-believe advising is meant. Following the first "general" meeting, which took place on 31 May (and was probably the last of its kind), every individual had his own work cut out for him, with the plan being first to present to the prime minister a catalogue of the principal problems in a particular domain and eventually to ask him about the attendant situation as viewed from the standpoint of the general government administration, whereupon the experts should expect detailed questions from Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz.

Some of the consultants already have established personal contacts with the prime minister, by memos for the time being. Besides, it seems that this form of dialogue is to predominate (recently K.T. Toeplitz, M. Komar, W. Nieciunski, and W. Zatonski have been most active in this respect, and the issues these consultants presented to the prime minister include, among other things, promotion of Polish capital and placing it on in a position equal to that of foreign capital, the crisis in housing construction, social reforms and especially the timetable for their conflict-free introduction, social poverty and pauperization, the planned introduction of the value-added tax on books, and others).

The substitute ear of the prime minister is to be Andrzej Barcikowski, even though he affirms that the advisers will see the prime minister not just on the television screen. Incidentally, the 40-year-old Barcikowski (no relation to the former secretary of the PZPR Central Committee) has the chance of becoming a veritable eminence grise of Cimoszewicz's cabinet. He has known the prime minister since university times, and they worked jointly for the PZPR party chapter at Warsaw University. Subsequently, Barcikowski was an adviser to Cimoszewicz when the latter chaired the Parliamentary Caucus of the Democratic Left (which, it is said, is nowadays the most promising and most frequent stage on the road to becoming head of state).

The Office of the Council of Ministers will not pay the consultants any salaries, but they will receive honorariums for specific position papers, especially if these require time and considerable effort to prepare. Many of them have declared that they will not accept any remuneration, but others are willing to be paid. Besides, Andrzej Barcikowski himself encourages his associates to view their duties pragmatically. The Office of the Council of Ministers is to provide them, insofar as possible, with any information, classified or not, on the state of the nation, provided that they pass all the required procedures for access to state secrets.

The 40-member team of consultants and advisers to Prime Minister Cimoszewicz does, despite some deficiencies, produce a solid impression (more than one-half of the members have titles of professors or doctors). But as to whether it will be a professional advisory body with good access to the prime minister or yet another sham body created to satisfy official conscience, only the head of state himself and his closest entourage will decide.

[Box, p 27]

Consultants and Advisers to Prime Minister Cimoszewicz

Consultants:

Jan Baszkiewicz, historian (history of political and legal thought)

Janusz Czapinski, psychologist (social psychology)

Wlodzimierz Czerzasty, publisher (Muza Publishers)

Pawel Czechowski, lawyer (agricultural and administrative law, European integration)

Jerzy Gluszynski, sociologist

Stanislaw Gebethner, lawyer (constitutional law, political science)

Ryszard Harbala, business executive (Stalexport)

Wojciech Jozwiak, economist (agricultural economics)

Zbigniew Kielminski, political scientist (political science, modern political systems)

Wojciech Szczesny Kaczmarek, mayor of Poznan, chairman of the Association of Polish Cities

Michal Komar, publicist, editor in chief of SZTANDAR, director of the Chamber of Press Publishers

Boguslaw Kot, banker

Marek Kotanski, public activist, founder of Monar [society for aiding drug addicts]

Leon Kurowski, economist (budget and tax systems)

Stefan Kurowski, economist (political economics, political geography)

Kazimierz Kutz, filmmaker (among others, "Pearl in the Crown," "Death as a Slice of Bread")

Dominik Ludwiczek, Polish Peasant Party activist, farmer

Ryszard Lawniczak, economist (international economic relations)

Boguslaw Madera, business executive (Zelmer, linked to the Movement of the Hundred)

Miroslawa Marody, sociologist (social psychology)

Andrzej Micewski, historian, publicist

Witold Nieciunski, economist (social policy, housing policy)

Stanislaw Owsiuk, economist (public finance)

Leslaw Paga, economist (former chairman of the Securities Commission)

Krzysztof Pawiak, business executive (Pollena-Ewa [cosmetics factory])

Krzysztof Piotrowski, business executive (Gdansk Shipyard)

Jacek Raciborski, sociologist (political sociology)

Andrzej Rynski, mayor of Olsztyn, local-government activist

Zdzislaw Sadowski, economist, president of the Polish Economics Society

Wladyslaw Szymanski, economist (economic theory, market analysis)

Jolanta Supinska, political scientist (social politics)

Krzysztof Teodor Toeplitz, publicist, editor in chief of WIADOMOSCI KULTURALNE

Jacek Wodz, sociologist (planning sociology, social malaise, problems of Silesia)

Witold Zaraska, business executive (Exbud, chairman of the Board of Governors of Business Center Club)

Witold Zelonski, oncologist (epidemiology of neoplasms)

Tadeusz Zielinski, lawyer, former citizens' rights spokesman

Advisers on International Affairs:

Adam Bromka, political scientist (international law)

Andrzej Drawicz, philologist, translator (Eastern Slavonic philology, history of modern Russian literature)

Wlodzimierz Konarski, SLD [Democratic Left Alliance] deputy, lawyer, Orientalist, diplomat

Wlodzimierz Luzinski, journalist

Poland: Timetable for Administrative Center Reform

96EP0078A Poznan WPROST in Polish 9 Jun 96 No 23, p 8

[Article by Marek Pol, government adviser on reform of the administrative center: "A Forecast: Following Reform of Our Economic Administration System, Our Government Administration System Will Be Similar to That of OECD Countries"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The acceptance of the related draft laws by the Sejm Special Committee has made possible the next stage of reform of the economic and administrative center of the government. The 10 bills will be discussed in the Sejm probably as early as in mid-June. By 1 January 1997 we shall carry out reforms that radically change government administration in Poland.

The deputies have amended the government draft by deciding, for example, that there will be no separate Office of the Minister of the Treasury and minister of privatization. Following the decisions of the Sejm Committee we can also expect new legal solutions concerning the status of the prime minister and strengthening the standing of the head of state. Under the new system the division of tasks within the Council of Ministers will be organized more flexibly. Thus our system of state administration will be similar to that operating in OECD countries.

Committee work on that package involved cooperation among deputies of differing political hue, with the principal votes being practically unanimous; the issues were examined from a suprapartisan point of view. After all, what we are designing is instruments for exercise of power by whatever political grouping comes to the fore, provided only that it accepts two principles—a market economy and democracy—as the basis for governance.

The timetable adopted by the committee provides for commencing as soon as October the transfer to the voivodes of control over state enterprises. Then also the office of the minister of the Treasury will be established; it will not only keep records of public assets and agencies administering these assets but also will administer the Treasury stocks and shares that until now were dispersed among numerous organizations.

Also beginning in October, if the Sejm accepts the proposal, supervision of the UOP (Office for State Protection) will be entrusted to the prime minister. On this subject, too, the members of the Sejm Committee reached a consensus: They deprived the UOP of merely a few prerogatives, making it less omnipotent. There has been no dispute about subordinating the UOP to the prime minister nor about the prerogatives of the committee supervising the operations of that office. As for the Ministry of Internal Affairs, in its present shape, after the UOP is detached from it, it would continue to function until year end.

As of 1 January 1997 the greatest organizational restructuring of the Polish Government administration will commence. Then the offices of the minister of the economy and the minister of internal affairs and administration will be established. Also established will be the Government Center for Strategic Studies, as a think tank for the prime minister and the government, and the Office of the Chancellery of the Prime Minister. By the end of the first quarter of 1997, the offices whose functions are to be taken over by the new institutions will be disbanded. On this matter, too, there exists a consensus on the Polish political scene.

In the future major changes will take place in economic laws and the customs administration will be reformed. Acts establishing the Ministry of Economic Infrastructure are being drafted. Work on the concept of the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development is continuing. The voivodes in their capacity as local representatives of the state administration will, already at this stage of reform, be vested with greater powers at the expense of the ministers of state. After 75 years the Polish Government will finally be provided with legislation defining the operating procedures of the Council of Ministers. The domain of public administration will be brought into order. This is being expected nowadays by every political force.

In the next few months we shall perform a delicate surgery on the living organism of the state. We cannot allow a situation in which, as a consequence of the mergers of ministries and changes in the nature of their operations, we might lose the best qualified personnel. We cannot allow uncertainty about the future to prompt the departure of the best government employees and the emergence of chaos in public administration. That is why for the immediate future we face arduous work on the program for introducing the reform that we initiated several months ago.

Poland: Government Reform of Administration Criticized

96EP0078B Warsaw POLITYKA in Polish 8 Jun 96 No 23, pp 30-32

[Article by Janina Paradowska: "The Center Will Reform Itself; Decreed: A Strong Prime Minister, Ministers of State With Shifting Powers, and a Partisan Division of Spoils"]

[FBIS Translated Text] All the previous administrations, beginning with the cabinet of Jan Krzysztof Bielecki, prepared to reform the system of administrative and economic governance, but never before have the related draft laws advanced beyond the first Sejm reading. Everything indicates now, however, that Prime Minister Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz will succeed in introducing these reforms, and on a much broader scale than initially conceived, at that. The deputies of the Special Sejm Committee have reached an unusual political consensus on approving a package of laws abolishing several old ministries and establishing new ones, while at the same time making it possible to flexibly establish additional ministries. This does not mean, however, that the ministerial fiefs will be once and for all be defined precisely by law. Such a solution will markedly strengthen the prime minister's standing.

The Council of Ministers may lose many of its charms because presentation by ministers of public opinions that differ from those settled upon at government meetings will not be possible. Until now some members of the successive cabinets have been doing it with such zeal as might produce the impression that precisely that possibility of presenting a different opinion was the principal reason why they held ministerial portfolios. In the future, however, under the new law, a minister will have to present exclusively the government's position, which in the case of the more ambitious ministries may be tantamount to being exiled to Siberia but may prove to be the salvation for the cohesiveness of the policies pursued by the government.

The committee's work will most likely be accepted by the Sejm because many political parties are in the grip of an unprecedented determination to do something about the reform of the government at a time when in general reforms have come to a halt. Thus, unexpectedly, the only great reform to be carried out, the reform of the state administration, may prove to be a hallmark of the ruling SLD-PSL (Democratic Left Alliance-Polish Peasant Party) coalition, supported this time by the Freedom Union.

The Silent Hero

The silent hero behind this unprecedented change, which goes against powerful interests of party and economic lobbies, is undoubtedly Minister Marek Pol, the government's reform commissioner, who kept on doing his job regardless of political eddies and government crises. The concepts of a reform of the economic administration drafted by Marek Pol are likewise the strongest part of the entire package of laws. Also important are the amendments offered by deputies, especially those concerning a flexible membership of the Council of Ministers and the integration of many special ministerial offices with voivodship offices. Other proposals, especially the concept of a combined superministry of internal affairs and administration advocated by Minister Leszek Miller, still remain highly controversial and dubious. They have survived so far owing to political compromises and the absence of alternative ideas; that is, in reality they point to impotence in the face of complicated issues.

Changes will begin in September. They will result in the successive disbanding of the following ministries: Foreign Economic Relations, Construction, Industry & Trade, Privatization, and Internal Affairs (in its present shape). The Office of the Council of Ministers and the Central Planning Office will likewise disappear. Instead, there will arise the following ministries: the Economy, the Treasury, and Internal Affairs and Administration. The Chancellery of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers will be established, along with the Government Center for Strategic Studies and the Committee for European Integration. The government had planned to retain the Ministry of Privatization but it could not withstand the adamant resistance of the deputies, who themselves came mainly from the parties belonging to the ruling coalition—the PSL and the SLD, which on the whole may promote the health of reform. Privatization matters will instead be handled by the minister of the Treasury. It is he who shall conduct the largest capitalized privatization projects and supervise smaller privatization projects handled by the newly established Privatization Agency and the voivodes.

Thus in the economic domain there will appear two new ministries, those of the Treasury and of the Economy. The Ministry of Finance will be left intact, as will the Ministry of Transport & Maritime Economy and the Ministry of Communications, but their responsibilities will be sharply curtailed because the articulation of the government's economic policies will be henceforth handled by the minister of the economy, while ownership duties and rights will be under the control of the minister of the Treasury. Thus, for example, the Ministry of Transport & Maritime Economy will no longer be the owner of LOT Polish Airlines. Similarly, being a minister of communications who is no longer the owner of Telekomunikacja Polska, S.A., means holding a completely different post. Such ministers will still keep their regulatory functions and the power to draft legal framework for the domains under their jurisdiction, but they will be bereft of their influence on the management of enterprises. Besides, it is being planned that, in the next stage of the reform, transportation and communications will be combined under a single Ministry of the Infrastructure, and likewise the functions of the Ministry of Agriculture and Food Economy will be changed. Even now the Agency for Treasury-Owned Farm Property will be excluded from its jurisdiction because all the components of public assets are being transferred to the jurisdiction of the minister of the Treasury.

A Different System of Governance

We have been preparing to reform the economic administration for quite a long time. That precisely was to become the main element of restructuring the government. Yet it turned out that actually the revolution took place where it was not expected and where no attempts even were made to propose it out of fear that the resistance of the current Council of Ministers would be so great as to torpedo any change whatsoever.

The fundamental change, and at the same time the most valuable contribution of the proposed reform (which not only restructures the government but also presents a way of conceiving governance) has been the totally new formula for forming government. The draft law on the operating procedure and organizational structure of the Council of Ministers has been, on the motion of some deputies, complemented with an entire new chapter concerning the scope of the operating principles and procedures of the ministers of state. Heretofore the individual ministries have been established solely through legislation, and laws define closely their powers, but now it is being proposed that the basic scope of activities of every minister be defined in the Constitution with respect to the ministers mentioned in it, that is, the ministers of internal affairs, defense, and foreign affairs, while all the other ministers may be appointed by the Council of Ministers and hence also by a corresponding executive order of the president and by a resolution of Sejm. The specific scope of activities of every individual minister is henceforth to be defined by the prime minister by issuing a so-called attributive order, following the formation of a government. In practice, the adoption of such a system means the disappearance of a legally specified number of ministers with fixed powers. Their number and the nature of the ministries they would head will be decided by the prime minister. Thus a situation is conceivable in which one minister is given, e.g., two different offices if, owing to functional considerations and in order to pursue an established policy, the prime minister considers it advisable.

The plan is that such "flexible" ministries should commence operating only nine months after the Law on the Council of Ministers takes effect, that is, nine months hence, and in the meantime the current rigid division and legally defined number of ministers would continue along with a gradual, evolutionary formation of the government by the prime minister. Introducing this principle requires amending the Constitution. Such an amendment has already been the subject of the first debate at the last meeting of the Sejm, and the tone of the discussion indicates that the concept of a flexible Council of Ministers will gain the approval of a majority of the deputies.

But such approval does not come free. The initiative on the issue of restructuring the Council of Ministers came from the Freedom Union. It was supported by PSL [Polish Peasant Party] representatives, but in return for introducing regulations establishing that the change of the government will be accompanied by the departure of the entire political leadership of the state—ministers, secretaries and under secretaries of state, and voivodes and deputy voivodes.

Thus it was assumed that the transfer of power will be based on the principle of division of party spoils, emulating the example of the United States. Had this principle been clearly and plainly formulated some 15 months ago by Michal Strak, the then chief of the Office of the Council of Ministers, the Freedom Union would have viewed it as an assault on the foundations of a professional and apolitical state administration. But now that party has no objections and its leader Jan Rokita has admitted outright that it has changed its opinion on this matter. It has done so in the expectation that the reorganization of the government will be accompanied by enacting a law on civil service that will explicitly separate the political leadership of the ministries from their core of regular civil servants. The ministerial civil-service personnel will be headed by a director general who shall keep his post regardless of political fluctuations.

The Civil Service

But the law on civil service, even if it is finally passed by the Sejm (for the time being a Sejm committee is working on it), will take effect gradually and over many years. Current government employees will not automatically become members of the civil service. That service will grow over the years in measure with the increments in personnel with suitable qualifications and depending on the financial possibilities of the government. It is thus to be expected that for the next few years the government administration will become highly politicized, and that every change in government—and after all in this matter our experience is only too rich, because on the average the government has been changing every few months—may threaten chaos, long coalition negotiations for positions, and a rudderless administration. Even now selection to even ministerial posts is too often a negative selection, and as for what is happening to appointments to the posts of under secretaries of state, voivodes, and deputy voivodes, it is better to be passed over in silence.

The Special Committee adopted a coherent model that has an internal logic but is good for countries with a relatively stable democracy and a civil service corps that performs its duties irrespective of changes in government. But we Poles exist in an unsettled period when as many positions as possible are being staffed by partisan criteria. Perhaps we should gather courage and finally jump into that water into which other countries have been wading slowly and gradually. But this should not be done so suddenly as to drown. Besides, the government itself is showing relative restraint toward this new principle of a spoils system, viewing its adoption as a major potential source of chaos in the state.

This is not the only dubious decision adopted by the Special Sejm Committee. The doubts concerning the establishment of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Administration have not dissipated. Even the deputies who ultimately accepted the concept advocated by Minister Leszek Miller are not free of apprehensions. To be sure, some teeth have been pulled from that ministerial Moloch (as it was called by a committee member), but the threat of the emergence of a hugely ramified and unwieldy structure with excessive powers still remains. These pulled teeth mean chiefly the extractions, from the future ministry, of responsibilities over the complex aspects of housing policy (transferred to the minister of the economy, the new Office of Geodesy and Cartography, which has considerable autonomy), and also the hopes linked precisely to that flexible nature of the ministries (a minister may but does not have to be endowed with certain powers). Such is the official interpretation, but in reality no tooth has actually been extracted, for that ministry will retain the jurisdiction over all the uniformed services, a substantial part of the Office of the Council of Ministers, and the supervising and police powers of the current Ministry of Construction. Only the Office for State Protection (with its powers to be somewhat limited compared with the past) will be transferred to the prime minister's control, which also is not a matter to be glossed over given the weakness of parliamentary control over the special services and the excessive ambitions of politicians to embroil these services in politics, such as we have been lately witnessing. There is no doubt that this aspect of the reforms has been considered and prepared the least astutely, and that it is in thrall to sporadic political power plays rather than to concern for properly reorganizing the government administration.

But that still is not the end of the list of dubious and controversial decisions. Two other controversial issues are the survival of the Central Planning Office under a new name and the formation of the Committee for European Integration. Formally, the Central Planning Office is to be disbanded and replaced by the Government Center for Strategic Studies, conceived as a think tank for the prime minister, and this idea should be applauded. But the decision to appoint a minister of state, a member of the government, rather than simply a chairman, to head that center, means in reality a continuation of the conflict that continually surfaces between the head of that agency and the minister of finance owing to divergences between macroeconomic forecasts and current economic policy.

Likewise, the idea of establishing the Committee for European Integration as a decisionmaking and policymaking agency in that domain is not meeting with general acceptance. To be sure, interministerial coordination is urgently needed so that, e.g., in Brussels, Poles would speak more or less with one voice, in order that we would finally know who is traveling about concerning what matter and what interests he is trying to attend to, but coordination is not the same thing as formulating government policies, which is the task of the minister of foreign affairs. That is a matter that—if left to discretion of the Committee for European Integration, which will not be merely an advisory and coordinating body—could be adversely affected while at the same time introducing a harmful duality of powers.

The Sejm Special Committee has steered successfully past many reefs, and undoubtedly the draft laws transmitted to the Sejm for a second reading will be better and more far-reaching than the government's drafts. But their general flaw is that they mean yet another reform from the top down rather than vice versa. The proper sequence of reforms that would bode well for the operation and avoid even transient chaos should be, first, the completion of the reform of local governments (the introduction of counties as administrative units), followed by delegation of powers to lower levels and only then by the reorganization of the central government.

It has become a Polish specialty to commence reforms from the top down. It can be said, of course, that it is better to reverse that process and accomplish something rather than accomplish nothing. Such also was the guiding idea of the deputies working on the reform of the central government, accompanied by their belief that while, to be sure, we are not being threatened by a cataclysm linked to a total paralysis of the government administration, considerable chaos of competencies during the initial period of implementation of the reform is a threat. At any rate, the central administration is facing an unprecedented logistical operation.

Refurbishing the Cabinet

The following agencies will be disbanded:

—Office of the Council of Ministers

—Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations

—Ministry of Construction

—Ministry of Industry & Trade

—Ministry of Privatization

—Ministry of Internal Affairs (in its present shape)

—Central Planning Office

The following will be established:

—Chancellery of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers

—Ministry of the Economy

—Ministry of the Treasury

—Ministry of Internal Affairs and Administration

—Government Center for Strategic Studies

—Committee for European Integration

During the next stage, the Ministries of Transport & Maritime Economy and Communications will be combined into the Ministry of Infrastructure.

Poland: Glemp Criticizes Delays in Concordat Ratification

LD2706130396 Warsaw Third Program Radio Network in Polish 1200 GMT 27 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Primate Jozef Glemp has voiced the opinion that the behavior of Democratic Left Alliance [SLD] politicians who oppose ratification of the Concordat before the adoption of the constitution is not in accordance with the Polish raison d'etat.

[Reporter] The primate criticized, above all, politicians from the SLD and not the government. In his view, the government is interested in the speedy ratification of the Concordat. Three years have passed since the Concordat was signed, and this provided lots of food for thought, particularly as regards the effectiveness of foreign policy, the primate said. Cardinal Glemp believes that the public is interested in knowing the details of the internal and external negotiations between the politicians and the Holy See. This is why the press ought to print in full the text of the Concordat, which has in fact already been printed, the primate recalled, but a long time ago. He doubts whether the public remembers what it is.

Primate Jozef Glemp has gone to Paris to attend festivities connected with the 150th anniversary of the foundation of the Polish Catholic mission in France.

This is Mira Nowakowska reporting from Okecie airport [in Warsaw].

Slovenia: Drnovsek on 'Intensified' Diplomacy With Croatia

AU2806114796 Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 27 Jun 96 p 1

[Interview with Slovene Prime Minister Janez Drnovsek by Mihailo Nicota in Ljubljana on 26 June: "Drnovsek: Piran Bay Awaits an Agreement"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Will Slovenia, now that it has become an associate member of the EU, use its improved position to harden its positions in negotiations with Croatia? That was the question the correspondent of VJESNIK asked Slovene Prime Minister Dr. Janez Drnovsek. Drnovsek answered that there would be no hardening at all. The most important interest of Slovene policy was to have good and settled relations with neighboring countries:

"Now that we have finally improved relations with neighboring Italy, the only thing left is to settle our relations with neighboring Croatia. Over the last couple of years, we have started to solve a series of disputable questions, all of which we inherited from the former state. These problems concern the borders, the distribution of property in both countries, and financial relations, and we have to reach the necessary economic and other agreements. In all these talks, at certain points, it seemed that we were very close to reaching an agreement, but nevertheless we have not reached the end, the solution, yet and we have not reached agreement in a 'package,' although some individual documents are already ready to be signed.

In our opinion the main reason for that is Croatia's long engagement with the other side, so its relations with Slovenia, in the war situation, were not a priority. Recently, we have reactivated our diplomatic activity in order to reach a solution and to sign the necessary agreements. Primarily, I am talking about the Krsko nuclear power station, about property and legal relations, and about border traffic.

Soon, we expect Dr. Mate Granic, Croatian deputy prime minister and minister of foreign affairs, to visit Slovenia. That will be an opportunity to make a serious assessment of what can be done in the month or two ahead. Expert solutions have already been prepared, diplomatic activities have once again intensified, and we hope that we will be able to sign those prepared agreements. I think that, being the most complex, two questions will remain unanswered: the sea border, that is, Piran Bay, and the Ljubljana Bank debt to Croatian investors."

Slovenia: Army Presents New Equipment at Exercise

AU2706090096 Ljubljana DELO in Slovene 17 Jun 96 p 2

[Article by Blaz Zgaga: "The Slovene Helicopters Are Already Equipped With Missiles"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Pocek, 16 June—At the military exercise held yesterday, modern weaponry of the Slovene Army was also presented. Among this weaponry was the Bell 412 multipurpose helicopter, which is armed with two multiple launchers for nonguided [nevodene] 70 mm projectiles.

As Defense Minister Jelko Kacin told DELO, this is not the only improvement on these aircraft. Eight Bell 412 helicopters—painted in military colors—will shortly be fully equipped militarily. Apart from the nonguided projectiles, this equipment includes a heat decoy launcher used against infrared guided air defense rockets, targeting devices, equipment for night operations, and other equipment. According to the defense minister, a different kind of helicopter, Bell 206, will not be armed and will mainly be used for training purposes.

The Israeli short range radar Elta 2106 (with a range of 20 km and 2400 meters in height) was presented. It is difficult to detect this radar due to its extremely low radiation. The tactical communication system made by the Tadiran company was also presented. These are digital systems with a range of up to 30 km, and they are used at the levels of a company up to a battalion. These systems enable the eavesdropping of conversations. The Slovene Army units will soon receive another shipment of communication devices.

The Slovene company Fotona also had a breakthrough to present. They presented their thermovisual binoculars for the Maljutka and Fagot antiarmor projectiles, a thermovisual device which is part of the firing regulation system of the M-84 and T-55 tanks, as well as passive night observation devices that increase starlight up to 30,000 times. The Artes 1000 artillery [topniski] system for fire guidance, which has attracted a great deal of attention on the world market due to its compatibility with all kinds of weapons. All the Fotona equipment is already being tested in the units of the Slovene Army.

The Israeli Ortek as well as the Austrian Swarovski night scopes are also undergoing testing, as are German metal detectors, which are being tested by the engineering units.

Federal

Federal: Platform for Conference of Balkan States Adopted

LD2706170896 Belgrade TANJUG in English
1537 GMT 27 GMT 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, June 27 (TANJUG)—The Yugoslav Government on Thursday adopted a platform for Foreign Minister Milan Milutinovic's participation in a conference of Balkan foreign ministers in Sofia on July 6-7.

The Yugoslav information secretariat quoted the government as saying it was in the mutual interest to boost cooperation in the Balkans as well as to encourage further positive trends and promote stability, security and goodneighbourly cooperation.

A large number of officials of international organisations, including the European Union, the European Commission, the five-nation 'Contact Group' and others, are expected to attend the conference as observers.

The Yugoslav Government adopted also a platform for talks on an agreement between Yugoslavia and Russia on cooperation in the sphere of environment, authorising minister of development, science and environment Janko Radulovic to sign an agreement to this effect.

Federal: Visit of Bulgarian Air Force Commander

LD2506224196 Belgrade TANJUG in English
2232 GMT 25 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, June 25 (TANJUG)—Bulgaria's Air Force commander, Air Marshal Mikho Mikhov, arrived in Belgrade on Tuesday on a several-day official visit to the Yugoslav Air Force.

Air Marshal Mikhov was received by the commander of the Yugoslav Air Force and anti-aircraft defence, Air Marshal Ljubisa Velickovic, the Yugoslav Air Force said in a statement.

Mikhov and Velickovic exchanged views on cooperation between the air forces of the two neighborly states and stressed they were sure that good-neighborly bilateral relations would be further developed.

Mikhov is scheduled to tour some unit commands, flying squads and institutions of the Yugoslav Air Force, the statement said.

Federal: Government Appoints New Deputy Defense Minister

LD2706163696 Belgrade TANJUG in English
1627 GMT 27 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, June 27 (TANJUG)—The government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on Thursday appointed Yugoslav Army Lieutenant-General Ratomir Milanovic deputy federal defense minister.

Outgoing deputy Bogoljub Bjelica has been relieved of office as he is taking over another duty, the Yugoslav Secretariat of Information said.

Federal: Tanks, APC's Pass Through Subotica

AU2706131296 Belgrade BETA in Serbo-Croatian
1058 GMT 27 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Subotica, 27 June (BETA)—This morning a convoy of dozens of tanks, armored personnel carriers, and accompanying vehicles passed through the center of Subotica. According to eyewitness reports, the vehicles came from the direction of Sombor in the early morning hours and, with the help of the police, passed through the town in small groups or individually, in the direction of the army barracks on the way to Palic.

The demilitarization of eastern Slavonia began on 21 May and officially ended on 20 June.

Federal: Army Allegedly Under Media Embargo

AU2806100896 Belgrade NASA BORBA
in Serbo-Croatian 24 June 96 p 4

[Commentary by Vladimir Jovanovic: "Media Embargo Imposed From 'Above'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] General Momcilo Perisic generated a lot of concern when he gave the following statement on the deck of the river warship Kozara on June 10: "It is better not to say anything at all than to say something that is already known. What needs to be said would hurt many people!"

So what is it that Gen. Perisic did not say that he was (supposed) to say, and who would be hurt by such a need?

The prologue to the story begins on page four of the official magazine VOJSKA No. 200 of 6 June 1996. At the very bottom, almost unnoticed, there was an item of information that said the following: "On the occasion of 6 June—Yugoslav Army Day, Gen. Momcilo Perisic, chief of staff of the Yugoslav Army, will give an interview to the magazine VOJSKA. Because of the need to be published to coincide as closely as possible with the holiday, and due to some other technical reasons, issue number 201 will be published on Saturday 15 June instead of Thursday 13 June 1996. We ask our readers to understand the reasons for this issue's change of date."

Five days later, on Monday, 10 June, the appearance of Gen. Perisic on the deck of the Kozara before members of the press was anticipated as an interesting introduction to the announced interview; for the chief of staff of the Yugoslav Army has not made any similar public statements for two whole years—his last significant public announcement was printed on the page of POLITIKA in the middle part of 1994.

However, the general's disappointing performance on the deck of the Kozara, as it were, turned out to be a sufficiently convincing signal that things were getting slippery: Someone did not like to see any kind of military gabble about "current issues," which are clearly hard to separate from political. Optimists, nevertheless, still waited to see the announced interview in VOJSKA.

Suddenly, on Thursday, 13 June, at the regular time, a new issue of VOJSKA appeared, in spite of assurances that it would come out on Saturday, "because of the need to be published to coincide as closely as possible to the holiday."

No "technical reasons," nor any other reasons, were an obstacle to the magazine being printed and distributed at the regular time. But the important news is: The announced interview with Gen. Perisic was not published.

The other significant news in issue number 201 of the VOJSKA was that the readers were not even given any reasons as to why the interview with Gen. Perisic was not where it was supposed to be. Not did even the next, the 202d issue, give any explanations, nor, of course, did it carry the announced interview. What happened?

The relatively few observers who had been able to register this media incident with Gen. Perisic and the army magazine, are divided into two opinion groups, of which both agree that there was, and still is, a media embargo in existence, imposed from "above," against the Army Headquarters, after General Radosav Martinovic gave an interview full of intrigue to POLIS magazine earlier this month. Some statements made in this interview, will, as it turns out, additionally undermine the constructiveness of official policy toward the promises made in Dayton, which is no secret, but it is not nice when it is said publicly.

Since Gen. Martinovic is one of the closest associates of the chief of staff of the Yugoslav Army and his direct subordinate, and as such, had to get permission from Gen. Perisic to give an interview to this progovernment magazine from Podgorica, there is reason to assume that the first man in the army would have elaborated the theses from POLIS, whatever they meant. Since Gen. Martinovic said for the first time that during the previous year there was no modernization, and therefore no transformation of the Yugoslav Army, this meant that Gen. Perisic could take a more detailed interest in the state of the army that results from its status. Of course, in the planned interview with Gen. Perisic there was supposed to be talk about the army's attitude toward the Hague Tribunal, imposing a limit to the FRY's military power, etc.

The other opinion group, which relies on a more radical version, offers mainly strange coincidences. Namely, there is the unavoidable dilemma of why Gen. Perisic's planned interview to VOJSKA had to be timed to coincide so closely with the army holiday?

Two days earlier or later do not mean very much, but those inclined to believe in the conspiracy theory link the planned 15 June and the mysterious views of Gen. Perisic with the planned stay of the Serbian president in Greece and with the elections in Russia.

The second coincidence corresponds to the day of Gen. Perisic's appearance on the deck of the Kozara and relates to an unusually (pre)mature appearance of lists of newly appointed, promoted, or retired Yugoslav Army generals. And that list, again by coincidence, does not say who is the newly appointed officer replacing General Dragoljub Ojdanic as commander of the strongest strategic group (the Belgrade Army). A progovernment daily newspaper (POLITIKA), has already disclosed that Gen. Martinovic was seen as the most serious candidate for that position, but things got complicated somewhere along the way. Where?

The situation can already be diagnosed with certainty as disconcerting. The top civilian command obviously assesses that any army views, except formal statements in the presence of the supreme commander, i.e. Mr. Lilic, are not desirable. On the other hand, there is a stony silence in the Army Headquarters. Gen. Perisic's one-time close associate, retired Colonel Ljubodrag Stojadinovic, has in the meantime made efforts to shed light on the current events. "Perisic came out of the war with the aura of ambiguous honor. He stood before Milosevic with the heart of a rabbit: He was not even close to the category of men who would be able to stand up to his self-will."

"For Perisic and our society, it seems in fact, that the army is a second-rate object when it comes to the destiny of personal staff," the retired colonel said.

Serbia

Serbia: Milosevic's Office on Talks With Kornblum

AU2706144196 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 27 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Last night in Belgrade, President of Serbia Slobodan Milosevic received John Kornblum, assistant U.S. secretary of state, and his aides. The talks focused on topical issues related to the implementation of the peace agreement for Bosnia, with particular emphasis on preparations for the upcoming elections. The importance of consistent implementation of the peace agreement was stressed, being the best way to normalize the situation and relations, and to stabilize peace in the region that had been affected by the civil war. The common expectation is that setting the election date for 14 September will make it possible to enter the final stage of implementing the peace agreement. The federal foreign minister, Milan Milutinovic, also attended the talks, reads the statement issued by President Milosevic's office.

Serbia: JUL Spokesman on Role in Solving Kosovo Problem

AU2606160896 Novi Sad DNEVNIK in Serbo-Croatian 25 Jun 96 p 5

[Article by Z. Mijatovic: "JUL's Appeasing Mission"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 24 June—It is not true that the Albanians and the Serbs hate each other and that they cannot live together, but rather that the Albanian and the Serbian nationalists are locked in a fierce conflict and that is the gist of the problem. Only the left can contribute to the abatement of tensions in Kosovo, Yugoslav United Left [JUL] spokesman Aleksander Vujin, whom we asked whether the JUL had a program for the solution of the "Kosovo issue," assessed in a statement for DNEVNIK.

"JUL has a platform for the resolution of the Kosovo problem, however, this is not something that can be put on the paper just like that. JUL is aware of how great a problem Kosovo is, however, not for it as a political organization but for the state. JUL sees its role in the southern province as an appeasing and a healing one, for the simple reason that it has never soiled its hands with nationalism and has never done anything bad. The solution of the Kosovo issue is not a matter of political parties, however, but of the state and the people performing state functions. Political organizations can, with their political authority and power, influence the abatement of the situation and prevent the ugly things that happened in the past from repeating themselves in Kosovo, but it is up to the state to crush terrorism, violence, and everything that can provoke large-scale conflict on this territory."

Explaining why only the left can contribute to the abatement of the situation in Kosovo, Vujin says:

"It is easy with JUL. JUL can talk to everyone, it can find ideologically close allies in the entire nation, those who believe in the possibility of people living together, because the ideology that we espouse is not national but supranational and, by virtue of this, universal. As soon as it becomes universal, one can find ways. Approaching matters by representing only the Serbs or the Albanians, to negotiate from these position, involves certain intentions. We do not want a division, Kosovo is a part of the FRY and it shall remain so for as long as this country exists, and there can be no debate about it. JUL sees a solution in the integration of the Albanians into the political dialogue and the integration of their legal representatives into the parliament, and this will come onto the agenda."

Serbia: JUL's Markovic Views Breakup of SFRY

AU2606125096 Ljubljana PANORAMA in Slovene 7 Jun 96 pp 6-7

[Interview With Mira Markovic, Yugoslav United Left leader and wife of Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic, by Janja Klasinc; place and date not given: "Everybody Started It First"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Klasinc] How do you assess the situation in the FRY and on the entire territory of the former Yugoslavia following the Dayton agreement? Who got what and who lost what? Do you think that the Serbs are satisfied with the current division of Bosnia-Herzegovina?

[Markovic] The Dayton agreement has made it possible for the war on the territory of former Yugoslavia to end, especially in Bosnia-Herzegovina. It has also made it possible for relations among those Yugoslav peoples who were involved in the war to be dealt with in a peaceful way. Any kind of peaceful method is better than war.

As for who got and who lost something, I can only repeat my six-year-old position: All the peoples and republics of Yugoslavia have lost something with its breakup.

After the breakup of the country and the war that took place in part of the former country, in fact until a few days ago, it was most important for everyone that the war should end in all those areas where it was going on. It is important that there is a end to the fear that war will break out in areas where there has been no war and that violence and the fear of violence cease to exist.

[Klasinc] What is your relation with the Bosnia-Herzegovina Serbs?

[Markovic] I have from the outset had a negative relationship with the Bosnia-Herzegovina Serb leadership. I believed that this leadership had a nationalist policy. A nationalist policy in a multinational community can, in the best case, only lead to constant tension, and in the worst case, to violence and a civil war. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, because of the nationalist policies of all three peoples, the worst occurred: war.

[Klasinc] Has the time come for you to be able to assess the responsibility for the breakup of Yugoslavia? Who is, in your opinion, the most guilty party?

[Markovic] I gave my opinion on the responsibility for the breakup of Yugoslavia a few years ago, at the very beginning of the war. Three subjects are responsible for the breakup of Yugoslavia and for the war on its territory. Foremost, the centers of the economic and political powers outside Yugoslavia, whom the breakup of Yugoslavia greatly suited for political, geostrategic, and other reasons, in the same way as the breakup of the USSR suited them, as well as Czechoslovakia. The changes in the countries of eastern and central Europe, the countries of former socialism, have been, to a great extent, provoked by these centers of power.

The second subject is the internal forces. By this I mean the nationalist ideologists and their representatives in politics, the economy, culture, science, even in sports, which operated among all the Yugoslav peoples at the beginning of the 1990s.

The third subject is the political emigres, again from all the Yugoslav peoples. Those who had to leave the country after World War II for political reasons. They are anticommunists and nationalists. For all those years between 1945 and 1990, they carried deep within them a hatred of socialism and Yugoslavism [Jugoslovanstvo]. When they felt that danger was threatening socialism and Yugoslavism, they did everything to make this danger happen as soon as possible. Not the distant, but the near future will prove that the influence of this emigre revenge was very great at the time of the breakup of Yugoslavia.

With this I must emphasize that I had already written and spoken about these subjects of the breakup of Yugoslavia and the war in Yugoslavia in 1991 and 1992.

[Klasinc] How do you comment on the War Crimes Tribunal in The Hague seeing the greatest guilt among Serb politics at that time and the memorandum of the Serb Academy of Sciences?

[Markovic] Whenever there is a civil war in a multinational state, it is most often the case that the responsibility lies with all the peoples that are participating in it. Sometimes quite equally and sometimes the responsibilities are different. I have just told you that the responsibility for the breakup of Yugoslavia and the war within it is very universal, deep, and very, very complicated.

That is why no tribunal can assess responsibility. Its evaluation will be done by history, by the next generation. It could also be done by this generation of former Yugoslavs. This could be done at least by the intellectuals, but they are unfortunately mostly silent.

[Klasinc] Before the breakup of Yugoslavia, nationalism had greatly strengthened in all the then republics of the SFRY [Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia]. Where do you think this nationalism originated from (viewed from a geographical and sociological point of view)?

[Markovic] Viewed geographically, nationalism originated throughout the former Yugoslavia. If we view it sociologically, then in all the environments of former Yugoslavia. Unfortunately.

In the former Yugoslavia, nationalism was a kind of awful typhoon. Yugoslavia remained untouched, in the regional and social sense, in just an oasis or two. I claim, with many arguments and full responsibility, that they had to go through great troubles in the moral sense of the word and perhaps the most was suffered by those who were not nationalists. Those that did not hate others. I permit myself to claim this because I belong to just those people.

[Klasinc] Edvard Kardelj [Titoist ideologist of Slovene nationality] said back in 1952 that Slovenia would be in Yugoslavia only temporarily if relations to do with the equality of the republics are not addressed. Do you think that a confederation could have preserved Yugoslavia?

[Markovic] At the beginning of 1991, I wrote: Better a confederation than the breakup of the country or war breaking out. I am today still of this opinion. I just do not know whether, in the event of a confederation, we could have avoided all that happened in spring 1991, just a month later.

But it would seem to have been worth a try. From my point of view then and now, it would seem that anything would have been worth a try, anything in the world, just to preserve Yugoslavia and, most of all, to prevent war breaking out.

[Klasinc] How much are you satisfied with the current Yugoslavia? Is this a democratic state?

[Markovic] In the FRY, we set up a civil [mescansko] society with the adoption of the 1990 Constitution. With this Constitution, all the forms of ownership became equal and the market became the decisive administrator of economic relations and relations in society as a whole. We also introduced a multiparty system. The state took over a great deal of responsibility in the areas of politics and economics, which in the previous system belonged to self-management bodies at various levels. With the development of private ownership, the independent individual initiative achieved conditions for a visible expansion.

In Serbia alone, 118 parties were registered at the last elections. Parties of all directions operate on the territory of the FRY, from the extreme left to the extreme right. In no country, or in few counties, does the opposition have as much media space as is the case here. In Serbia alone, the opposition has over 15 daily and weekly newspapers at its disposal. The media at the disposal of the opposition in the FRY are unfortunately not used for the affirmation of their own, that is, the competitive, political, and social concept, but are abused for the primitive personal settling of accounts with representatives of the authorities and members of their families, for the expression of primitive hatred. Overall, the most negative aspects of Balkan thought have been displayed in the print media. However, regardless of their profile, the media exist and are not subject to any sanctions. Not even those which are under similar conditions used in the developed civil societies of the current world. [sentence as published] Moreover, there are not such a lot of public and completely free meetings and other public gatherings of a political nature in any European state. Strikes are free, common, and without any kind of consequences for their organizers or their participants. I even think that there is a kind of understanding and agreement among those who are on strike and the authorities. This is due to both the former and the latter. Overall, if the current Yugoslavia is viewed in terms of the understanding of a democracy in contemporary civil societies, it is very a democratic society.

[Klasinc] How do you view relations between the authorities and the opposition in Serbia? The Socialist Party of Serbia [SPS] has had, at every election since 1990 until the last, the clear support of the inhabitants of Serbia. If we view the reasons for this support, I am convinced that the party will also have significant support at the next elections. This gives the party the feeling of security in their political behavior, which is understandable. That is why I think that the opposition parties are not really of any kind of special interest to the ruling parties. Although I also do not know why they should be. The ruling party must take care of the interests of the inhabitants and the state, a responsibility that the party takes on with its assumption of power.

[Markovic] In my opinion, regarding the opposition parties, some of them do not yet have a sufficient profile. We can identify them by their leaders, whose roles are, in my opinion, not only too highly profiled, but they also have some of the characteristics of tribal leaders. With the lack of political identity, these parties are narrowing their political thought and operations to a struggle for pure power. Their platform is really only simple personal hatred toward those who are ruling. The lack of political identity and the lack of all political culture is characteristic of the right-wing political opposition in Serbia. Lacking the conditions for contemporary political operations, they are occasionally trying between elections violently to take positions that they could not win through the elections. However, even in the election campaign they have shown a tendency toward physical and verbal violence.

All this could be the expression of parliamentarianism in our environment and it could also be the face of the Balkan parliamentarianism in general. It could also be a sign of the degeneration of parliamentarianism in general and it could also be a sign of its historical end.

I think that this short outline that I have tried to give you is a result of all this together.

[Klasinc] After the latest events in Kosovo, when there were terrorist acts of Albanian extremists, there exists the possibility of a renewed increase in tension in the situation there. In your opinion, what would be a lasting solution to the Kosovo issue, and how do you assess the reaction of the Republic of Serbia toward the Kosovo region, considering that they abolished the autonomy there and introduced extraordinary measures?

[Markovic] There is a great deal of nationalism in Kosovo: Albanian, Serbian, and Montenegrin nationalism. This nationalism makes room and creates the possibility for various kinds of political manipulation. Nor should one forget that, with the traumas that the FRY has gone through (sanctions, the war in its neighborhood, the breakup of the country, refugees, etc.), there has also come about a great social polarization in Kosovo among all the people who live there, Serbs, Montenegrins, and Albanians alike. This social polarization is also a good motive for political manipulations and the provoking of conflicts and unrest.

The national and social dissatisfaction needs to be taken care of in parallel. For this to be possible, all the inhabitants of Kosovo—the Albanians, Serbs, and Montenegrins alike—need to cooperate together and equally in political life and decide equally on everything: the economy, education, science, culture, the health service, and sports. They must regulate their own lives together and equally.

The nationalists are the obstacle to this life together in equality, and they operate on all sides. Each group should get rid of its own nationalists, its own extremists. The Serbs in Kosovo must be represented by Serbs who do not hate Albanians and the Albanians in Kosovo should be represented by Albanians who do not hate Serbs. This is the path by which the conditions in Kosovo can immediately and lastingly be solved. At the moment, this solution provides a peaceful and normal life to the people who live there. It can protect them from violence, fear, and poverty. It provides them with security, as well as their economic and cultural development.

Such a policy is the basis for a lasting solution of the conditions in Kosovo. In my view, such conditions can only be provided by establishing a Balkan community of peoples. Only in such a community can the Balkan peoples protect themselves from war, violence, and conflict, and hope for economic and cultural progress. And only in such a way can each of the Balkan peoples live in one state. All the Bulgarians, all the Serbs, all the Albanians, all the Croats, all the Greeks,.... All those who today, apart from living in their own countries, live in neighboring countries as minorities, whose status is a constant source of misunderstandings and tensions between the mother country and the neighboring countries where it has its minorities.

[Klasinc] You are the head of the management of the Yugoslav United Left [JUL] movement. Who does the Yugoslav left consist of?

[Markovic] The JUL was formed on 23 July 1994 from 23 leftist and Yugoslav-oriented parties. A large number of individuals of the same orientation began to join the JUL very quickly. The number of individuals joining the JUL today is much greater than those who join collectively. This is now a movement in which the left is shown in a very broad and contemporary manner. This broad and contemporary manner in which the left orientation is being expressed or is attempting to be expressed is more of a civilizational than a political nature.

I will explain our political declaration. The JUL is against war and violence, and is for a peaceful and safe life for all the people; it is against poverty, and for wealthy and equal citizens; it is against primitivism, is therefore against nationalism and provincialism in science, art, and education, against vulgarity and nonobjectivity [neobjektivnosti] in information. However, we favor free education and the free development of science and art, and objective and polite news reporting. Finally, we are for the equality of all peoples and all the people, as a basic definition.

This platform could be political, but it could also be of a broader, civilizational nature. This platform, or any similar one, must unite not only the left in the broadest sense of the word, but all people who favor a contemporary economically and culturally developed country, the equality of peoples and people, for peace in the world.

After everything that this century has gone through at its end, I am convinced that the time has passed, at least with regard to the left, with its division into parties: communist, socialist, social democratic, and workers.' The left has passed its long and pleasant life being split into fractions and wings. I do not know whether this was really necessary or whether it was a mistake. In any case, the left must exist in the 21st century. The new left must organize itself as a civilizational movement that associates all progressive and humane people around itself. It could happen that the next century will be the first century of the left being organized in such a way.

The theoretical and value basis of such a left will of course be new, and therefore broader. This basis should be formed out of everything of a liberating manner, of an emancipating manner, that humanity has reached in its development in the fields of philosophy, religion, science, art, etc. Only a left that is understood and organized in such a way can bring a historic victory over the abuse of human labor, poverty, ignorance, centuries of nonfreedom, in which whole races, peoples, classes, and a gender have lived.

In our Balkan circumstances, such a leftist front would really be a front against fascism of the Balkan type, against an antihistorical orientation toward the distant past, which is already returning both in the material and spiritual meaning, toward primitivism and violence. The right in the Balkans is unfortunately not the bearer of the classic European spirit, but the bearer of the primitive, antihistorical, aggressive, and a kind of possible Balkan fascism, which could be worse than during World War II. The face of this possible Balkan fascism was announced by—Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[Klasinc] Where does the JUL operate in an organized manner?

[Markovic] In Serbia, with the exception of Kosovo. It is not organized even in Montenegro. We have postponed the organization of the JUL in Kosovo on purpose, and in Montenegro the authorities are causing us problems.

[Klasinc] What possibilities does the JUL have at this year's elections?

[Markovic] I do not know. We will go to the elections with our definitions. The citizens should decide for themselves who they will vote for. And they of course carry the responsibility for their decision, that is, for the destiny that their choice will bring. I greatly wish, because of the present and even more because of the future, that people would open their eyes wide at the elections. They themselves are choosing whether to live in the past or in the future, whether to live in the suburbs or in the center, whether they will be dying in war or living in peace. With any kind of pathos, in the end, the decision that they are making is whether to be excluded from history, from time, and from life. [sentence as published]

[Klasinc] I am interested in your relation toward Slovenia and the Slovenes. Throughout history there have never been any serious problems between the Serbs and the Slovenes. That is why I am interested in where you see the reason for the creation of these problems and the splitting up and how you look at the possibilities of future relations between the peoples and the states?

[Markovic] For my generation, Slovenia was, within the Yugoslav framework, the West in the civilizational meaning of the word. It was the most developed part of our country. Especially in the material aspect. And that is why we all wished Yugoslavia were like Slovenia in that sense. Slovenia had a great reputation in Yugoslavia and also in Serbia. I knew Slovenes as diligent, happy, and sophisticated people. I am of the same opinion even today. Just as I have not changed my opinion about any of the former Yugoslav peoples. I once said, and I will say the same thing 1,000 times, that we are all people and that we are quite primitive brothers. I have never had any unpleasant experiences with Slovenia or with the Slovenes. On the contrary.

Everyone more or less started the conflict that took place among the Yugoslav peoples together. Each contributed the same, and more or less responded similarly. I will never accept the theory that someone started first. EVERYONE STARTED IT FIRST. [sentence in upper case as published]

I am convinced that when this fire, that burned down Yugoslavia, dies down, a process of restoring trade, transportation, cultural, sports, economic, financial, political, friendly, and human ties will begin among the former Yugoslav peoples—and in this regard also between Slovenia and Serbia. We shall see what the result will be like. I think that it will be large and precious for one and the other, as well as for everyone.

All the former Yugoslav nations would, because of their greatness and common level of development, find it difficult to live independently and be free and safe at the same time.

[Klasinc] What do you say to the common comments in the current Yugoslavia press that you and your husband rule Serbia?

[Markovic] My husband, as president of Serbia, makes decisions within the framework of his jurisdiction and the responsibility that derives from this. As for myself, I do not make any decisions. I do not even make those decisions that I should make. I am one of those people who generally find it difficult to make decisions and need to consult others when making a decision. Especially people that are close to them. I am otherwise one of those people who have a developed sense of the democratic. I greatly consider other people's opinions and feelings and believe that everything that one does, one should decide upon together with those one works with.

What is possible is my influence upon others. Just as the influence of other people upon myself is possible. We cannot exclude mutual influence in any social environment, especially not among intellectuals. I do not at all hide the desire to influence others. Just as I do not conceal the content of this influence. The very fact that I often appear in public, along with my position, proves that I wish to influence the public. If I have, with my influence, contributed to the policy of peace, equality among peoples, tolerance, links to the world, and the understanding of politics to promote the economic and cultural development of society, then I do not need to hide my influence. I would permit myself not to be humble, if I were satisfied with my influence. But not because of myself, but because of others. Because of those whom I have strengthened a little in their conviction that a world, in which they will live like people is possible.

Serbia: Seselj Supports Karadzic 'in Everything'

LD2706155796 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1419 GMT 27 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 27 June (SRNA)—Vojislav Seselj, chairman of the Serbian Radical Party (SRS), said today that he supported Radovan Karadzic, president of the Serb Republic, in everything he does and he strongly opposed "all attacks on Karadzic in the work that he carries out."

Seselj said at a regular news conference that "the SRS is prepared to withdraw its candidate in the forthcoming elections in the Serb Republic and Croat-Muslim Federation if Karadzic does decide to run as candidate."

"We condemn the joint statement of Lilic, Milosevic, and Bulatovic directed at the Serb Republic presidency, in which they call for capitulation to the demands of the great powers," Seselj said and added: "This is flagrant interference in the internal affairs of the Serb Republic and may boomerang back against the FRY."

Serbia: Balkan Center To Study Local Self-Rule

LD2706155896 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1530 GMT 27 Jun 96

["Balpool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Nis, June 27 (TANJUG)—The Balkan Centre for Local Self-Rule was founded in the eastern Serbian town of Nis on Thursday [27 June].

The centre would get together all Balkan national and higher educational institutions engaged in studies of local self-rule.

The unique institution of its kind in the Balkans appointed Professor Dontcho Khrusanov, dean of the Sofia University School of Law, as chairman of its assembly, and Mile Ilic, president of the City of Nis Development Council, as its director.

The centre, according to the statue it adopted, would publish a periodical dedicated to local self-rule and would organize meetings on self-rule questions generally related to the Balkan countries.

Ilic stated that the goal of the centre would be to help exchange scientific achievements between the Balkan countries and experience in the legislative field related to questions of local rule.

Serbia: Policy Toward Bulgarian Minority Lauded

LD2806152096 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1356 GMT 28 Jun 96

["Balpool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Bosilegrad, June 28 (TANJUG)—Raycho Milev, publicist from Bulgaria, pointed out that Serbia is financing the preservation of the personality of the Bulgarian minority, in observance of the national and human rights of its citizens.

Writing in the first issue of the periodical VOICE OF BULGARIANS IN SERBIA, published by the ethnographic association from Bosilegrad, a city in south-east Serbia, Milev assessed that conditions had been created for members of the Bulgarian ethnic minority in Serbia to feel spiritually and politically equal with the Serbs.

Milev based his conclusion on the achievements of institutions in the fields of education, information and culture, which have been formed for the needs of the Bulgarian minority and which are financed by the Serbian authorities.

He said that at the pedagogical academy in Vranje, there is a department for the training of teachers in the Bulgarian language, and at the Belgrade University a department for Bulgarian philology.

The minority, Milev noted, has developed information media in its language: Television Serbia broadcasts weekly news and Radio Nis a daily information program in Bulgarian, and the news publishing house Bratstvo publishes a newspaper, a literary review and a periodical for children.

All that is the result of a consistent policy and there hasn't been a single disputable situation, he pointed out and added that a "spiritual closeness and many mixed marriages have cemented the connection between Bulgarians and Serbs."

Milev pointed out that no one had the right to separate Bulgarians ethnically from the serbian people or to separate them geographically, because Serbia is territorially united, and such divisions would be nothing else than separatism.

Montenegro

Montenegro: President, French Envoy on Improved Relations

LD2706152396 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1503 GMT 27 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Podgorica, June 27 (TANJUG)—Montenegrin President Momir Bulatovic and the ambassador of France to Yugoslavia, Gabriel Keller, said here on Thursday that significant advancement had been made in the realization of a certain number of key provisions of the Dayton peace agreement.

Bulatovic and Keller said that this has lifted the serious obstacles to the speedy and successful implementation of the civilian component of the Dayton agreement and surmounted one of the critical stages of the peace process in Bosnia, the Montenegrin president's Cabinet said.

Bulatovic and Keller expressed mutual satisfaction over the visible intensification and promotion of political relations between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and France which has created the necessary conditions for the improvement and spreading of cooperation in all other spheres.

Montenegro: Commission Reaches No Conclusions on Abductions

LD2706155296 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1449 GMT 27 Jun 96

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Podgorica, Yugoslavia, June 27 (TANJUG)—The Montenegrin parliamentary commission supervising the investigation into the abduction of 19 passangers on the Belgrade-Bar railway line three years ago has completed work without producing any definitive conclusion as to their whereabouts and fate.

The commission's final report was on Thursday submitted to the parliament of that Yugoslav republic.

It has been established that a group of 19 Serbian and Montenegrin inhabitants was abducted from the train at the railway station in the eastern Bosnian town of Strpci, the commission said. it expressed a reserve, however, as to the final number of the abducted persons.

The multi-party parliament commission, set up at the end of 1993, has addressed a number of institutions in quest of information relevant to the case.

Unfortunately, apart from persons representing the families of the abducted people and some parliament members, almost nobody showed readiness to present the needed information, the commission said.

The Montenegrin Interior Ministry has failed to respond to many concrete questions and initiatives, the commission said and requested that the republican government inquire into its work on the case.

It also said it had documents identifying three of the abductors, as well as the names of four other suspected persons.

The commission did not give the names of those persons.

Commenting the commission's report, Montenegrin President Momir Bulatovic said that Montenegrin bodies had tried to do everything possible under the given circumstance.

"We tried to get a definitive information and, with military operations going on, to at least pay for their release," he said.

Bulatovic expressed regret that the tragedy is used for making attacks on Montenegrin authorities and for political disputes.

Montenegro: Bulatovic Admits Offering Money for Abductees

AU2806074496 Belgrade DNEVNI TELEGRAF in Serbo-Croatian 27 Jun 96 p 3

[Unattributed report: "We Offered To Buy Those Kidnapped in Strpci From the Serb Republic, but We Received No Reply"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Momir Bulatovic voiced "his deepest sympathy with the families of the kidnapped passengers in Strpci," emphasizing that the "state leadership has done everything within its power to find out what happened to them."

"We even offered to buy these people off, which, to tell the truth, was an ugly practice during the war," Bulatovic said. "On several occasions the Montenegrin state leadership officially and unofficially turned to the Serb Republic leadership, however, we never got any reply," Bulatovic said.

Montenegro: TANJUG Reports on Bulatovic Interview

LD2706164896 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1459 GMT 27 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Prague, June 27 (TANJUG)—President Momir Bulatovic of the Yugoslav Republic of Montenegro said in an interview to Prague-based Radio Free Europe that Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic was persistently refusing to do that to which he had obliged himself by accepting the Dayton peace acords.

That is why we had to show our resolve that we shall try to discredit him using political means, Bulatovic said in an interview which Radio Free Europe will broadcast over the next few days.

Bulatovic was asked to say what Yugoslavia would do if Karadzic continued to refuse to step down.

As you know, Yugoslavia has no army or police in Republika Srpska, so that we cannot apply any measures of repression. We have only political means in our hands and we shall use them, said Bulatovic.

Karadzic can only go on deluding himself that he is the most popular politician. There are major political figures and strong political forces in Republika Srpska which could without a doubt and very clearly, with our support, slightly shake him in that belief, Bulatovic said.

Asked if Belgrade and Podgorica would extradite three Yugoslav citizens, former Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) officers, to the international tribunal for war crimes, Bulatovic said the issue was too sensitive to deserve a simple yes or no answer.

However, he said, Yugoslavia wants its officers to be tried in a national court, with respect for procedure and Hague tribunal representatives at the trial.

Bulatovic said a solution to the problem of Prevlaka, a strategic premontory on the border between Yugoslavia and Croatia, was the main precondition for a wider normalization of relations between Belgrade and Zagreb.

Bulatovic said Montenegro had returned to Croatia all the cultural treasures taken during the fighting around Dubrovnik.

Speaking about relations within Yugoslavia, he said Montenegro's strategic option was a modern federation with Serbia, but without any enforced solutions.

Montenegro: Opposition Leader Sends Message to Karadzic

LD2706141496 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1126 GMT 27 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Podgorica, 27 Jun (SRNA)—Novak Kilibarda, chairman of the People's Party of Montenegro (NS CG), has said in a telegram to Dr Radovan Karadzic, Serb Republic president and chairman of the Serb Democratic Party (SDS), that he believes that the electoral assembly of the SDS will "reach its decisions in line with the most fundamental interests of the Serb nation as a whole as well as the vital needs of the Serb Republic."

In his message of greetings to the SDS on behalf of himself and the NS CG, Kilibarda expressed the belief that the past period "which will unfortunately always be marked by the unprecedented blockade on the Drina river, will be an important experience which will broadly guide the cooperation between the SDS and the Serb Republic, Montenegro, and the FRY."

"I believe we are bound to recall, today more than ever before, our wise teacher Jovan Raskovic [founding member of SDS] and his words that the Serb question is a democratic question. Remain committed to that principle and preserve your faith, tradition, and family as the sources of the values of our nation," Kilibarda's telegram says.

Montenegro: Serbian Assembly Party Greets Karadzic

LD2806132096 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1245 GMT 28 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Podgorica, 28 Jun (SRNA)—The founding assembly of the Serbian Assembly Party (SSS) was held in Podgorica today. Mr. Mitar Cvorovic, a professor at Podgorica university and a former prominent member of the People's Party (NS) of Montenegro, was elected as its chairman.

It was said at the founding assembly that the just formed SSS is a parliamentary party because it has three federal deputies, including, certainly the most well-known deputy, Momir Vojvodic, who is also a former member of the NS.

The basic aim of the SSS, according to Cvorovic, is "to strengthen the fatherland of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which will very soon be joined, as an equal member of the federation, by the young state of the Serb Republic, which won its statehood heroically in a war." [passage omitted]

Fraternal greetings were sent by the SSS founding assembly to Dr. Radovan Karadzic, president of the Serb Republic, and to the assembly of the Serb Democratic Party, which is meeting in Pale today. The greetings' message expressed the hope that its work would be successful and fruitful for the Serb Republic and the Serb people as a whole.

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